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 This thesis examines the question of Canadian domestic, and international, rights 
and obligations owed to individuals detained by Ships of the Royal Canadian Navy in a 
selection of contemporary naval operations.  The thesis discusses the underlying lawful 
authority for these operations as well as the international law affecting the maritime 
environment.  Next the thesis reviews extra-territorial extension of a State’s jurisdiction 
and the rights and international and Canadian State obligations triggered when an 
individual is detained together with issues arising from breaches of these rights and 
obligations.  Legal issues found in maritime operations are then analyzed in contrast to 
the robust legal discussion surrounding land operations involving detention of individuals 
and attendant human right’s concerns.  The thesis concludes by re-conceptualizing naval 
operations in light of State border and frontier zone legal principles and concludes by 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
Canada has the longest coastline in the world
1
 and is actively engaged in the 
maritime environment.
2
  As one of the community of nations using the world’s oceans, 
Canada maintains the Royal Canadian Navy (the “RCN”), both for self-defence and to 
conduct foreign and domestic missions in the national interest.  This spectrum of 
missions extends to deployments into international and even foreign State waters as part 
of Canada’s contribution to United Nations-sanctioned actions, working with allies to 
combat transnational crimes,
3
 and crests in missions involving international armed 
conflict.   
Throughout the spectrum of RCN operations Her Majesty’s Canadian (“HMC”) 
Ships may be required to stop other vessels, and potentially seize and detain individuals.  
What then are the legal issues faced in this eventuality, and in particular what rights and 
obligations are triggered for Canada and the individuals involved?  Are these rights and 
obligations simply elements of Canadian domestic law arising from the Charter
4
 and set 
out within Canadian statute and common law, or are they imposed by international law, 
or both?  Further, to what extent do domestic or international laws engage state 
                                                 
1 Hugh Kindred & Phillip Saunders, eds., International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in 
Canada, 7th ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2006) at 921. 
2 R.R. Churchill & A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3d ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1999) at 178 (Table 1, Leading EEZ Beneficiaries.  Canada ranked ninth in the world for the size of 
her EEZ in 1992), at 280 (Table 4, Catches of the twenty leading fishing States.  Canada is 20th in 
average annual catch in the 1993-5 period). 
3 Robert J. Currie, International and Transnational Criminal Law, (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2010) at 
15 where he cites  Neil Boister’s description of transnational criminal law as encompassing “the 
indirect suppression by international law through domestic penal law of criminal activities that have 
actual or potential trans-boundary effects”. 
4 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 




responsibility, individual liability of State agents, or both, with regard to any failure to 
safeguard the rights owed to detainees or to observe obligations imposed on States in 
these situations?   
These questions frame this thesis, set against the complex legal reality of the 
maritime environment and within the context of a select number of contemporary 
operations currently conducted by the RCN.  Unlike the rest of the Westphalian world,
5
 
divided into Nations entitled to almost exclusive legal jurisdiction within their territorial 
borders, the legal seascape of the world’s oceans is vastly different.  Away from the 
shores of every coastal State the domestic law of that State begins to erode, moving from 
the relatively narrow expanse of maximum coastal State jurisdiction within internal 
waters to the Territorial Sea, through the Contiguous and Exclusive Economic Zones and 
then the Continental Shelf – all ending at the legally complex environment of the High 
Seas or Mare Liberum, where States exercise limited jurisdiction.
6
  Within the context of 
contemporary RCN operations, such questions, involving the interplay of domestic law 
and international human rights law, have not yet been addressed by Canadian courts and 
jurists, unlike other jurisdictions, including the U.K. and Denmark
7
.  These questions are 
                                                 
5 Supra note 2 at 4, describing the evolution of international law through the lens of European State 
relations and commonly attributed to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which marked the end of 140 
years of cyclical, religiously fueled conflicts that had plagued Europe and paved the way for the 
modern creation and acceptance of sovereign nation-States. 
6 Ibid at 4-5 describing the evolution of the law of the sea based upon the concept of Mare Liberum as 
proposed by Hugo Grotius in a pamphlet published in 1609.   
7 Douglas Guilfoyle, “Counter-piracy law enforcement and human rights” (2010) I.C.L.Q., 59(1), 141-
169.  At 141-142 he describes the HMS CUMBERLAND who on 12 November 2008 boarded a 
suspected pirate vessel to discover Yemeni fishermen being held by the Somali pirates.  Rather than 
simply release the pirates they were transferred to Kenya for prosecution, raising questions of 
international human rights not only in the approach, hailing, boarding and detention actions by the 
warship but also the subsequent transfer.  The issue of transfer was also described in the 2008 
incident involving the Danish warship ABSALON who was compelled to free suspected pirates 




also distinct from those raised during operations conducted during international armed 
conflicts, which involves International Humanitarian Law, largely codified in the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and particularly Geneva Convention III with regards to POWs,
8
 
Geneva Convention IV protecting civilians in time of war,
9
 and the Additional Protocols I 
and II (AP II focusing on protections for victims in non-international armed conflicts).
10
     
This thesis will examine the various rights and obligations triggered upon the 
detention of individuals in a selection of contemporary operations conducted by the RCN, 
and their likely operational consequences.  I will show that this particular issue imports 
considerations not previously examined by Canadian courts and as a result differs from 
the approach that has been taken towards similar situations in the context of Canadian 
land combat operations or law enforcement actions occurring within the territory of other 
nations.  As a result, a blended approach borrowing from recognized principles, 
international tribunals and Canadian jurisprudence is suggested, which would provide 
both a measure of certainty for Canadian naval commanders and sailors as well as 
safeguard the rights of detainees. 
This examination will commence in Chapter One, with a description of those 
contemporary RCN missions that will form the focus of this study.  The missions 
examined will be limited to a select number which share a number of common themes.  
                                                 
8 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 
75U.N.T.S. 135 (“Geneva Convention III”). 
9 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 5U.N.T.S. 127 (“Geneva Convention IV”).  
10 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of  12 August1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (“AP I”); and Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 




First, they all involve missions outside of those involving international or non-
international armed conflict and thus governed by International Humanitarian Law.
11
  
Second, the missions highlighted are all commonly engaged in by the RCN, although 
they have received little judicial or academic scrutiny.  
Chapter Two will briefly discuss the international law engaged by this 
examination.  This will begin with a general review of the sources of international law 
followed by the international law governing jurisdiction over the maritime environment.   
Next I will canvass the international law specifically engaged by the contemporary 
operations under review and in particular those laws pertaining to detention of 
individuals, followed by consideration of rights owed to detainees, and other obligations 
imposed upon the detaining States.  Lastly I will cover legal remedies available at 
international law to aggrieved individuals and States where obligations are breached.   
Chapter Three will focus on the relevant Canadian legal landscape, first by 
examining how international law and corresponding obligations are imported into 
Canadian domestic law.  Next I will review the legal authority that supports the conduct 
of maritime operations, as well as the Canadian Charter and its impact on this question, 
together with the domestic law permitting the detention of individuals in the first place.  I 
will then review Canadian federal legislation that could impact upon the question of 
detainee rights, followed by a discussion of the potential liabilities, both civil and 
criminal, that could arise should detainee rights not be adequately observed. 
                                                 
11 Leslie Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict 2nd ed. (Manchester University Press, 2000) 
at 30 where he outlines a series of national codes, and within the writings of acknowledged 
international law authorities, as comprising the customary international law of armed conflict 




Chapter Four will provide a more detailed analysis, based upon the previous three 
chapters, of applicable Canadian and International Human Rights Law as informed by the 
naval operations contemplated within this thesis and will propose a way to view these 
rights and obligations in the maritime environment by analogy to a State’s frontier zones.  
Lastly, in Chapter Five I will conclude by outlining a number of proposed approaches 
applicable to contemporary RCN operations, based on Canadian and international law 
and my foregoing analysis.  
Ultimately I hope to provide a “fix on the chart” based on these naval operations 
together with a recommended “course to steer” in order to avoid the hazards of detaining 
individuals without a proper look-out for their rights and the corresponding obligations 
imposed on Canada and RCN personnel.  I will also demonstrate that concerns for 
maritime detainee rights and corresponding obligations should be more fully examined 
and recognized, at the same time illuminating the practical issues which should be 
considered.  This proactive approach is suggested in order to avoid any potential “chilling 
effect”
12
 on Canada’s desire to participate in contemporary naval operations should 
detainee rights not be observed.  It is hoped that the outcome of this work will assist in 
guiding the RCN, and HMC Ship’s commanders and sailors, into safe waters while 
conducting these important maritime operations. 
                                                 
12 John Bellinger, Vijay Padmanabhan, “Detention Operations in Contemporary Conflicts: Four 
Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and other Existing Law” (2011) 105 Am.J.Int’l L. 201 at p.201, 
citing Jakob Kellenberger, Official Statement of the ICRC: Strengthening Legal Protection for Victims 




CHAPTER 2: INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY NAVAL 
OPERATIONS 
 
 Current operations of the RCN range across a wide spectrum, the most benign 
involving “flag waving” visits to foreign States and exercising with foreign allies.  RCN 
Ships are also active in sailing in support of other governmental departments (“OGD”), 
assisting them to achieve their mandates.  These missions are most commonly in support 
of those OGDs who lead the mission, but RCN support missions for OGDs could be 
conducted under distinct legal authority provided within the National Defence Act itself.
13
 
Within the context of contemporary operations, however, RCN Ships are most commonly 
deployed on international operations, normally in support of and under the authority of 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions (“UNSCR”s) or other bilateral or 
multilateral agreements, as a part of international coalitions.
14
      
 This chapter examines a number of specific contemporary missions short of 
armed conflict, together with their underlying legal authorities.  This review will begin 
with missions in support of OGDs, and conducted under a variety of domestic legal 
authorities.  Next I will examine contemporary counter-narcotics operations, which draw 
their legal authority from both domestic and international law, followed by an outline of 
counter-piracy operations, which again find their basis in both Canadian and international 
law.  Lastly, I will describe those elements common to all three of these types of 
                                                 
13 National Defence Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. N-5) at Art. 273.6(2), Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies 
is one such example. 
14 Chris Madsen, Military Law and Operations, loose-leaf (consulted on 24 July 2013), (Toronto: 
Thomson Reuters Canada Ltd., 2013) vol 1, ch 5 at 12-13 discussing sovereignty missions, 13-14 
continental defence, 16-17 evacuation of nationals, 17-18 humanitarian relief, 18-20Peace keeping, 




maritime operations, a categorization which will be subsequently used in the analysis of 
international and domestic human rights and obligations engaged.  While these missions 
are not at the core of the RCN’s mandate to defend Canada and Canadian sovereignty 
they do form the bulk of operations conducted by the RCN in the current era, and both by 
their prevalence and the importance of the human rights issues engaged, demand that 
such an analysis be conducted.  
2.1 Support to Other Government Departments 
 
 Through the Canada First Defence Strategy the Canadian Government has given 
the Canadian Armed Forces (“CAF”), including the RCN, the primary goals of defending 
Canada and North America, and contributing to international peace and security – with 
the additional requirement to support OGDs exercising leadership responsibilities within 
their own spheres.
 15
  This provision of assistance to OGDs normally involves military 
elements taking a support role by providing manpower, equipment and expertise, but 
acting under the overall leadership – and statutory authority – of the lead OGD.
16
  These 
RCN ships are acting largely pursuant to domestic statutory authorities, and it is in this 
capacity that they can expect to be most frequently employed.  Such operations see RCN 
ships used as “taxis” for OGDs to enable them to operate on the high seas or within 
Canadian internal waters and territorial zones, over extended distances and for extended 
periods, or possibly providing the OGDs with the support of military technology and 
                                                 
15 Canada First Defence Strategy (Online: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-
premier/June18_0910_CFDS_english_low-res.pdf).   The Canada First Defence Strategy is a 
government issued platform outlining the modernization of the CAF and sets out a strategy based on 
future requirements, risks and threats facing Canada. 




expertise not otherwise available.
17
  On rare occasions the RCN could be tasked to act as 
the lead agency in such a request,
18
 but this is a relatively infrequent possibility for the 
RCN.  I will therefore begin by discussing contemporary operations in direct support of 
OGDs, followed by an overview of possible domestic operations involving the RCN as 
the lead agency. 
2.1.1  Support to Domestic Criminal Law Enforcement  Constitutional authority for 
Canadian criminal law flows from subsection 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867
19
 as a 
responsibility reserved for the federal government, and has been legislated primarily 
within the Criminal Code.
20
  While enforcement of Canadian criminal law is to a large 
extent constitutionally assigned to provincial jurisdiction,
 21
 the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police (“RCMP”)
22
 as a federal department is authorized to enforce Canadian federal 
laws and, where an arrangement to provide these services exist, provincial laws.
23
  
Enforcement of Canada’s criminal law is normally limited to Canadian territory,
24
 
                                                 
17 Supra note 14 vol 1, ch 5 at 2. 
18 Supra note 13.   
19 Supra note 21 at s.91(27). 
20 Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985,c. C-46.  While not exhaustive, additional criminal offences are also set 
out within the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, (S.C. 1996, c. 19), the Fisheries Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 
F-14, the Oceans Act (S.C. 1996, c. 31) and the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, (S.C. 
2000, c. 24).  
21 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Victoria, c.3. at s.92(14). 
22 Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. R-10) at art. 3 and 4. 
23 Ibid at art 18 and 20. 
24 Supra note 20  (Criminal Code) s.6.2, providing that no person shall be convicted of an offence 
committed “outside Canada”.  This is mirrored in the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21 at s.8(1) 
which states “Every enactment applies to the whole of Canada, unless a contrary intention is 




legislatively defined to include Canada’s internal waters and territorial sea.
25
  Additional 
powers of arrest and seizure exist in the contiguous zone but are specific to customs, 
fiscal, immigration or sanitary law where the offence occurred in or is reasonably 
believed will occur in Canada.
26
  As well, prescriptive and enforcement jurisdictional 
authority over some criminal acts is provided out to the limits of Canada’s Exclusive 
Economic Zone (“EEZ”) and continental shelf for offences related to those areas.
27
 
Despite this, law enforcement operations have been conducted beyond this limit and on 
the high seas,
28
 and could conceivably involve the domestic prosecution of pirates
29
 in a 
                                                 
25 Ibid (Interpretation Act) s.35 referring to Oceans Act supra note 20 at art. 4 -7 where the territorial 
sea is defined as the waters off Canada measured from the low water line or baseline, as will be 
further described in this paper.   
26 Supra note 20 (Oceans Act) art 11-12, thus providing preventative criminal law enforcement 
powers throughout the contiguous zone, which extends from the territorial sea out to a distance of 
24 miles. 
27 Ibid (Criminal Code) at art 477.1 extending criminal jurisdiction over offences committed within 
and in relation to the Canadian EEZ  by a Canadian citizen or permanent resident; above and in 
relation to the Canadian continental shelf; on board or via a Canadian flagged vessel; outside Canada 
and in relation to hot pursuit; or outside the territory of any State by a Canadian citizen.  Criminal 
jurisdiction is extended for offences on or under a marine installation attached/anchored on the 
continental shelf at art 477.1(b) and the Oceans Act, ibid, art 20. 
28 Once such operation, OP CHABANEL, occurred in April and May of 2006 and saw HMCS 
FREDERICTON support an RCMP counter-drug operation to “buy” drugs on the high seas off the coast 
of Africa.  FREDERICTON then shadowed the transiting ship to Canada for protection of the RCMP 
involved.  As a federal law enforcement task, such a request could have been made pursuant to supra 
note 13 s.273.6(2) as in the national interest and the matter could not be effectively dealt with except 
with the assistance of the CAF.   The RCMP remained the lead agency in this law enforcement 
operation, and as such retained primary responsibility for the lawfulness of the seizure and detention 
of the suspected smugglers, drugs and the vessel involved.  See Darlene Blakeley, Royal Canadian 
Navy Operations & Exercises, Domestic Operations:  Successful counter-drug operation nets 
prestigious award (29 October 2007) (Online: http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms/4/4-
a_eng.asp?id=632).  Additional jurisdiction is provided with relation to offences committed beyond 
Canada but onboard a Canadian ship [477.1(c)], in the course of hot pursuit [477.2], and committed 
outside any State by a Canadian [477.1(e)],  
29 Supra note 20 (Criminal Code) at s.74-75, prohibiting piracy defined as “any act that, by the law of 
nations, is piracy” committed in or out of Canada and piratical acts while in or out of Canada but in 
relation to a Canadian ship.   Given the definition of piracy found within UNCLOS as a codification of 





Canadian exercise of universal jurisdiction, as will be described later.  Throughout many 
of these legislated authorities additional requirements also exist, such as the requirement 
for the Attorney General of Canada’s consent within eight days of commencement of 
proceedings.
30
  These additional requirements are beyond the scope of this paper, but do 
underscore the complicated nature of enforcing Canadian domestic law outside of 
Canada’s territorial limits. 
The CAF do not have a law enforcement mandate, but a number of domestic legal 
authorities do permit the CAF to provide support to Canadian law enforcement efforts.  
Under the Emergencies Act,
31
 the Governor in Council has the authority to direct “any 
person or a class of persons” in the event of a spectrum of emergencies, which could 
include law enforcement activities and the CAF as a “class of persons”.  The National 
Defence Act (“NDA”)
32
 also provides a number of mechanisms for CAF law enforcement 
assistance, including at part VI dealing with “Aid of the Civil Power”, which requires the 
Chief of Defence Staff to call out such part of the CAF as necessary at the request of a 
provincial Attorney General to deal with riots or disturbances of the peace beyond the 
                                                 
30 Ibid (Criminal Code) at s. 477.1 where offences are alleged within the EEZ, against marine 
installations attached or anchored to the continental shelf, onboard or by means of a Canadian 
registered ship, with regards to hot pursuit or outside of any State territory by a Canadian citizen.   S. 
477.2 describes the need for consent of the Attorney General within eight days  after proceedings are 
commenced. 
31 Emergencies Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 22.  Public welfare emergencies (of a natural disaster nature) are 
defined and authority to provide direction are found at part I; public order emergencies (involving 
threats to national security) are found at part II; international emergencies (involving Canada and 
one or more other countries, involving force or threat of force amounting to a national emergency) 
are found at part III; war emergency (war or armed conflict involving Canada or an allied nation) is 
found at part IV.  




capability of civil authorities to adequately address.
33
  Assistance to law enforcement is 
further authorized by the NDA
34
 and provided for in a number of additional instruments 
including orders in council
35
 and memoranda of understanding (“MOU”)
36
 in instances 
where requested support is done on a regular, or not infrequent, basis.
37
   
2.1.2  Support to the Department of Fisheries  Canada supports a robust fishing 
industry, making use of the right to exclusively regulate this living resource out to a limit 
set under international and domestic law, which will be more fully discussed in 
subsequent chapters.  Canada is also a member of a number of regional fisheries 
management organizations (RFMOs), organized “to co-operate in managing the high-seas 
fishery for certain stocks in a defined area”.
38
    Maintaining watch over these fisheries 
                                                 
33 Ibid, at part VI.  The CDS “shall” call out such part of the CAF as he considers necessary, with 
consultation of the attorney general and direction from the Minister of National Defence, based upon 
the provincial assessment for which no authority is provided to dispute.  Examples of use include the 
FLQ crisis in 1970 and Oka crisis in 1990 (supra note 14 at vol 1, ch 5 at 11 – 12). 
34 Ibid at s.273.6(2) for assistance to law enforcement when in the national interest and beyond civil 
means to control. Canadian Forces Armed Assistance Directions, P.C. 1993-624. 
35 P.C. 1996-833, Canadian Forces Assistance to Provincial Police Forces Directions (June 4, 1996) for 
military assistance to provincial and territorial law enforcement, and P.C. 1993-624 Canadian Forces 
Armed Assistance Directions (30 March 1993) for military assistance to the RCMP where required in 
the national interest and follows a graduated scale of support ranging from the loan of  personnel and 
/ or non-operational equipment to supporting through operational equipment and personnel where 
a disturbance of the peace is beyond civilian capacity to address.  
36 Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (“DAOD”) 7014-0 Memoranda of Understanding 
(MoU), for example Memorandum of Understanding between the Canadian Forces and Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police Concerning Drug Law Enforcement (January 20, 2005). 
37 Supra note 14 at vol 1, ch 5 p. 5.  MoU set out the “terms and procedures by which the [CF] 
provides support outside its normal range of activities, including such things as an allocated number 
of days for the use of military platforms such as warships and aircraft, the rates and ceilings for 
recoverable costs, and precedence in operational matters”. 
38 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1883 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter 
UNCLOS] at art. 117 and 118, and the United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 34 ILM 
1542 (1995); 2167 UNTS 88 (UN Fish Stocks Agreement) at art 8-13 set out the basis for RFMOs, and 
requires States to take measures or cooperate with others in conservation of high seas living 




areas is the responsibility of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (“DFO”)
39
 and is 
frequently accomplished in partnership with elements of the CAF and in particular the 
RCN.
40
  Ongoing operations such as Op DRIFTNET
41
 see the close collaboration 
between the DFO and RCN to combat ‘illegal, unreported or unregulated’ (“IUU”)
42
 
fishing, and create the possibility that during any such operation a person may be 
detained within Canada’s EEZ.  Actions taken under these authorities are permitted under 
both domestic and international law
43
 and normally will be limited to boarding and 
inspection of ship documents, with more restrictive detentions taken in only the most 
serious cases.  Such patrols are normally conducted with Canadian fisheries officers 
                                                                                                                                                 
Organization (NAFO), the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), the International 
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation 
Organization (NASCO), the North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission (NPAFC) and the Western 
and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC).   
39 Department of Fisheries and Oceans Act, (R.S.C., 1985, c.F-15) art. 4 and Supra note 20 (Oceans Act) 
at art. 40. 
40 Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the Canadian 
Forces Respecting Surface Ship Patrols and Aerial Fisheries Surveillance (May 13, 1994). 
41 Op DRIFTNET is the Canadian contribution as a member of the North Pacific Anadromous Fish 
Commission, the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission and the North Pacific Coast 
Guard Forum, and involves RCAF aircraft patrolling for illegal fishing activities using driftnets 
prohibited under the UN global moratorium on high seas driftnet use.  (Online:  http://www.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/media/npress-communique/2010/hq-ac53-eng.htm).  
42 W. Edeson, “The international plan of action on illegal unreported and unregulated fishing:  the 
legal context of a non-legally binding instrument” (2001) 16 IJMCL 603 at 605. 
43 Canadian domestic jurisdiction to prosecute offences within the EEZ is provided at supra note 20 
(Criminal Code) s. 477.1(1) over every person committing an act or omission that if committed in 
Canada would be contrary to a federal law, in relation to exploring or exploiting, conserving or 
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living.  As well, various instruments permitted 
under RFMO agreements (see supra note 38) such as the NAFO Conservation and Enforcement 
Measures, NAFO FC Doc. 13/1 Serial No. N6131 provide for inspection and limited enforcement 




embarked, who exercise DFO jurisdiction to conduct the required boarding, search and, if 
required, seizure for violations.
44
   
 One such example of this synergistic RCN support to a DFO operation was 
Operation OCEAN VIGILANCE, conducted from 1995 – 1997.
45
  This operation saw up 
to five RCN ships take part in what became known as the “Turbot Dispute” between 
Canada and the European Union over alleged over-fishing of the turbot species by 
Spanish fishing ships.
46
  The operation culminated in the much publicized boarding and 
seizure of the “ESTAI”, a Spanish deep-sea fishing trawler allegedly engaged in IUU 
fishing
47
 within the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (“NAFO”) Regulatory 
Area.
48
  Although no RCN Ships were directly involved in any boarding or seizure 
activity on that occasion, the possibility existed that such action could have been taken.
49
   
                                                 
44 See for example National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “DFO recognizes HMCS Summerside for 
stellar role providing CF support to fisheries patrols” (16 May 2012) (Online: http://www.cjoc-
coic.forces.gc.ca/fs-ev/2012/05/20120516-eng.asp).   Boarding and evidence gathering are provided 
for at international law in supra note 38 (UN Fish Stocks Agreement) art 21-22. 
45 Operations & Exercises, Background Summaries:  Summary:  Operation OCEAN VIGILANCE (1995-
1997) (Online:  http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms/4/4-a_eng.asp?id=508).  
46 Ibid. 
47 Pereira v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FC 1011 (CanLII) (“Pereira v. Canada”) paras 1-17. 
48 Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 1135 UNTS 369; 
34 ILM 1452 (1995).   
49 In Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), 1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec. 4) Canada was taken to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) by Spain over this matter for serious infringement of a right 
deriving from its sovereign status, namely exclusive jurisdiction over vessels flying its flag on the 
high seas (para 10), while Canada raised the issue of fishing, conservation and management of 
fisheries resources within the NAFO Regulatory Area and denied the ICJ had no jurisdiction over the 
matter (para 12).  In a majority decision the ICJ held it was without jurisdiction to hear the matter 
(para 88).  Within Canadian jurisprudence, allegations of Charter rights violations were made in Jose 
Pereira E Hijos, S.A. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1996 CanLII 4098 (FC), [1997] 2 FC 84 including 
s.10(b) the right to counsel without delay and s.15 equality.  All claims for Charter breaches were 
subsequently dropped or ruled against (see Pereira v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FC 1011 
(CanLII) and Canada (Procureur général) v. Hijos, 2007 FCA 20 (CanLII)); however the court left open 
for another day the possibility that such Charter rights breaches could be successfully found in 




2.1.3  The RCN as Lead Agency in Domestic Operations  A number of provisions are 
found within the NDA
50
 authorizing elements of the CAF to assume lead responsibility 
for domestic roles in support of and at the request of Canadian civilian authorities.
51
  
These CAF domestic deployments arise where civilian authorities deem a situation 
beyond the capability of OGDs to adequately deal with, as was the case in the Oka crisis 
of 1990.
52
  To date there has been no instance of HMC Ships called out in such 
circumstances and therefore this issue will not be further explored.    
2.1.4  Conclusion:  CAF Support Operations to OGDs  From the foregoing 
descriptions of typical RCN operations in support of OGDs, a number of conclusions can 
be drawn.  The lead OGD, whether DFO in the case of fisheries patrols or RCMP for 
Canadian criminal law enforcement support, will assume primary responsibility for 
detainees and observance of any detainee rights.  In the rare case the CAF has been called 
out in a lead role domestically, the CAF will retain these responsibilities in conducting 
                                                 
50 Supra note 13 at s.2 (g)(ii) definition of “Peace Officer”, and Queen’s Regulations And Orders for the 
Canadian Forces (“QR&O”)  art. 22.01.  In the event an RCN warship is called out to provide assistance 
under one of these authorities, and if necessitated by the nature of the duties being performed, 
members of the CAF may also be designated “peace officers” and could potentially be required to 
detain persons under this authority.    In such situations, and depending upon the authority used and 
location / circumstances of the detention, deployed elements of the RCN might face both domestic 
and international legal considerations regarding detainees. 
51 Ibid  at s.273.6 regarding Public Service, and Part VI Aid of the Civil Power.  Armed assistance to 
Canadian law enforcement is also permitted under the Canadian Forces Armed Assistance Directions, 
P.C. 1993-624 and the Canadian Forces Assistance to Provincial Police Force Directions, P.C. 1996-833; 
Canadian Forces Assistance to Federal Penitentiaries, P.C. 1975-131; while arguably the Emergencies 
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 22(4th Supp.) provides authority for the Governor in Council to order CAF 
involvement in matters of a Public Welfare Emergency at Part I, and a Public Order Emergency at 
Part II, and an International Emergency at Part III. 
52 P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “Carrying the Burden of Peace: The Mohawks, The Canadian Forces, and 
the Oka Crisis”, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Vol. 10 Issue 2 (Winter 2008) (Online: 
jmss.synergiesprairies.ca/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/download/89/99).   Another well known 
instance of the CAF assuming control as the lead agency occurred during the Quebec FLQ crisis of 
1970, however that instance involved the invocation of the War Measures Act – see Sean Maloney, “A 
‘Mere Rustle of Leaves’: Canadian Strategy and the 1970 FLQ Crisis” (Summer 2000), Canadian 




whatever mission was assigned.  Rights and obligations while conducting these 
operations and owed to detainees may encompass rights under the Charter
53
 and 
therefore CAF personnel engaged in such missions must be educated and trained to act in 
a manner respectful of this possibility.  Also, it must be recognized that while the RCN 
may not be primarily responsible for observing and enforcing detainee rights in all 
domestic operations, HMC Ships and crews would remain generally responsible under 
Canadian domestic law for observing human rights obligations in their treatment of those 
detained.      
2.2  Contemporary Counter-Narcotics Operations – OP CARIBBE 
 
Ships of the RCN, together with RCAF aircraft, have for over seven years 
supported Operation CARIBBE, Canada’s contribution to the American, European and 
Western Hemisphere counter-narcotics Operation MARTILLO.
54
  Op CARIBBE is “a 
joint interagency and multinational collaborative effort among Western Hemisphere and 
European nations to counter illicit drug-trafficking in the Caribbean Basin”.
55
   Together 
with maritime forces from France, the Netherlands, Spain and the U.K., Canadian naval 
and air forces work with US Navy (“USN”) and Coast Guard (“USCG”) forces to stem 
the flow of illicit drugs being transported by sea in the eastern Pacific Ocean and 
                                                 
53 Supra note 4. 
54 Online: United States Southern Command, Operation Martillo www.southcom.mil/newsroom 
/Pages/Operation -Martillo.aspx,  visited 2 Aug 2012. 
55 CF deploys RCN ships on Op CARIBBE to support joint interagency multinational counter-
trafficking operation, National Defence and the Canadian Forces (24 April 2012, last modified 28 






  Previously operating in a purely support role, RCN ships did “not 
board or search vessels of interest, and they [were] not mandated to detain or arrest 
anyone or seize any drugs.  They provide[d] direct support to the United States Coast 
Guard”.
57
  This support role has evolved however, with the deployment onboard HMCS 
TORONTO in February 2011 of a USCG Law Enforcement Detachment (“LEDET”) in 
direct support of Op CARIBBE.
58
  RCN Ships continue to sail in support of Op 
CARIBBE, and the legal basis for these deployments will be discussed further in 
subsequent chapters.  
2.3  Contemporary Counter-Piracy Operations  
 
Piracy enjoys a special place within international law as the starting point of the 
universal jurisdiction principle, being one of the first crimes proscribed by international 
law to permit the extra-territorial enforcement of a State’s criminal laws.
59
  Occurring 
wherever seafarers were to be found,
60
 the phenomenon of piracy enjoys a long and 
varied history and State efforts to deal with this threat included the formation of the 
                                                 
56 Leslie Craig, “Op CARIBBE”, The Maple Leaf vol 14, No. 3 (19 Jan 2011) (Online: 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/commun/ml-fe/article-eng.asp?id=6685). 
57 Ibid. 
58 Backgrounder The Canada-United States Military –to-Military Relationship, BG-12.005 (24 January, 
2012) (Online:  http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=4073). 
59 Robin Geiss and Anna Petrig, Piracy and armed robbery at sea: The legal framework for counter-
piracy operations in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2011) at 72. 
60 Douglas Johnston, et al., The Historical Foundations of World Order: The Tower and the Arena 
(Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007) at 366-368.  Many cultures including the Vikings, ancient 
Chinese, Japanese and North Africans have been noted for their prowess at piracy, while history 
records Julius Caesar having been captured and released by pirates, later to return and seek 




United States Coast Guard.
61
  Pirate activities span from hostage taking to murder, 
plundering of cargos and the interference with navigation,
62
 and are described by some as 
the world’s first “international crime”
63
 in that it is a crime prohibited within State 
domestic law but for which universal enforcement jurisdiction exists.  Piracy has 
continued to present times and has recently become the topic of international concern, 
action and cooperation.
64
   
After the fall of Siad Barre’s national Somali government in 1991, piracy re-
emerged in the public eye as a threat to international shipping
65
 and the Canadian Navy’s 
first contemporary involvement in counter-piracy operations occurred in 1995.
66
  The 
piracy threat grew such that following the Somali pirate attack on the French yacht Le 
                                                 
61 Mr. C. Havern, “To Break Up the Haunts of Pirates” (Spring 2012), The Coast Guard Proceedings vol 
69, No. 1 at 6-11.  Following the end of the Revolutionary War and dissolution of the US Navy, the US 
Congress approved establishment of “Customs House Boats” in 1790 which later became the US 
Coast Guard.  Their mission was to be “sentinels of the laws” within the maritime environment. 
62 Jane Dalton, J. Roach, John Daley, “Introductory Note to United Nations Security Council: Piracy and 
Armed Robbery at Sea-Resolutions 1816, 1846 & 1851” (2009) 48 I.L.M. 129. 
63 Supra note 60 at 368.   
64 United Nations General Assembly, Report on the work of the United Nations Open-ended Informal 
Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea A/63/174, (08-44003 25 July 2008).  A wide 
variety of measures were called upon for action by the international community, including 
cooperative suppression, information sharing, apprehension and domestic prosecution efforts.  
65 C. Alessi, “Combating Maritime Piracy”, Council on Foreign Relations (23 March 2012)(Online: 
http://www.cfr.org/france/combating-maritime-piracy/p18376).  See Lucas Bento, “Toward an 
International Law of Piracy Sui Generis: How the Dual Nature of Maritime Piracy Law Enables Piracy 
to Flourish”, (2011) 29 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 399 at 400 where it is pointed out that piracy is not 
confined to Somalia, as “maritime piracy is a global crime impacting a number of areas around the 
world, such as South East Asia, the Far East, and the Americas” 
66 On 5 April, 1995 HMCS FREDERICTON responded to the distress calls of the sailing yacht Longo 
Barda while participating in OP PROMENADE, a Canadian Trade mission to the Middle East.  Longo 
Barda was under attack by pirates operating off the coast of Africa, and the FREDERICTON, as well as 
the commercial vessel Mersk Antwerp, together thwarted the piracy attempt.  (Online: 
http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/di-ri-eng.asp?IntlOpId=200&CdnOpId=240, last 






 a coalition of navies deployed to the Gulf of Aden to suppress the 
piracy threat.
68
  This action has seen some success, as in April 2009 when the American 
flagged Maersk Alabama was attacked and seized by four pirates while transiting the 
Gulf of Aden.
69
  Following attempts at negotiations, and fearing for the safety of an 
American captive being held by the pirates, U.S. Navy SEALs shot and killed three of the 
pirates,
70
 while a fourth was captured and subsequently prosecuted in a U.S. court.  Such 
prosecutions by western States remain rare however,
71
 underscoring a greater need to 
understand the legal dynamics involved.   
The fact that Somalia proved unable to adequately deal with acts of piracy staged 
from its territory
72
 first emerged in 1991 but only much later arose as an issue for the 
international community, propelling a novel international response.  Canada, along with 
many other countries, deployed naval forces in 2008 to the waters off Somalia at the 
                                                 
67 D. Guifoyle,  “Counter-Piracy Law Enforcement and Human Rights” (2010) I.C.L.Q. 59(1),141-169 at 
146.  Following this, France called upon the UN for a counter-piracy mandate to address the issue.   A 
Panossian, ‘L'Affaire du Ponant et le renouveau de la lute internationale contre la piraterie’ (2008) 
112 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 661, 662. 
68 Supra note 65.  CTF-151 is an international counter-piracy task force operating under the 
Combined Maritime Forces and in accordance with S.C. Res 1816, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 
2008), S.C. Res 1846, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec 
16, 2008) directing action to address acts of “piracy and armed robbery at sea” off of the coast of 
Somalia, and S.C. Res 1897, U.N. Doc.S/RES/1897 (Nov. 30, 2009), S.C. Res 1950, U.N. 
Doc.S/RES/1950 (Nov. 23, 2010), S.C. Res 2036, U.N. Doc.S/RES/2036 (Feb. 22, 2012).  The CTF-151 
mission is to disrupt piracy and armed robbery at sea in cooperation with regional and other 
partners (Online: http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-151-counter-piracy/). 
69  Erin Durkin, Captain Richard Phillips Heard Shots and Ducked When Rescued from Pirates, Daily 
News Staff Writer, NY Daily News (27 April 2009) (Online: http://www.nydailynews.com 
/news/world/captain-richard-phillips-heard-shots-ducked-rescued-pirates-article-1.363368). 
70 Ibid. 
71 “Navy must still ‘catch and release’ Somali pirates”, CP 24 January 2012 (Online: 
www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2012/01/24/pol-cp-pirates-prisoners.html). 
72 Mario Silva, “Somalia: State Failure, Piracy, and the Challenge to International Law” (2009-2010) 




request of and under the authority of the UN Security Council.
73
  The RCN has operated 
alternately with Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150), a coalition of naval forces 
responsible for maritime interdiction operations associated with Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan, and CTF 151, charged in 2009 with an exclusively counter-
piracy mandate.
74
  UN Security Council authorization to conduct and continue these 
operations has since maintained and expanded the initial grant of authority,
75
 permitting 
third party States and international organizations (“IO”s), including Canada and NATO, 
to take proactive measures within Somali territory to combat piracy in this region.
76
   
2.4  Stages in Maritime Operations 
 
 Regardless of the RCN mission contemplated, the specific point at which rights 
and obligations under domestic or international legal protections arise is largely context -
                                                 
73 Supra note 68.  Counter-piracy UNSCRs began with UNSCR 1816, then UNSCR 1846 and UNSCR 
1851 which directed action to address acts of “piracy and armed robbery at sea” off of the coast of 
Somalia.  UNSCRs 1816, 1846 and 1851 provided UN Chapter VII authority to use ‘all necessary 
means’ to counter-piracy, first within Somali territorial seas at UNSCRs 1816 and 1846, but with 
further authorization to conduct operations ashore in Somalia at UNSCR 1851.   UNSCR 1838 was 
concerned with actions on the high seas.  
74 Combined Maritime Forces (Online: http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-151-counter-
piracy/; last visited 02/04/2013).   
75 Supra note 68 (UNSCR 1816). Authority was first granted at UNSCR 1816 for a period of six 
months, allowing States cooperating with the Somali Transnational Federal Government to enter 
Somali waters to repress piracy and armed robbery at sea, requiring only that participating States act 
in a manner consistent with similar actions permitted on the high seas and consistent with 
international law (para 7). The follow-on resolution, UNSCR 1846, further extended this 
authorization for 12 months, and at UNSCR 1851 this authority was expanded to allow for land-based 
counter-piracy and armed robbery actions to supplement measures being taken at sea (Detainee 
issues related to the authorized land-based counter-piracy operations are beyond the scope of this 
paper, and will not be further explored). Resolutions UNSCR 1897, 1950 and most recently 2036 
were subsequently authorized, reaffirming UNSCR 1950 and its implicit extending of authority, 
providing for subsequent 12 month extensions of the authorizations previously granted at UNSCR 
1846. 
76 Ibid, authorizing “States, regional and international organizations” to operate within the region in 




and situation - driven.  While all maritime operations examined here involve sea-going 
and crewed vessels, the actions that may be taken by Canadian warships vary widely.  If 
positioned along a sliding-scale of possible actions, at one end would be the simple 
hailing of vessels (either by radio, signal light / flags or simply shouted over the side), 
while at the opposite extreme of the scale would lay the act of physically detaining 
individuals onboard the RCN Ship.  This section will describe the various stages of 
maritime operations that will be the subject of the subsequent analysis, divided between 
hailing vessels, “stopping, boarding and searching the vessel for evidence of the 
prohibited conduct (‘boarding’)”, and the subsequent phase following discovery of 
evidence indicating prohibited conduct involving “the arrest of persons aboard and/or 
seizure of the vessel or cargo (‘seizure’)”.
77
  These conceptual divisions will then further 
be divided between the situation of seizure involving the detained sailors retained 
onboard their own vessel, and the situation whereby detained sailors are brought onboard 
the RCN Ship.    
2.4.1  Right of Approach - Hailing and Information Gathering  The hailing and 
questioning of a ‘vessel of interest’ is normally accomplished via marine radio but could 
also involve the use of flashing-light (‘Morse code’), flag hoists or loud-hailer.  Such 
exchanges are routinely conducted between ships for reasons of safety and collision 
avoidance in accordance with the “Rules of the Road”,
78
 in order to gain information on 
the vessel’s course and speed, maneuvering intentions and other information to permit the 
safe passing of the vessels concerned.  These standard navigational exchanges are not 
                                                 
77 D. Guifoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea, (Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 9. 
78 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972  (COLREGs) 20 




part of this analysis.  International law also recognizes, however, the right of warships 
and other authorized State vessels and aircraft to approach any vessel sailing in 
international waters for the purpose of verifying its nationality.
79
  Additional information 
gathered may also include the vessel’s cargo, port of departure and destination, and crew 
manifest.
80
  Ultimately the approach and hail may involve the warship directing the target 
vessel to take specific actions; but throughout this approach and hailing process no 
physical contact is made between the warship and the target vessel. 
2.4.2  Visit and Search  The next action that a warship could take along the spectrum 
would involve the insertion of a Naval Boarding Team (“NBT”) onboard the target vessel 
for a visit and search; always requiring domestic authority but if taking place beyond the 
warship’s seas possibly also requiring international legal authority.
81
  Where the boarded 
vessel is Canadian flagged there is no requirement for international authority, but the visit 
and search of foreign flagged vessels will normally require further international 
authorization which could take the form of prior flag State authorization pursuant to bi- 
or multi- lateral agreement, or UN Security Council resolutions.
82
  Consent in such 
circumstances may also be provided by the target vessel’s master; however, the RCN 
                                                 
79  J. Ashley Roach and Robert W. Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims (3rd ed., Koninklijke Brill NV, 
Leiden, The Netherlands (2012) at 565, citing UNCLOS art. 110 (2) which describes that a warship 
may send a boat for the purposes of verifying the ship’s flag status by reviewing its documents. 
80 Ibid at 564-565. 
81 As previously discussed, ships of the RCN require domestic authority to act regardless of 
international legal authorities. 




considers a master’s consent to be insufficient basis by itself and thus consent from the 
vessel’s owner, flag State, or some other international legal authority, is still required.
83
   
A general grant of international authority to conduct a visit and search is also 
found under UNCLOS itself, in cases where a reasonable basis exists to believe the target 
vessel shares the same nationality as the boarding warship, or where it is believed the 
vessel is engaged in piracy, the slave trade or unauthorized broadcasting.
84
  These last 
categories of vessels are considered to be Stateless vessels, or those not legitimately 
registered in any one State, and thus they do not enjoy the protection of any flag State and 
are “subject to the jurisdiction of all States”.
85
  Stateless vessels also include those that 
have been denied the right to sail under a State’s flag,
86
 and in the case of the United 
States, vessels suspected to be engaged in drug trafficking.
87
   
                                                 
83 Ibid.  Consent can be provided on a case by case basis, or through the use of international 
agreements providing for ‘pre-approved’ consent in the event stated conditions are met, as was 
discussed in 2.2  Contemporary Counter-Narcotics Operations – OP CARIBBE.  UNSCRs invoking the 
authority at Chapter VII and authorizing “all necessary means” have been used in an apparent 
exercise of the previously discussed principal Lex Specialis derogate legi generali, in that the 
applicable UNSCR is seen as authority to pierce the immunity normally enjoyed by flagged non-
governmental ships. 
84 Ibid at 565, citing UNCLOS art. 110(1) and (2) which requires reasonable basis to believe the vessel 
is engaged in piracy, the slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting, is without nationality or is the same 
nationality as the warship.  
85 Ibid and as provided for at UNCLOS art. 110(1)(d).  Stateless vessels may be boarded in any waters 
beyond territorial waters.  Supra note 2 at 214 further discusses that while being a  Stateless vessel 
does not entitle every State to assert jurisdiction over them, rather it denies any single State from 
complaining of a violation of international law by another State asserting jurisdiction over that 
vessel. 
86 Ibid at 565-566, citing UNCLOS art. 92(2) and supra note 2 at 213-214, citing as an example Taiwan 
revoking flag State status of ships violating domestic laws with regards to drift-net fishing. 
87 Supra note 2 at 214, citing the American claim based on the trafficking of drugs as a grave threat 
pursuant to the 46 USC Chapter 705 Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act which will be further 
discussed in Chapter 3.  The US considers the right to visit and search these vessels implicit as US 




A visit and search boarding is conducted to inspect the target ship’s and crew’s 
documents, confirm navigational information including past and planned movements, and 
to inspect cargo manifests and, if provided for in the international agreement or 
applicable Security Council resolution, it could involve further law-enforcement actions 
including arrest and seizure.
88
    
2.5  Summary 
 The vast majority of contemporary RCN operations are centered on support to 
OGDs and international multinational operations, and as a result engage critical legal 
issues related to those detained.
89
  These modern operational experiences include support 
to OGDs, counter-narcotic operations under Op CARIBBE and counter-piracy operations 
as part of an international coalition.  While obviously diverse in aim these mission sets 
are all similar in that they engage a juxtaposition of international law rules, and human 
rights obligations, with Canadian domestic law.  It is this common theme that will be 
explored next.  
Having described a set of missions in which detentions could arise, outside of 
armed conflict but still focused beyond Canadian waters, I will next examine the two 
legal systems which are engaged by these actions.  This will begin with an examination 
of international law, starting with the sources of international law and followed by the 
international legal regime of the maritime operational area.  I will then detail those areas 
of international law specifically engaged by contemporary naval operations, including 
                                                 
88 Supra note 79 at 566-567. 
89 Michael Wood, “Detention During International Military Operations:  Article 103 of the UN Charter 
and the Al-Jedda Case” (2008) 47 Mil. L. & L. War Rev. 139, where he highlights the complex 
relationship between international humanitarian law (“IHL”), international human rights law 




jurisdiction to conduct such missions and the engagement of human rights recognized at 
international law, the latter to include protections and the co-existent obligations resting 
on the detaining State.  This will be followed by a similar discussion focused on 
applicable Canadian domestic law, commencing with the implementation of international 
law in Canadian law and then canvassing domestic authority to conduct these missions, 
issues of jurisdiction and Canadian human rights legislation applicable to these 
operations.  This discussion will conclude with an examination of potential liability of the 
Crown and for individuals where breaches of these rights are found.   
Lastly, building on the analysis of applicable international and Canadian domestic 
law, I will analyze the specific questions arising from detaining ships and individuals 
during the conduct of select RCN operations.  It is from this analysis that a number of 
conclusions will be drawn regarding the likely rights and obligations engaged in these 




CHAPTER 3:  INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HIGH SEAS 
DETAINEES 
 
This chapter begins by canvassing the various sources of international law 
applicable to my examination.   International law as set out by treaty and custom will be 
discussed first, as well as various principles and subsidiary means of determining 
international law.  Next I will examine the complex legal seas upon which RCN 
operations are conducted, engaging both customary and conventional international law.  
Following this I will address the critical issue of jurisdiction, focusing on when and how 
jurisdiction to conduct relevant operations is found at international law.  I will next focus 
on International Human Rights Law (“IHRL”), and the rights and obligations created 
thereby.  Any discussion regarding the rights of those detained under IHRL must also 
look at the issue as one of obligations owed by detaining States, and therefore I will also 
consider the issue of State responsibility for breaches of obligations as well as any 
associated rights of redress and remedies available.   Throughout this examination of the 
international legal seascape it will become apparent that many of the issues remain in 
flux, and neither States nor international tribunals have conclusively resolved these 
questions. 
3.1  Sources of International Law 
 
International law is that body of law governing relations between sovereign States 
and, to a limited extent, between States and internationally recognized bodies such as 




described by the Permanent Court of International Justice (“ICJ”) in The Steamship 
Lotus.
90
  This seminal case involved a collision on the high seas between the French ship 
LOTUS and Turkish ship BOZ-KOURT, and the Turkish prosecution of the French 
captain when he subsequently arrived in Turkey.  In rejecting France’s claim against 
Turkish jurisdiction the ICJ found that restrictions on the actions of States grounded in 
international law cannot be presumed but must themselves be found within international 
law: 
The rules of law binding upon States, therefore, emanate from their own free will 
as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing 
principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between these 





This positivist statement of international law can be understood to mean that 
States have the lawful authority to act in any way, unless a constraint is found at 
international law prohibiting or regulating this action.  Based upon this foundational 
concept, and as expressed in the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
92
 sources of 
international law arise from: (1) international conventions (Treaties) establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the States involved (either general or specific); (2) international 
custom evidencing general practices accepted as law; and (3) general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations.  Also noted as a means of determining or interpreting 
international law are ‘subsidiary means’, including judicial decisions and teachings of the 
                                                 
90 The Steamship Lotus (France v. Turkey) (1927), P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10 (“The Steamship Lotus”).   
91 Ibid, at 18. 
92 United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946 (Online: 




most highly qualified publicists.
93
  Each of these sources or means is separate and 
distinct, deserving of further review here. 
3.1.1 Treaty Law International conventions (hereinafter referred to as treaties)
94
 are “the 
clearest expression of legal undertakings made by States”.
95
  As required under the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
96
 which is broadly reflective of customary law 
in this regard, treaties require two or more States, and to be valid must incorporate three 
elements: all parties must be subject to international law, all parties must intend to create 
obligations binding under international law, and the resulting agreement must itself be 
governed by international law.
97
  Within the Canadian context treaty negotiation and 
ratification is an executive function
98
 and must follow a number of formal steps prior to 
taking effect, including the formal conclusion of the treaty, ratification (where required 
by the nature of the treaty) and subsequent registration.
99
  The treaty will then enter into 
                                                 
93 Ibid. 
94 J. Currie, C. Forcese & V. Oosterveld, International Law Doctrine, Practice, and Theory (Toronto: 
Irwin Law Inc, 2007) at 40, describing treaties as in one sense “international ‘contracts’ between 
States and/or certain international organizations, setting out rules that bind, as a matter of 
international law, the parties to them in their relations with one another.”  Treaties between two 
parties are – ‘bilateral’; or multiple parties – ‘multilateral’ and synonyms for treaty include covenant, 
protocol, agreement, process-verbal, exchange of notes / letters, joint communiqué, charter, statute 
and convention.  For ease of convenience, within this thesis the term treaty will be used exclusively. 
95 Supra note 2 at 6. 
96 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N.T.S. vol. 1155, p. 331 (Online: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a10.html accessed 25 May 2013). 
97 Supra note 2 at 6.  
98 Having been negotiated and ratified by the executive, the treaty must then be implemented 
through legislation; see Ruth Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes 3d ed. (Butterworths, 
Markham, 1994) at 396-397, describing the two techniques used to implement treaties: for those 
affecting the rights of subjects, having a financial impact or requiring changes to existing law by 
implementing legislation whereby the legislature interprets and decides how much of the treaty 
should be implemented; or by incorporating the treaty by reference directly into legislation without 




force.  Throughout this process but prior to formal conclusion a State party can at any 
point make “reservations” which may in some circumstances serve to exclude or modify 
provision(s) of the treaty and their legal effect on that State party.
100
  Treaties are, by their 
very nature, generally binding only upon those State parties who have agreed to be so 
bound as discussed above.  Treaties to which Canada considers herself bound are 
interpreted based upon principles of public international law – even where incorporated 
in a domestic statute
101
– a factor that will be considered in my analysis and conclusions. 
3.1.2 Customary International Law and Jus Cogens  The next source of international 
law is customary international law, and requires two elements: consistent practice 
generally adopted by States; and the belief that the practice is required by customary 
international law, or concerns a matter subject to legal regulation and is consistent with 
international law (also known as opinio juris).
102
  The point at which practice is sufficient 
to support a rule of customary international law was addressed in both The Steamship 
Lotus
103
 above, and the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,
104
 and requires extensive and 
                                                                                                                                                 
99 Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, (online: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3930.html [accessed 3 April 2013]) at art. 102, and 
supra note 96 at art. 80.  Registration with the United Nations is conducted through the UN 
Secretariat and is expressly required [art 102(2)] before “any organ of the United Nations” would be 
permitted to rely on the treaty in proceedings before the ICJ – this an effort to deter ‘secret’ treaties 
and alliances which could destabilize international order (supra note 94 at 60-61).  Canadian treaties 
are registered domestically via the Canada Treaty Register, see Canada Treaty Information; Policy on 
Tabling of Treaties in Parliament (3 March 2011) (Online: http://www.treaty-
accord.gc.ca/procedures.aspx) [accessed 23 July 2013]. 
100 Further discussion regarding the process of reservations is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
however is very usefully discussed at supra note 98 at 124-129. 
101 Ibid (Sullivan) at 397. 
102 Supra note 2 at 7. 
103 Supra note 90. 
104 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases: Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark and v. Netherlands 




uniform State practice (particularly States whose interests are specifically affected) 
showing general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.
105
  State 
practice alone, absent evidence of an underlying rule of law or opinio juris compelling 
this practice, is insufficient.
106
   
A unique feature of customary international law is that once the above elements 
are met, any right or obligation created through the customary international law is 
presumed to universally bind all States, even those which have not expressed acceptance 
of the obligation.
107
  This is in contrast to treaty law, which as explained above relies 
upon agreement and consent of the parties to the treaty and creates legal obligations only 
between those same parties.  Even the acquiescence by a State to an international norm of 
general practice and opinio juris can be seen as evidence of the lawful nature of the 
practice.
108
  The exception to this rule of universal application is only found in the case of 
‘persistent objectors’ – referring to those States who protest particular practices 
consistently, beginning with the creation or genesis of that practice and continuing on in a 
                                                                                                                                                 
continental shelf claims by Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands and interpretation whether art. 6 
of the Geneva Convention was expressive of customary international law.  The ICJ rejected that 
customary law had been crystallized at art. 6, and further rejected that the Geneva Convention had 
established customary international law as the partial result of its own existence (paras 61-64).   
105 Ibid at paras 73- 74.  The ICJ also acknowledged that widespread and representative participation 
in [a] convention might also suffice provided it included that of States whose interests were specially 
affected.  In dissenting opinions Judge Tanaka stressed that, with regards to a treaty as expressive of 
customary international law, the number of ratifications or accessions must be considered in context, 
and courts should be wary of seeking evidence of subjective motives but rather should rely upon 
objective acts as sufficient. (pp. 175-176), a holding agreed to by Judge Lachs at p. 227 and 231 
stressing the importance of consensus and negotiation.   
106 Ibid at paras 76-77. 







  In such a case the State may not be bound by this 
customary law and its otherwise universal application.
110
 
One particular aspect of customary international law deserving of special notice 
and consideration is that of jus cogens, rules “accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States” which can be “modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character”.
111
  So powerful is the principle of 
jus cogens that any such modification, or emergence of a new peremptory norm of 
general international law, would then automatically void or terminate any existing treaty 
found in conflict with the new norm.
112
  Jus cogens therefore has been described as being 
constitutional in character, providing as it does a series of “rules to limit the ability of 
States to develop, maintain or change other rules, or to prevent them from violating 
fundamental rules of international public policy”.
113
  Rules that are widely acknowledged 
as jus cogens include the prohibition against use of force in aggression or genocide, and 
prohibitions against slavery, torture and apartheid.
114
  In Canada, and as will be further 
explored, the Supreme Court of Canada has examined the impact of jus cogens on the 
interpretation of Canadian domestic law regarding refoulement of a person to a State 
                                                 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid at 78-79, in describing the persistent objection of the U.K. to other coastal States claim’s of 
maritime jurisdictional in excess of 3 NM from their coast.  Through the application of persistent 
objection, these wider claims were not ‘opposable’ towards the U.K., meaning they could not be 
imposed upon the U.K.. 
111 Supra note 96 at art. 53. 
112 Ibid at art. 64. 
113 Michael Byers, “Conceptualizing the Relationship between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules” 
(1997) 66 Nordic J. Int’l L. 211 at 220. 




where they faced the risk of torture.
115
  While not authoritatively pronouncing on the 
acceptance of the proposed norm against refoulement as jus cogens domestically, the 




3.1.3  General Principles of International Law  There is no universal agreement as to 
the meaning and composition of this source of international law, other than as a means 
for the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) to gap-fill treaty and customary international 
law by applying legal principles common in major legal systems.
117
  General principles 
are accorded “a particular and fundamental importance”, and therefore serve “as a 
residual presumption for the resolution of doubtful claims”.
118
  Thus general principles do 
not import “private law institutions ‘lock, stock and barrel’, ready-made and fully 
equipped with a set of rules”, but rather “regard any features or terminology which are 
reminiscent of the rules of private law as an indication of policy and principles” useful to 
the development or understanding of international legal disputes.
119
  As a rule of 
interpretation then,
120
 general principles may assist in the understanding of international 
law, but do not directly form international law. 
                                                 
115 Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] 2 FC 592, 2000 CanLII 17101 
(FCA), examining if the prohibition against torture is part of customary international law and a 
principle of jus cogens, and if so whether this altered the interpretation of domestic legislation with 
regards to deporting a person to a risk of torture. 
116 Ibid at paras 30-31. 
117 Supra note 2 at 12. 
118 Ibid. 
119 International Status of South West Africa Case, Adv. Op. [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 128 at 148. 
120 In Canadian jurisprudence, rules of interpretation with regards to international treaties were 
discussed in considerable detail in Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 




3.1.4  Subsidiary Means of Determining International Rules of Law  Comprised of 
judicial decisions and the writings of publicists, “subsidiary means” is an umbrella 
concept that describes recognized sources used to determine, but not create, rules of 
international law.  The first such source concerns the role of judges and jurists in 
identifying rules created by States (who make law through treaty, customary rules and 
general principles of law).
121
  The weight given to a judicial pronouncement depends 
upon the court’s standing as well as the completeness of their research on the point in 
question.
122
  The second subsidiary source is the “teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists”,
123
 recognizing the complexity of international law and the value of collecting 
and analyzing State practice(s) together with articulating the underlying legal rules 
applicable.
124
  Subsidiary means therefore do not directly make international law, but 
only assist in its understanding. 
 In addition to judicial decisions and legal commentaries, another subsidiary 
means of determining international law is found through international organizations such 
as the United Nations.
125
  Resolutions made by the General Assembly are generally non-
                                                 
121 Supra note 2 at 13.  This is emphasized at supra note 92 art. 59 which states that decisions by the 
court are not binding except between the parties and their particular case. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Supra note 92. 
124 Supra note 2 at 13, where these rules are “sometimes described as general principles of law, in the 
sense that in the absence of clear proof of, for example, a right under treaty for a State other than the 
flag State to exercise jurisdiction over ships on the high seas, no such right will exist.”  In this regard 
the general principles functions “as a residual presumption for the resolution of doubtful claims”, 
such as if a non-flag State tried to assert a right over a ship on the high seas absent clear proof of, for 
example, a right under treaty. 






 but may be somewhat persuasive in determining international law on the topic 
due to their varied purpose, content and underlying support.
127
  In contrast, UN Security 
Council resolutions are binding in the specific case engaged but not as a general source of 
international law,
128
 and the degree to which such UN Security Council Resolutions 
(“UNSCRs”) may be relied upon will be further discussed. 
Two concepts related to, but distinct from, the topic of subsidiary means are the 
processes of codification and progressive development.
129
  Codification may be thought 
of as “the more precise formulation and systematization of rules of international law in 
fields where there already has been extensive State practice, precedent and doctrine”.
130
  
Conversely, progressive development initiates the development of new law.
131
  While 
theoretically distinct from codification, the latter retrospectively looking backwards at 
developments in the law with the former prospectively looking forward at future 
directions the law will likely move, the distinction may be difficult to appreciate as “the 
                                                 
126 Supra note 99 at art. 17, 21 and 22, other than with regards to the UN budget, general 
administration of the General Assembly and other subsidiary organs established under that 
authority.  Non-binding resolutions are authorized at art. 10-16. 
127 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case [1996] I.C.J. Rep. 226. (Nuclear Weapons 
Case)  para 70 where the ICJ opined that resolutions of the UN General Assembly can have normative 
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examined “[for] its content and the conditions of its adoption; …. Whether an opinio juris exists as to 
its normative character… [acknowledging that] a series of resolutions may show the gradual 
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128 Supra note 99 art 25 which provides that “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter”. 
129 Supra note 2 at 13-22. 
130 Statute of the International Law Commission (21 November 1947), U.N.G.A. res 174(II) as amended 
by res 485 (V) (12 December 1950), res 984 (X) and 985 (X) (3 December 1955), and res 36/39 (18 
November 1981), art. 15. 
131 Johathan Charney, “International Agreements and the Development of Customary International 




two notions tend in practice to overlap or to leave between them an intermediate area in 
which it is not possible to indicate precisely where codification ends and progressive 
development begins”.
132
   
3.2  Legal Regime of the Maritime Operational Area 
 
 Detentions by the RCN as contemplated in this paper occur in the maritime 
environment, subject to the law of the sea, and therefore I propose to quickly canvas this 
ancient, and still evolving, area of international law.  The law of the sea is focused on 
issues of jurisdictional entitlements and the rights and duties of States, and is rooted both 
in customary international law and international conventions.
133
  Chief among the 
international conventions is the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS),
134
 an ambitious effort originally involving approximately 150 States and 
with the goal of codifying this contentious subject.
135
  As of 23 January 2013, 165 States 
have ratified UNCLOS
136
 and despite the notable absence of the United States, it is in 
large part seen as either codifying existing customary international law or as 
progressively developing customary international law.
137
  While UNCLOS occupies a 
central role in any discussion of this area of international law, customary international 
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136 The United Nations, Office of Legal Affairs, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea 
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law continues to remain an important source of the law of the sea.  I will therefore briefly 
discuss the law of the sea as set out within UNCLOS and customary international law, 
first with regard to maritime zones, and then with regard to the nature of flag State 
jurisdiction on the high seas. 
3.2.1  Coastal State Jurisdiction - Internal waters and Baselines  The concept of State 
jurisdiction is inextricably linked to the defined territory of that State, and any 
examination of a coastal State’s jurisdiction must begin with the concept of baselines.
138
  
The normal baseline is a reference line normally found at the low-water line
139
 and, 
where waters are enclosed establishes the extent of a coastal State’s internal waters 
within which full sovereignty is exercised.
140
  A great many States also employ ‘straight 
baselines’, wherein a series of straight lines are drawn connecting the outermost parts of 
coasts “deeply indented or fringed with islands”.
141
  Of particular interest to Canada is the 
issue of historic bays, which although largely unaddressed in UNCLOS are generally 
found where historically a coastal State has “for a considerable period of time claimed the 
bay as internal waters and has effectively, openly and continuously exercised its authority 
therein, and that during this time the claim has received the acquiescence of other 
States”.
142
  Such a determination could see a closing line drawn across the mouth of the 
                                                 
138 Ibid at 31. 
139 Supra note 38 (UNCLOS) at art. 5, further detailed as appearing on large-scale charts recognized 
by the coastal State.  Baseline determination, as further detailed at UNCLOS Articles 7- 16, 
encompasses such geographical issues as mouths of rivers, bays ports and roadsteads, as well as 
permissible use of straight baselines where geographical features permit.  
140 Supra note 2 at 33, 61. 
141 Ibid at 33, supra note 38 (UNCLOS) at art. 7. 
142 Ibid (Churchill & Lowe) at 43-45, noting that the UN Secretariat published a study in 1962 
‘Historic Bays’, First UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol. I., pp. 1-38, ‘Juridical 




bay, thereby forming a baseline and creating internal waters.  With few exceptions, no 
foreign State may exercise the right of innocent passage within these internal waters;
143
 
rather coastal State permission is required to enter.
144
  Coastal States enjoy the right to 
enforce all domestic laws within internal waters, with the exception of vessels present by 
reason of distress and foreign warships, the latter being subject to sovereign immunity.
145
 
3.2.2  Territorial Sea and Innocent Passage  Seaward from the coastal State’s baseline 
is the territorial sea, a belt of water extending to a maximum limit of 12 NM.
146
  A coastal 
State enjoys sovereignty over the seabed, subsoil and the super-adjacent airspace within 
its territorial sea,
147
 and may enact and enforce domestic legislation within this area with 
only few limitations, particularly with regard to enforcement of domestic criminal and 
shipping-related laws.
148
  Unlike internal waters the coastal State may not bar the transit 
of any other nation’s vessels through its territorial sea provided the ship is exercising the 




  This right extends to all ships, including warships, 
                                                 
143 Ibid, noting that areas included within internal waters as the result of the imposition of straight 
baselines, that were not previously considered internal waters, were preserved as areas within 
which innocent passage exists- Supra note 38 (UNCLOS) art 8(2). 
144 Ibid at 61-63, noting that a customary right to enter internal waters for ships in distress continues 
to exist. 
145 Natalie Klein, “Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 
at 68, and Supra note 38 (UNCLOS) art 25(2). 
146 Ibid (UNCLOS) at section 1 and 2 of Part II. 
147 Ibid art 2(2). 
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necessary to suppress illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.   




regardless of cargo and requires neither prior notification nor authorization.  To meet this 
definition and benefit from these rights, the passage must be continuous, expeditious and 
for the purpose of either traversing that territorial sea without entering internal waters (or 
other State facilities outside of internal waters), or to proceed to or from internal waters 
or such other State facilities.
150
  In order to be found “innocent”, the passage must not be 
“prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State”,
151
 and must be 
made in conformity with additional requirements set out in UNCLOS.
152
  Failure to abide 
by these requirements in the case of civilian vessels can result in the coastal State taking 
regulatory enforcement action against these ships, while warships retain immunity from 
coastal State action excepting that they may be ordered out of the territorial waters.
153
 
3.2.3  Straits used for International Navigation In the maritime context an 
international strait refers to a “narrow natural passage or arm of water connecting two 
larger bodies of water”,
154
 used by international shipping for “international navigation 
between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the 
high seas or an exclusive economic zone.”
155
  Under UNCLOS, all ships and aircraft also 
enjoy the right of “transit passage” in straits used for international navigation, which is 
defined as “the exercise [in accordance with this part of UNCLOS] of freedom of 
                                                 
150 Ibid at art. 18. 
151 Ibid at art. 19.  Prohibited activities are further enumerated at arts. 19(2) and 20 and generally 
deny any activity that may interfere with the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of the coastal State.  In particular, warships are restricted from any weapons exercise 
or practice, launching or recovering aircraft or other military devices.  See also supra note 2 at 81-86. 
152 Ibid, at arts 21-23 and 25. 
153 Ibid at art. 28 – 32, and supra note 2 at 87-91. 
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navigation and over flight solely for the continuous and expeditious transit of the strait 
between one are of high seas or economic zone and another”.
156
   As a rule of customary 
international law, this right of transit passage through an international strait may not be 
suspended
157
 and warships may sail in their normal mode of continuous and expeditious 
transit but must refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of the coastal State.
158
  Where international 
conventions pre-exist UNCLOS,
159
 special regimes can exist for particular straits and 
these regimes may affect the general right of transit passage.  The most detailed example 
of such a convention is the Montreux Convention,
160
 which acknowledges Turkish control 
over the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean 
Sea, and has for many years imposed restrictions on transit hours, numbers and tonnage 
of warships.
161
   
3.2.4  Archipelagic Straits  Archipelagic States are comprised wholly of one or more 
archipelagos (and may include other islands) recognized as a: 
group of islands including parts of islands, interconnecting waters and other 
natural features which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and 
                                                 
156 Ibid art. 38, which goes on to state that notwithstanding this, the requirement of continuous and 
expeditious transit does not preclude passage through the strait for the purpose of entering, leaving 
or returning from a State bordering the strait, subject to the conditions of entry to that State.  See also 
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159 Ibid art 35. 
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other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political 




Archipelagic States are permitted to “draw straight archipelagic baselines joining 
the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago”
163
 and 
the waters within the baselines created are considered archipelagic waters, over which the 
archipelagic State exercises sovereignty with respect to the bed, subsoil and super 
adjacent air,
164
 but which are neither internal waters nor territorial sea.
165
  Innocent 
passage similar to that enjoyed within territorial seas may be exercised
166
 while the 
archipelagic State is permitted to designate sea-lanes, with rights that resemble in many 
respects transit passage through international straits.
167
  Given the virtually universal 
conformity, acceptance by other States and within treaties, these rules under UNCLOS 
may in fact have attained the status of customary international law although they are still 
the source of debate by some States.
168
 
3.2.5  Contiguous Zone  The contiguous zone is that belt of water adjacent to and 
seaward of the territorial sea extending up to 24 NM from the coastal State’s baseline, 
and within which coastal States have limited preventative and enforcement jurisdiction 
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164 Ibid art 49. 
165 Supra note 2 at 125. 
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reasons at art. 52(2).   
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against activities which may be considered a threat to maritime security,
169
 in particular 
customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary laws.
170
  Close examination of this provision in 
UNCLOS suggests that the first limb of Article 33 “applies to inward-bound ships and is 
anticipatory or preventative in character; the second limb, applying to outward-bound 
ships, gives more extensive power, and is analogous to the doctrine of hot pursuit”.
171
  
Coastal States are not obliged to claim a contiguous zone
172
 and those that do exercise 
control, not sovereignty or sovereign rights or jurisdiction in the zone, and are limited to 
preventative or repression measures such as inspections and warnings.
173
  These powers 
of arrest or to forcibly take ships into the coastal States’ ports are not universally 
accepted and rights of coastal States are strictly interpreted in this zone, such that any 
claims by coastal States not expressly provided for within UNCLOS are resolved on an 
equitable basis, weighing the respective importance of the interests of all parties 
involved.
174
  Thus coastal States may exercise prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction 
within the contiguous zone ratione materiae.
175
 
3.2.6  Exclusive Economic Zone  The EEZ is a band of water that a coastal State may 
(but not must) claim, adjacent to and seaward of its territorial sea and extending no more 
                                                 
169 Supra note 145 at 87. 
170 Supra note 38 (UNCLOS) at art. 33.  Coastal States are permitted to exercise necessary control to 
prevent infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitation laws and regulations within its 
territory or territorial seas, and to punish infringements of these laws and regulations. 
171 Supra note 145 at 87. 
172 Supra note 2 at 136. 
173 Supra note 145 at 88. 
174 Supra note 2 at 139. 




than 200 NM from the baseline.
176
   Coastal States enjoy sovereign rights related to the 
management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of living and non-living natural 
resources within the EEZ.
177
  The legal status of the EEZ is sui generis, neither territorial 
sea nor high seas,
178
 and certain law enforcement powers exist but are limited to the 
extent they are not incompatible with the EEZ regime,
179
 including the right of visit 
found on the high seas.  Other States therefore enjoy freedom of navigation and over-
flight, and may lay and maintain submarine cables and pipelines in these zones provided 
these activities don’t interfere with the coastal State’s rights set out above.  Should a 
vessel be found violating any of these coastal State rights, the coastal State’s enforcement 
jurisdiction is restricted to the seizure of the offending vessel(s).
180
      
3.2.7  The Continental Shelf  The juridical continental shelf of a coastal State is 
physically the seabed and subsoil extending beyond the territorial sea as a natural 
prolongation of its land territory, out to the edge of the continental margin to a maximum 
                                                 
176 Supra note 38 (UNCLOS) at Part V, arts. 55 – 75.  See also Supra note 2 at 161, 163-165 describing 
how coastal State islands can claim EEZ around the island provided they are capable of human 
habitation or economic life of their own [art 121(3)]; with regards to implementation of the rights for 
non-independent territories, and excluding all claims that would infringe on Antarctica (areas 60 
degrees South). 
177 Ibid, (UNCLOS) at art. 56.  Also provided for are coastal State jurisdictional rights with regard to 
establishing and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, marine scientific research and 
the protection/preservation of the marine environment. 
178 Supra note 2 at 166- 176.  Coastal States enjoy sovereign rights and duties related to living, non-
living and economic resource management and exploitation, and jurisdictional rights regarding 
artificial islands and installations, marine scientific research and pollution control.  Non-coastal 
States enjoy rights of over-flight and navigation that are not incompatible with coastal States EEZ 
rights, remain subject to coastal State pollution control and must not interfere with artificial islands 
and installations.  All States are free to lay submarine cables and pipelines subject to the interests of 
other States and the coastal State’s EEZ rights. 
179 Supra note 38 (UNCLOS) at art 58(2). 
180 Ibid at art 73, 220(6) and 226(1)(c).  See also supra note 145 at 88-89, and supra note 2 at 165-
166 where it is pointed out that UNCLOS Articles 55 and 86 clearly establish the EEZ does not enjoy a 
residual high seas nor territorial sea character thus displacing any presumption that activity outside 




distance of 350 NM from the baseline, or in some circumstances beyond this distance.
181
  
Coastal States enjoy sovereign rights over the natural resources of their continental 
shelves
182
 for purposes of exploring and exploiting these natural resources, including 
jurisdiction over artificial islands or installations and structures erected to exploit those 
resources.
183
 Coastal State law enforcement powers are therefore drawn from these 
sovereign rights combined with specific activities related to both the continental shelf 
itself and the EEZ.
184
  These sovereign rights are made up of “all rights necessary for and 
connected with the exploitation of the continental shelf… [and] include jurisdiction in 
connection with the prevention and punishment of violations of the law”.
185
  Coastal 
States may therefore lawfully take law enforcement actions related to unauthorized 
activities directed against these sovereign rights, provided these actions do not 
                                                 
181 Ibid (UNCLOS) at art 76, where additional restrictions are provided for with relation to straight 
baselines and submarine ridges and where the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Self – a 
body established under the authority of the UN to facilitate UNCLOS with regards to establishing 
continental self outer limits beyond 200 NM from coastal State’s baselines- are set out.   See Division 
for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, (Online: http://www.un.org/depts/los/index.htm).  See also 
supra note 2 at 141 where the continental margin is described as actually being comprised of three 
sections; the continental shelf proper, the continental margin and the continental rise, and at 148-
149 where the “Irish Formula” to determine the outer extent of the continental shelf is described as a 
limit “either a line connecting points not more than sixty miles apart, at each of which points the 
thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least one per cent of the shortest distance from such point to the 
foot of the continental slope, or a line connecting points not more than sixty miles apart, which points 
are not more than sixty miles from the foot of the slope.  In each case the points referred to are 
subject to a maximum seaward limit: they must be either within 350 miles of the baseline or within 
100 miles of the 2,500-metre isobath”. 
182 Ibid at 151-156.  The continental shelf is not part of the coastal States territory, rather the State 
enjoys sovereign rights in relation to the natural resources only (thus wrecks are excluded).   
183 Supra note 38 (UNCLOS) at art 77, 60 and 80. 
184 Ibid at art 77 and 56.  See also Supra note 2 at 144-145, describing the basis for these rights as 
arising from both customary international law and as the result of the evolution of a classical 
doctrine of the continental shelf. 








3.2.8  The High Seas and Law of the Flag State  The last remaining area to be 
examined is that of the high seas.  By definition the high seas comprise all parts of the sea 
that are not included within any coastal State’s jurisdiction, including waters above the 
continental shelf beyond 200 miles, although high seas navigational rights do exist in the 
EEZ.
187
  Freedoms exercised on the high seas include freedom of navigation and over-
flight,
188
 but must be exercised with ‘due’ or ‘reasonable’ regard for others exercising 
freedom of the high seas as well as all States’ UNCLOS rights under the seabed 
regime.
189
  This requirement for ‘due regard’ appears to favour established uses in 
contrast to new uses and seeks to have resolved differences between States through 
negotiation.
190
  Jurisdiction on the high seas is almost exclusively exercised by the ‘flag 
State’, that State granting to a ship the right to sail under its flag and therefore enjoying 
exclusive legislative and enforcement jurisdiction over this ship on the high seas.
191
 
                                                 
186 Supra note 145 at 99. 
187 Supra note 2 at 203, describing that the doctrine prohibiting any State from validly extend its 
sovereignty to the high seas is considered customary international law, codified within the 
conventions prepared by UNCLOS I and III; supra note 38 (UNCLOS) at art. 86 which also excludes 
archipelagic waters of archipelagic States from the definition of high seas.  At art. 58 all freedoms of 
the high seas, including those set out at arts. 88 – 115 are reserved for those vessels within a coastal 
States EEZ, provided they are not incompatible with the rights specifically reserved for coastal States 
within their own EEZ.  In limited circumstances these waters may be considered analogous to the 
high seas. 
188 Ibid (UNCLOS) at art. 87. 
189 Supra note 2 at 206. 
190 Ibid. 




In order for a ship to fly the flag of a State - its ‘flag State’ - the ship must first 
meet conditions set by that state, and as a consequence the ship and its equipment, 
persons onboard and its cargo will be subject (with rare exception) to the exclusive 
legislative and enforcement jurisdiction of that State while on the high seas.
192
  The rare 
exceptions to the otherwise exclusive flag State jurisdiction include provisions for those 
ships engaged in piracy, slavery and unauthorized broadcasting from the high seas, as 
well as those of uncertain nationality or Stateless vessels.
193
   Stateless vessels are simply 
not validly flagged (registered) in a State, but this does not mean they are open to 
jurisdictional claims by all other States – instead, these “ships enjoy the protection of no 
State and therefore if jurisdiction were asserted by another State, no State could be 
competent to complain of a violation of international law”.
194
  Other restrictions of 
freedom of the high seas can include UN Security Council authorized actions
195
 and 
States exercising the customary law right of hot pursuit and constructive presence.
196
  
Having reviewed the basis of international law found in custom and treaty 
together with the tools used to assist in the interpretation of international law, and the 
legal seascape of international law applicable to the maritime operational area, the 
                                                 
192 Ibid (UNCLOS) at arts. 91 – 92.  See also supra note 2 at 208, describing that the flag State enjoys 
exclusive legislative and enforcement jurisdiction over its flagged vessels. 
193 Ibid at arts 92, 99-107, 109-110.  
194 Ibid at 214, noting that the right to visit and board Stateless ships was expressly provided within 
UNCLOS at art. 110.  
195 Ibid at 423-425. 
196 Ibid at 214-215.  Hot pursuit, recognized at UNCLOS art 111 permits the pursuit, boarding and 
seizure of vessels violating a coastal States laws and originally found within its internal waters or 
territorial seas provided (among other requirements) such action is taken before the vessel enters 
the territorial seas of another State, while constructive presence refers to the use of ‘mother ships’ 




foundational concept of jurisdiction will now be discussed.  As will be seen, jurisdiction 
is a legal concept with many meanings and is central to all questions of international (and 
domestic) law, including the critical issue of when rights and obligations accrue. 
3.3 Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction has been described as “an aspect of sovereignty [referring] to judicial, 
legislative and administrative competence,” and where all of these competencies are 
enjoyed by a State to the exclusion of all other States they are termed ‘sovereign’.
197
  As 
an element arising from State sovereignty “there is a domestic law of jurisdiction and 
there is international law about jurisdiction”.
198
  All sovereign States have or create laws 
to govern their respective State authorities and prescribe the powers of those authorities – 
in Canada this commences with the Constitution Act 1867.
199
  It is the Constitution that 
sets out the limits and responsibilities of Canadian federal and provincial competency, 
competencies of the courts, and other limitations set by subject matter, geography and 
other factors,
200
 and upon which Canada has structured her laws creating and limiting 
federal and provincial agencies of government and enforcement.   
When reviewing a State’s exercise of jurisdiction, three divisions are most 
commonly used to describe the extent of State competencies.  The first is legislative or 
prescriptive jurisdiction, which refers to a State’s competency to make laws regarding 
matters, whether wholly domestic or touching outside a State’s territory.  Second is 
                                                 
197 Supra note 94 at 281. 
198 Teresa Scassa and Robert J. Currie, “New First Principles?  Assessing the Internet’s Challenges to 
Jurisdiction” (2010-2011) 42 Geo. J. Int’l L. 1017 at 1020. 
199 Supra note 21 




enforcement or executive jurisdiction and is the State’s ability to give effect to its laws, 
including investigative authority of police and other State actors such as the military.  
The last division of jurisdiction is judicial or adjudicative, which is found in the 
competency of a State’s courts to adjudicate cases.
201
  Any exercise of State jurisdiction, 
whether domestically or with extra-territorial effect, must therefore flow from one or 
more of these sources. 
As an umbrella concept the term ‘jurisdiction’ remains unsettled in public 
international law, resting on States’ ‘normative parameters’ to regulate matters that are 
not strictly domestic in nature and may be conceived as existing within the gaps between 
individual State’s competencies.
202
  In the international legal sense jurisdiction is 
primarily a creation of customary international law, and the purpose of the rules around 
jurisdiction “is to safeguard the international community against overreaching by 
individual nations”.
203
  Jurisdictional is therefore reflective of the principles of State 
sovereignty, the equality of States and "respect for independence and dignity of foreign 
States”.
204
  International jurisdiction originally arose from criminal law concepts
205
 and 
conceptually begins with territoriality, widely accepted as the “bedrock rule, the default 
or starting point”.
206
  Territoriality provides that a State enjoys exclusive jurisdiction and 
                                                 
201 Supra note 198 at 1022.  See also Roger O’Keefe “Universal Jurisdiction Clarifying the Basic 
Concept” (2004), J.I.C.J. 2, 735-760 at 735-737 and Christopher L. Blakesley “United States 
Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime” (1982) 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1109 at 1109.  
202 Supra note 198 at 1020-1021. 
203 Hannah L. Buxbaum, “Transnational Regulatory Litigation”, (2006) 46 Va J. Int’l L. 251, at 304.  
204 Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 90-91. 
205 Supra note 198 at 1022. 




control over every person and thing within its territory as a function of its sovereignty,
207
 
and as a result each State must be mindful of acts that might infringe upon matters 
outside of its own borders that may tread upon another State’s sovereignty.
208
   
Once beyond the boundaries of a State’s territory other principles underpinning 
extra-territorial State assertion of jurisdiction have evolved, which include the nationality 
principle,
209
 the protective principle
210
 and the passive personality principle.
211
  Of 
particular importance to this examination however is the universal principle, which 
permits State prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction over certain individuals (normally 
citizens), things (such as flagged vessels) or matters (such as acts of piracy).  The 
principle of universal jurisdiction is based in either customary or treaty-based criminal 
prohibitions, jurisdictional entitlements, or both.
212
  Universal jurisdiction provides the 
                                                 
207 Subject to the concept of sovereign immunity, described at I. Sinclair, “The Law of Sovereign 
Immunity:  Recent Developments” (1980) 167 Recueil des cours 113 as an international law concept 
that is an exception to the overarching principle of territorial jurisdiction, and is found where a State 
refrains from exercising its jurisdiction over a foreign State, normally in order to protect that foreign 
State’s sovereign rights while it is present or operating within the territory of the first State.   
208 Supra note 198 at 1025.  Geographic delineations of territorial sovereignty will be discussed in 
further detail within this paper. 
209 Ibid at 1027, this principle states that jurisdiction over the acts of a State’s nationals may be 
exercised regardless of where the underlying act occurred.  This generally accepted principle is more 
commonly relied upon by countries employing the civil law system than the common law system as 
found in Canada. 
210 Ibid, which states that the protective principle extends jurisdiction over acts committed beyond 
the territory of a coastal State but which are prejudicial to the security, territorial integrity and 
political independence of the State, and would include acts of treason and espionage. 
211 Ibid at 1027, the passive personality principle is used by a State to claim jurisdiction over an act 
(by another State or alien person) that caused injury to a national of that State, regardless of the 
location of the act or perpetrator.  This principle is acknowledged as a controversial basis for 
jurisdictional claims by a State however it has been more widely accepted within the context of 
terrorist violence. 
212 Ibid, describing this as the assertion of jurisdiction by States for criminal acts deemed offensive to 
the international community at large and for which some treaties have been adopted that require 
member States apprehending persons accused of relevant crimes to either prosecute or extradite the 




basis for criminal enforcement of international crimes
213
 including genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes,
214
 but also extends to crimes of piracy and the slave 
trade.
215
  States can exercise legislative universal jurisdiction narrowly (or conditionally), 
whereby the State enforces, prosecutes or even punishes offenders who are found present 
within the State.  States can also exercise this jurisdiction broadly (or absolutely) which 
involves a State acting against an accused regardless of where that person’s prohibited 
acts occurred or even if they are present in the State’s territory – such as in the case of 
piracy outside of another State’s territorial seas.  Bearing in mind these various principles 
of jurisdiction, a broader test for the extra-territorial exercise of legislative jurisdiction 
has more recently been proposed that would use these principles as criteria to satisfy the 
larger question of “whether there is a substantial and bona fide connection between the 
subject-matter and the source of the jurisdiction”.
216
   
3.3.1  Customary Rules of Extra-territorial Jurisdiction  The question of a State’s 
extra-territorial jurisdictional competency, and by extension an individual’s right to claim 
the application of domestic laws and State IHL obligations extra-territorially, has been 
the subject of a number of recent decisions by national and international tribunals.  These 
decisions have themselves been cited in Canadian and therefore it is instructive to review 
them beginning with the decision of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human 
                                                 
213 M. Madden, “Trading the Shield of Sovereignty for the Scales of Justice: A Proposal for Reform of 
International Sea Piracy Laws” (2008-2009) U.S.F. Mar L. J. Vol. 21 No. 2, at 156-157. 
214 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998)  
(“Rome Statute”).   The crime of aggression is also provided for however is as yet undefined in 
accordance with art. 121 and 123.  War crimes are defined at art. 8(2) and the International Criminal 
Court is given jurisdiction over these offences at art. 8(1).  Individual liability for crimes committed 
within the Courts jurisdiction at art. 25. 
215 Supra note 38 arts 99-100 




Rights (“ECtHR”) in Banković,
217
 followed by subsequent decisions from the House of 
Lords in Al Skeini
218
 and R (Al-Saadoon).
219
   Both of these last decisions are of some 
additional interest, as each was subsequently revisited by the ECtHR, first in 2010 as Al-
Saadoon
220
 followed by Al-Skeini and Others in 2011,
221
 where the Grand Chamber used 
similar reasoning as the House of Lords to come to a different conclusion.   
The Grand Chamber decision in Banković is generally seen as the modern 
benchmark for the question of extra-territorial jurisdiction, as the Chamber examined the 
jurisdictional limits of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”) in the context of military operations conducted by 
NATO, and whether claimants were properly within ECHR jurisdiction.
222
 In a 
unanimous decision the Grand Chamber reasoned that the special character of the ECHR 
was not intended to confer extra-territorial effect and therefore it was confined to act as a 
multilateral treaty within a regional, “legal space (espace juridique) of the contracting 
States”.
223
  Possible exceptions to this extra-territorial jurisdictional limit included “when 
                                                 
217 Banković v. Belgium and others (2001) ECHR 2001-XII, [2001] ECHR 890, 11 BHRC 435.   
218  Al-Skeini (Respondents) v. Secretary of State for Defence (Appellant), [2007] UKHL 26 (“Al Skeini”). 
219 R (Al-Saadoon and Another) v. Secretary of State for Defence [2009] EWCA Civ 7, 147 ILR 538 
(“R(Al-Saadoon)”). 
220 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom [2010]147 ILR 1(2) (“Al-Saadoon”).  
221 Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom [2011] ECHR 55721/07 (“Al-Skeini and Others”). 
222 Supra note 217.  This case inquired into whether citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) who were injured or killed when a building was bombed by a NATO air-strike within FRY 
territory were, in the circumstances, within the jurisdiction of the ECHR.  The Grand Chamber 
rejected the claimants’ argument that the victims were absorbed within the respondent NATO States’ 
jurisdiction by the air strike itself as a manifestation of sufficient control over the deceased, holding 
the ECHR was intended as a “constitutional instrument of European Order” and at para 80 concluded 
that in the circumstances no jurisdictional link existed between the respondent States and the 
victims, and the victims were therefore not within those States jurisdiction 
223 Ibid, at para 80 where the Grand Chamber acknowledged that the objectives of the ECHR were 
themselves not contrary to extra-territorial effect, the nature of the multilateral treaty confined it to 
regional application with few exceptions as the “Convention was not designed to be applied 




as a consequence of military action (lawful or unlawful) [a contracting State] exercised 
effective control of an area outside its national territory”, and “cases involving the 
activities of its diplomatic or consular agents abroad or onboard craft and vessels 
registered in, or flying the flag of, that State”.
 224
  With this ruling the Grand Chamber set 
up what has become a lightning rod for supporters and critics alike of extra-territorial 
jurisdiction, which has been alternately broadened and narrowed in subsequent national, 
and international, tribunal decisions.  
The limit to extra-territorial jurisdiction was subsequently re-visited by the U.K. 
House of Lords in Al Skeini
225
 and their review of the extra-territorial application of the 
U.K. Human Rights Act.
226
  Departing from Banković’s much criticized adherence to 
principles of territoriality, the House of Lords partially adopted reasoning previously used 
in the case of Issa v. Turkey,
227
 which held that the ECHR could not be interpreted so as 
to permit violations by a party to the convention so long as they were perpetrated in 
another State’s territory.
228
  Instead the Lords adopted the more nuanced approach of 
asking first if those affected “were under the authority and/or effective control, and 
                                                 
224 Ibid, at paras 70 and 72. 
225 Supra, note 218.   This cased involved six Iraqi civilians killed at the hands of British soldiers in 
Iraq; five as the result of troops operating within the country and the sixth after being detained by 
British forces and subsequently beaten to death by British troops. Families of the deceased sought to 
compel an independent inquiry into the circumstances of, and possible liability for, these deaths in 
breach of the ECHR as annexed within the U.K. HRA. 
226 Human Rights Act 1998, c42 (“HRA”), incorporating into U.K. legislation the ECHR. 
227 Issa v. Turkey (2004) 41 EHRR 567.  This matter involved Turkish denial of jurisdiction over an 
incident involving a number of Iraqi shepherds allegedly killed by Turkish troops operating in 
Northern Iraq, and whose families sought human rights protections under the ECHR.   
228 Supra, note 218 at para 71, where Lord Rodger stated for the court that “… a State may also be 
held accountable for violation of the Convention rights and freedoms of persons who are in the 
territory of another State but who are found to be under the former State’s authority and control 
through its agents operating – whether lawfully or unlawfully – in the latter State… Article 1 of the 
Convention cannot be interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the 




therefore within the jurisdiction, of the respondent State”.
229
  This refinement on 
Banković was tempered, however, as the Lords ultimately held that the ECHR was still 
only intended to operate regionally within the territory of member States, and thus 
applied “only in the case of territory which would normally be covered by the 
Convention”.
230
  It was further stressed that extra-territorial jurisdictional obligations 
must be rationally based and not subject to the vagaries of individual situations,
231
 and 
that Banković’s exceptions to extra-territorial jurisdiction based on effective control over 
an area and diplomatic agents embarked in ships or aircraft were not sufficiently “clear-
cut”.
232
  Lastly, the majority of the Lords rejected Issa’s ‘authority and control’ test in 
favour of a more restrictive ‘effective control’ test, requiring that de facto and de jure 
control by State agents extra-territorially be sufficient to secure all of the rights in 
dispute.
233
  Thus mere lawful physical control extra-territorially is by itself insufficient; 
                                                 
229 Ibid at para 72 and 74, requiring first a “sufficient factual basis for holding that, at the relevant 
time, the victims were within that specified area” 
230 Ibid at paras 77-78, where Lord Rodger noted that justification could be found, as acknowledged 
in para 80 of Banković, to fill a “gap or vacuum” but that the Convention was intended to operate 
regionally and not throughout the world, “even in respect of the conduct of contracting States”, and 
that “jurisdiction based on effective control only in the case of territory.  If it went further, the court 
would run the risk not only of colliding with the jurisdiction of other human rights bodies but of 
being accused of human rights imperialism”. 
231 Ibid at para 79, where Lord Rodger adopted the reasoning in Banković that a jurisdictional 
obligation was unable to be “divided and tailored in accordance with the particular circumstances of 
the extra-territorial act in question.  In other words, the whole package of rights applies and must be 
secured where a contracting State has jurisdiction”, and thus jurisdiction arises “only where the 
contracting State has such effective control of the territory of another State that it could secure to 
everyone in the territory all the rights and freedoms” associated.  At para 91 Baroness Hale agreed 
with this approach, stating that “The Strasbourg case law is quite plain that liability for acts taking 
effect or taking place outside the territory of a member State is exceptional and requires special 
justification”, a position also supported by Lord Carswell at para 97.  
232 Ibid at paras 30 and 33, where Lord Bingham examined the question of military forces exercising 
“effective control of an area outside its national territory” and cases involving diplomatic or consular 
agents abroad and on board craft and vessels registered or flagged by that State. 
233 Ibid, at para 127 where Lord Brown stated “It is one thing to recognize as exceptional the specific 




any previously existing laws governing the space in question must be displaced (or, it 
could be reasoned based upon the principle of complementarity, not be contrary to the 
extra-territorial application of the displacing law).
234
   
The issue of extra-territorial jurisdiction was subsequently revisited, first by the 
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
235
 in R (Al-Saadoon)
236
 and then on appeal by the 
                                                                                                                                                 
that whenever a contracting State acts (militarily or otherwise) through its agents abroad, those 
affected by such activities fall within its Article 1 jurisdiction.  Such a contention would prove 
altogether too much. It would make a nonsense of much that was said in Banković, not least as to the 
Convention being “a constitutional instrument of European public order”, operating “in an essentially 
regional context”, “not designed to be applied throughout the world, even in respect of the conduct of 
contracting States” (para 80). It would, indeed, make redundant the principle of effective control of 
an area: what need for that if jurisdiction arises in any event under a general principle of “authority 
and control” irrespective of whether the area is (a) effectively controlled or (b) within the Council of 
Europe?” Lord Brown continued at para 129 to rationalize that “except where a State really does 
have effective control of territory, it cannot hope to secure Convention rights within that territory 
and, unless it is within the area of the Council of Europe, it is unlikely in any event to find certain of 
the Convention rights it is bound to secure reconcilable with the customs of the resident population. 
Indeed it goes further than that. During the period in question here it is common ground that the U.K. 
was an occupying power in Southern Iraq and bound as such by Geneva IV and by the Hague 
Regulations. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations provides that the occupant “shall take all the 
measures in his power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while 
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country”. The appellants argue that 
occupation within the meaning of the Hague Regulations necessarily involves the occupant having 
effective control of the area and so being responsible for securing there all Convention rights and 
freedoms. So far as this being the case, however, the occupants' obligation is to respect “the laws in 
force”, not to introduce laws and the means to enforce them (for example, courts and a justice 
system) such as to satisfy the requirements of the Convention. Often (for example where Sharia law 
is in force) Convention rights would clearly be incompatible with the laws of the territory occupied” 
234 Ibid at para 33. 
235 On 1 October 2009 the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom assumed all judicial functions of the 
previous British House of Lords in their role as the court of appeal under the authority of the 
Constitution Reform Act 2005 (c.4). 
236 Supra note 219, this case involved claims advanced by Iraqi citizens who were detained by British 
forces operating in Iraq.  The British government agreed to an Iraqi request to transfer these 
prisoners to stand trial for alleged war crimes, which could have resulted in the imposition of the 
death penalty if convicted.  At the time of the prisoners capture, British forces were in Iraq as part of 
the coalition that displaced the former Iraqi government, and had declared themselves an occupying 
power as part of the Multi-National Force (“MNF”) which was endorsed by UN Security Council 
Resolutions 1483 and 1511 at para 13.  Subsequent S.C. Res 1546, U.N. Doc S/RES/1546 (8 June 
2004) at para 10 permitted the troops forming the MNF, following the end of this occupation but 
remaining at the request of the Iraqi government, to contribute to the stabilization of Iraq and 
authorized them to “take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and 




Strasbourg Court in Al-Saadoon.
237
  Looking first at the unanimous Supreme Court 
decision, four propositions were set out;
 238
 
(1)  It is an exceptional jurisdiction, 
(2) determined in harmony with other applicable norms of international law.  Together 
these propositions require the lawful exercise of sovereign legal authority, and not merely 
de facto power, extra-territorially, and further that as a condition precedent this authority 




(3)  it reflects the regional nature of Convention rights, 
(4)  and the indivisible nature of Convention rights.  Still recognized was the concept of 
the State parties espace juridique, and that this legal space must be capable of near-
                                                                                                                                                 
detained they were within U.K. jurisdiction for the purpose of section 1 of the ECHR, and thus should 
benefit from the rights provided for there including the right not to be deprived of life at Article 2.   
237 Supra note 220. 
238 Supra note 219 at paras 37-39 where Laws LJ stated for the court “It is not easy to identify 
precisely the scope of the Article 1 jurisdiction where it is said to be exercised outside the territory of 
the impugned State party, because the learning makes it clear that its scope has no sharp edge; it has 
to be ascertained from a combination of key ideas which are strategic rather than lexical” 
239 Ibid, stating this extra-territorial application of jurisdiction “is of itself an exceptional state of 
affairs, though well recognized in some instances such as that of an embassy. The power must be 
given by law, since if it were given only by chance or strength its exercise would by no means be 
harmonious with material norms of international law, but offensive to them; and there would be no 
principled basis on which the power could be said to be limited, and thus exceptional. … It is 
impossible to reconcile a test of mere factual control with the limiting effect of the first two 
propositions …  These first two propositions, … condition the others.”  He went on to state that “If a 
State party is to exercise Article 1 jurisdiction outside its own territory, the regional and indivisible 
nature of the Convention rights requires the existence of a regime in which that State enjoys legal 
powers wide enough to allow its vindication, consistently with its obligations under international 
law, of the panoply of Convention rights—rights which may however, in the territory in question, 




replication in the extra-territorial environment to a level comparable with what the 
sending State executive enjoys within its own territory.
240
   
A few years after R (Al-Saadoon) and Al-Skeini were decided in the U.K. the 
matters were referred to the Strasbourg Court as Al-Saadoon and Al-Skeini and Others 
where the court employed much of the same reasoning as the Supreme Court yet came to 
opposite conclusions on their finding of the facts.  On the issue of jurisdiction the court 
again noted the limited, “notably territorial” jurisdictional reach permitted by Article 1, 
recognizing the need for contracting States to secure protected rights and freedoms to 
those within its own jurisdiction while not imposing these standards upon the States 
within which this extra-territorial jurisdiction was being exercised.
241
  The court then 
further acknowledged that customary international law and treaties do recognize the 
extra-territorial exercise of a State’s jurisdiction, again citing examples of diplomatic or 
consular agents abroad and on board aircraft and vessels registered in or flying their 
State’s flag.
242
  Using similar reasoning as the U.K. Supreme Court, the Strasbourg Court 
disagreed in the result and concluded that the circumstances showed both de facto and de 
jure control and therefore the detainees were within U.K. jurisdiction and entitled to 
                                                 
240 Ibid, stating that “The Convention's natural setting is the espace juridique of the States parties; if, 
exceptionally, its writ is to run elsewhere, this espace juridique must in considerable measure be 
replicated. In short the State party must have the legal power to fulfill substantial governmental 
functions as a sovereign State. It may do so within a narrow scope, as in an embassy, consulate, 
military base or prison; it may, in order to do so, depend on the host State's consent or the mandate 
of the United Nations; but however precisely exemplified, this is the kind of legal power the State 
must possess: it must enjoy the discretion to decide questions of a kind which ordinarily fall to a 
State's executive government. If the Article 1 jurisdiction is held to run in other circumstances, the 
limiting conditions imposed by the four propositions I have set out will be undermined.” 
241 Supra note 220 at para 84, and supra note 221 at paras 131-150. 




protections of the ECHR.
243
  In the end these two courts, despite coming to different 
results, agreed upon the principles governing the exercise of extra-territorial State 
jurisdiction.  
3.3.2  Extra-territorial Jurisdiction and Security Council Resolutions  As can be seen 
from these decisions, an overriding concern regarding State extra-territorial actions 
remains the degree of infringement one State may impose upon the sovereign jurisdiction 
of another State.  At this point it becomes important to also recognize the potential effect 
of the UN Charter and its goal of maintaining international peace and security.
244
  In 
achieving this goal, the UN Charter balances the interests of international human rights
245
 
with respect for the independence and equality of States,
246
 and in the context of 
international jurisdiction it is the work of the UN Security Council, through its 
resolutions (UNSCRs), that will have the most effect in achieving this balance. 
                                                 
243 Ibid at para 87 where the Strasbourg Court stressed that the detainees were taken prisoner and 
the deaths occurred while the U.K. was essentially an occupying power and then retained while the 
U.K. remained to assist in stabilizing Iraqi security – during which time a Multi National Force order 
stated that “all premises currently used by the MNF should be inviolable and subject to the exclusive 
control and authority of the MNF”.  The Strasburg Court went on at para 88 to hold this result was 
consistent with their own dicta in Al-Skeini, citing supra note 218 at para 62.  Also followed in supra 
note 220 at paras 149-150 where the Court held that in the exceptional circumstances of coalition 
forces removing the Iraqi government from power and until the accession of the interim government, 
the UK “exercised authority and control over individuals killed in the course of security operations”, 
thus establishing a jurisdictional link. 
244 Supra note 99, supra note 1 at 35, discussing the recognition at art. 1 of the UN Charter of the 
interdependence of political, social, cultural, humanitarian and economic problems internationally, 
and the role the UN is expected to play in addressing these human problems together with a number 
of idealistic, rather than normative, objectives that balance the interests of States against those of 
peoples (individuals). 
245 Supra note 99 (UN Charter ), preamble “We the Peoples of the United Nations determined … to 
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the 
equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under 
which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international 
law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom”. 




The UN Security Council enjoys the authority to “determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and to take such measures 
as required to “maintain or restore international peace and security”,
247
 all the while 
acting “in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”.
248
  In 
order to give effect to this responsibility, all member States must accept the 
implementation of Chapter VI and VII measures,
249
 alongside the requirement imposed 
by Article 103 that “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of 
the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”
250
  
Thus any discussion of international jurisdiction must acknowledge the power of the UN 
Security Council, which through its resolutions can cross all principles of State 
jurisdiction, and even sovereignty, and sanction at international law an otherwise 
unlawful act (such as by authorizing the use of force against a State). 
The question of the extent to which UNSCRs can qualify other international law 
was reviewed by the British House of Lords in Al-Jedda
251
 where Articles 25
252
 and 
                                                 
247 Ibid, at art. 39. 
248 Ibid, at art. 24(2). 
249 Ibid, at art 25 “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of 
the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter”. 
250 Ibid, at art. 103. 
251 R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58, [2008] 3 All ER 
28 (Al-Jedda).  Specifically the question raised was whether the U.K. had sufficient authority to detain 
individuals for security reasons while operating in Iraq as part of a UNSCR authorized multinational 
force. 
252 Article 25 states ““The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions 






 of the UN Charter were examined to see if they qualified U.K. obligations under 
Article 5(1) of the ECHR.
254
  The majority decisions reconciled the competing 
commitments of the UN Charter and UNSCR 1546 (2004)
 255
 with those of the ECHR by 
qualifying, rather than displacing, ECHR Article 5(1) with UN Charter obligations.
256
  
Reconciling practical realities of ground operations with the desire to observe detainee 
rights to the greatest extent possible,
257
 the decision held that the UN Charter had 
primacy over ECHR obligations, and only by qualifying the ECHR right under Article 
                                                 
253 Article 103 reads “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United 
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, 
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” 
254 Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, incorporating into U.K. law the ECHR.  See Supra note 251 at paras 
151-152. 
255 Supra note 236 (UNSCR 1546) at para 10.  This authorization was similar to that granted for ISAF 
forces authorized under S.C. Res 1386 (2001), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (20 December 2001) para 3, 
and S.C. Res 1510 (2003), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1510 (13 October 2003) para 4 which authorized ISAF to 
“take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate” to maintain security throughout Afghanistan to 
allow Afghan Authorities, UN personnel and international civilians engaged in reconstruction and 
humanitarian efforts to operate in a secure environment).  
256 Supra note 89 at 144, supra note 251 at paras 3, 26-39 (Lord Bingham), paras. 115-118 (Lord 
Rodger), paras. 125-129 (Baroness Hale), paras 131-136 (Lord Carswell), and paras 151-152 (Lord 
Brown).   Lord Bingham noted the text of the UNSCR which said in part that “the multinational force 
shall have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security 
and stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters annexed to this resolution”.  Among these annexed 
letters was that from US Secretary of State Colin Powell, which provided at paragraph 14 that as part 
of its combat operations “the MNF stands ready to continue to undertake a broad range of tasks to 
contribute to the maintenance of security and to ensure force protection. These include activities 
necessary to counter ongoing security threats posed by forces seeking to influence Iraq’s political 
future through violence. This will include combat operations against members of these groups, 
internment where this is necessary for imperative reasons of security…” (emphasis added). 
257 Ibid at para. 34, 39 where Lord Bingham held that U.K. forces were “bound to exercise its powers 
of detention where this was necessary for imperative reasons of security”, but “must ensure that the 
detainee’s rights under Article 5 [of the Convention] are not infringed to any greater extent than is 








From the reasoning in Al-Jedda, Articles 25 and 103 of the UN Charter combine 
to mean “the [UN Security] Council has the authority to make legally binding decisions 
with which States must comply in all circumstances”, because absent this broad authority 
the UN Security Council and Chapter VII actions would be ineffective.
259
  It therefore 
follows that, when examining other international obligations, including those involving 
human rights (with the possible exception of jus cogens norms), these competing 
obligations may be qualified by applicable Security Council resolutions.   This is not to 
say that conflicting obligations are always to be invalidated in favour of Council 
authorizations; rather infringement of these rights is to be no greater than required in 
meeting the Security Council mandate.
260
  The effect of this reasoning is evident in the 
contemporary practice of summarily disposing of equipment, arms and ships suspected of 
being used or intended for use in piracy – a power not provided for under UNCLOS or 
any other international law.
261
   
                                                 
258 Supra note 89 at 157, citing ibid at para. 125, 126 where Baroness Hale expressed that “some way 
has to be found of reconciling our competing commitments under the (UN Charter) and the European 
Convention”, and held that “the only way is by adopting such a qualification of the Convention rights” 
such that the right was not “displaced. … the right is qualified only to the extent required or 
authorized by the resolution.  What remains of it thereafter must be observed”. 
259 Supra note 89 at 146, citing S. Ratner, “The Security Council and International Law, in D. Malone 
(ed.), the UN Security Council: from the Cold War to the 21st Century (Boulder, Rienner, 2004), 34. 
260 Ibid at 157, 159-161. 
261 Supra note 67 at 146-147.  At supra note 68 (UNSCR 1846 para 9; UNSCR 1851 para 2; UNSCR 
1897 para 3), novel authority is arguably provided when ‘States, regional and international 
organizations’ are called upon ‘to take part actively in the fight against piracy’, including by ‘seizure 
and disposition of boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment used [or where there are 




It is with all of this in mind that my examination of the international legal bases 
for operations will proceed, as the RCN’s extra-territorial actions will necessarily engage 
one or more of the above principles.  I will therefore next outline the legal basis at 
international law for jurisdiction over counter-narcotics trafficking, and then counter-
piracy operations, after which I will discuss the jurisdiction required to lawfully detain 
ships (and their occupants) at sea, and the rights and obligations engaged under IHRL 
when persons are detained, as well as potential remedies for any breaches. 
3.3.3  Jurisdiction in Counter-Narcotics Missions – OP CARIBBE  The international 
legal basis for Op CARIBBE can be traced first to Article 108 of UNCLOS, which 
requires all States to co-operate in suppressing illicit high-seas drug trafficking.
262
  
Article 108 goes on, however, to restrict this requirement to situations where a State 
believes on reasonable grounds that its own flagged ship is engaged in illicit trafficking, 
and provides that the State may request co-operation from another State.
263
 Subsequently, 
the UN Narcotics Convention was adopted, which again permitted third party requests to 
board and search another State’s flagged vessels where ‘reasonable grounds’ existed to 
suspect they were engaged in illicit trafficking while exercising ‘freedom of navigation’ 
and, where illicit narcotics are found, to take appropriate action.
264
  This authority 
contemplated such actions anywhere outside of territorial waters,
265
 but again relied upon 
consent from the flag State to take action.  As with UNCLOS, then, the enforcement 
                                                 
262 Supra note 38 (UNCLOS) at art 108(1). 
263 Ibid at art. 108(2). 
264 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 20 
December 1988, U.N.T.S. 1582, p. 95. (“UN Narcotics Convention”) at art 17(3) and (4). 




jurisdiction provided through this treaty contained a gap by requiring flag-State consent 
prior to taking investigative or enforcement action. 
Through a series of multilateral and bilateral treaties, themselves encouraged by 
the UN Narcotics Convention,
266
 a number of affected States entered into agreements that 
have formed a web of ‘advance’ permissions to interdict suspected traffic.
267
  These 
permissive agreements all contain ‘preferential jurisdiction’ clauses, retaining exclusive 
flag State jurisdiction over their flagged vessels,
268
 but the agreements then vary in their 
functional approach to boarding and detentions by the other signatory State.  The 
Spanish-Italian agreement, for example, provides that each party gives to the other the 
“right to intervene [aboard] as its agent”,
269
 while the Council of Europe Agreement 
(“1995 European Agreement”) provides that arrested suspects may be “surrendered”
270
 
rather than extradited, “reflect(ing) some States’ view that the boarding States’ 
enforcement jurisdiction is essentially one loaned by the flag State”.
271
  Thus European 
                                                 
266 Supra note 264 at art. 17(7). 
267 Supra note 77 at 85 – 96 citing the Treaty between the Kingdom of Spain and the Italian Republic to 
combat Illicit Drug Trafficking at Sea, 1776 UNTS 229 (“1990 Spanish-Italian Treaty”), the Agreement 
on Illicit Traffic by Sea, implementing Article 17 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, ETS no. 156 (31 January 1995) (“1995 European 
Agreement”), and 24 bilateral agreements between the United States and States in the Caribbean 
basin, Central and South America and the United Kingdom. 
268 Ibid at 85 citing the 1990 Spanish-Italian treaty, art. 4(2) and 6; at p. 86 with reference to 1995 
European Agreement. 
269 Ibid, at 85 citing R v. Dean and Bolden [1998] 2 Cr. App. R. 171, 173-5. 
270The term ‘surrender’ has been held to be synonymous with ‘transfer’, this implying the forced 
movement of the prisoner without recourse to the full rights normally engaged in an extradition – 
within the European context this has been described as “at most, … a simplified form of extradition 
involving a judicial process and a degree of human rights scrutiny” (Ibid, at 87 citing N. Vennemann, 
‘The European arrest warrant and its human rights implications”, (2003) 63 ZaőRV 103 at 109, 112-
19. 
271 Supra note 77 at 86 citing supra note 267 (1995 European Agreement) arts. 14, 15 and W. 
Gilmore, ‘Narcotics interdiction at sea: the 1995 Council of Europe Agreement’ (1996) 20 Marine 






 have moved beyond the encouragement found in the UN Narcotics Convention 
to create a proactive and multilateral approach to stemming the flow of narcotics, 
permitting an expeditious application of UNCLOS and UN Narcotics Convention 
enforcement spirit. 
Of greater concern to contemporary RCN operations are the extensive series of 
bilateral treaties entered into between the United States and affected Caribbean basin 
States, providing for “consensual boardings in international waters and enforcement 
(seizure) jurisdiction over vessels, their cargo or crew”.
273
  These agreements typically 
provide for “either actual or presumed consent to boarding flag vessels”,
274
 requiring a 
request for consent from the intervening State, but then providing “[i]f there is no 
response [within a set time limit] the requesting Party will be deemed to have been 
authorized to board the suspect vessel for the purpose of inspecting … to determine if 
[the suspect vessel] is engaged in illicit traffic”.
275
  The time requirement ranges from 




 and three hours.
278
  These treaties 
                                                 
272 Ibid (1995 European Agreement).  In 2007, seven European countries (France, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the U.K.) concluded an agreement to co-operate through the 
Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre (Narcotics) (MAOC (N)) for the suppression of illicit drug 
trafficking by sea and air within an operational area of the Atlantic (Europe to West Africa) and into 
the Western Mediterranean basin.  Canada and the US hold observer status. 
273 Supra note 77 at 89. 
274 Ibid. 
275 Ibid citing the Agreement between the United States and Guatemala Concerning Cooperation to 
Suppress Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances by Sea and Air (2003) 
(“Guatemala agreement”) at art. 7(3)(c) and (d). 
276 Ibid at 90 citing the Agreement between the US and Haiti concerning cooperation to suppress illicit 
maritime traffic, KAV 6079 (1997) (“Haiti Agreement”) and Agreement between the US and Costa Rica 
Concerning Cooperation to Suppress Illicit Traffic, TIAS 13005 (19 November 1998, amended 2 July 
1999 ) (“Costa Rica Agreement”). 
277 Ibid at  89-90 citing agreements with supra note 275 (“Guatemala Agreement”), Agreement 




then further provide direction on authority for subsequent legal proceedings, should 
illegal activity be revealed following a boarding – again covering a range of constraints 
and permissions to seek instructions from the flag State
279
 prior to taking law 
enforcement actions.  Because these agreements are binding only upon those States party 
to the agreements, it can be seen that care must be taken to understand, early in the 
boarding and search phase of a naval operation, precisely which flag a particular target 
vessel flies.  
Next, looking to the practice of LEDETs, operating as law enforcement 
authorities from one State embarked on another State’s government vessels and boarding 
ships for law enforcement purposes, it may be observed that this approach is neither 
uncommon nor novel.  The use of ‘ship-riders’, or law enforcement officials embarked 
onboard another State’s governmental vessels, is specifically contemplated and 
                                                                                                                                                 
maritime traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, TIAS, 2000 U.S.T. LEXIS 159 
(“Honduras Agreement”), Agreement between the US and the Government of Nicaragua concerning 
cooperation to suppress illicit traffic by sea and air, TIAS, 2001 U.S.T. LEXIS 63 (“Nicaragua 
Agreement”), Arrangement between the Government of the US and the Government of Panama for 
Support and Assistance from the U.S. Coast Guard for the National Maritime service for the Ministry of 
Government and Justice, TIAS 11833, U.S.T. LEXIS 51 and supplementary arrangement (“Panama 
Agreement”), and the Agreement between the US and Venezuela to suppress Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances by Sea, TIAS 11827 (1991) (“Venezuela Agreement”). 
278 Ibid, at 90 citing agreements the Agreement between the US and Colombia to Suppress Illicit Traffic 
by Sea, KAV 4867 (1997) (“Colombia Agreement”), the Agreement between Barbados and the US 
Concerning Cooperation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime Drug Trafficking, KAV 5337 (1998) (“Barbados 
Agreement”), and the Agreement between the Government of the USA and the Government of Jamaica 
concerning cooperation in suppressing illicit maritime drug trafficking, TIAS, 1977 U.S.T. LEXIS 21 
amended TIAS , 2004 U.S.T. LEXIS 1 (“Jamaica Agreement”). 
279 Ibid at 90-91.  Agreements between the US and supra note 276 (Haiti Agreement) at art. 16, Costa 
Rica Agreement at art. 6, supra note 277 (Honduras Agreement) at art. 7(1) and ibid (Barbados 
Agreement) at art. 15 are cited as typical, providing that flag States retain primary jurisdictional 
rights on their vessels, which may be waived on request from the US.  In contrast, ibid (Columbian 
Agreement) permits situations of US law enforcement primacy to the exclusion of Columbian 
criminal law at art. 16, while the agreement at supra note 277 (Venezuelan Agreement) only permits 
“an expeditious ‘decision by the flag State as to which Party is to exercise enforcement jurisdiction’” 




authorized within one multilateral convention
280
 and seven US bilateral treaties.
281
  The 
intent of these agreements is to permit States (normally non-US) to retain formal control 
over interdictions involving their own flag vessels
282
 and for all vessels within their own 
territorial waters,
 283
 likely in situations where those States did not have the naval 
capabilities to exercise such operations themselves.  The US Coast Guard use of 
LEDETS then evolved in a parallel fashion, first to deploy on USN “’ships of 
opportunity’, transiting or operating in areas frequently used by illegal drug traffickers” 
as a means of working around the American posse comitatus doctrine prohibiting US 
military personnel from directly engaging in law enforcement activities.
284
   
Under the LEDET paradigm, a USN vessel interdicting suspected drug smugglers 
would “shift its tactical control to the [US] Coast Guard, hoist the Coast Guard ensign to 
signify its law enforcement authority as a temporary [US] Coast Guard unit, and then 
deploy its LEDET to carry out the law enforcement boarding”.
285
  This process is also 
                                                 
280 Agreement Concerning Co-operation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime and Air Trafficking in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in the Caribbean Area, 10 April 2003, TS 2003-82 at art. 8-10. 
(Online: http://www.minbuza.nl/en/key-topics/treaties/search-the-
treatydatabase/2003/4/010467. html) 
281 Supra note 77 at 91 citing supra note 278 (Barbados Agreement) at art. 3-4; Costa Rica Agreement 
at art. 4; supra note 276 (Haiti Agreement) at art. 4-10; supra note 277 (Honduras Agreement at art. 
4; and Nicaragua Agreement at art. 4-5); and supra note 278 (Jamaica Agreement) art. 7-9. 
282 Ibid. 
283 Juliana Gonzalez-Pinto, “Interdiction of Narcotics in International Waters”, (2007-2008) 15 U. 
Miami Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. at 454. 
284 Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs): A History (Online: 
http://www.uscg.mil/history/articles/LEDET_History.asp last modified 26 January 2012), Michael 
Cunningham “Military’s Involvement in Law Enforcement: The Threat is Not What You Think”, 26 
Seattle U. L. Rev. 699 (2002-2003) 703-705. 
285  Douglas Daniels, “How to Allocate Responsibilities between the Navy and Coast Guard in 
Maritime Counterterrorism Operations” (2006-2007) 61 U. Miami L. Rev 467, at p. 483.  See also 
Joseph Kramek, “Bilateral Maritime Counter-Drug and Immigrant Interdiction Agreements: Is This 




known as CHOPing, or a ‘Change in Operational Control’.
286
 Those detained by the 
LEDETs are then prosecuted within the American judicial system for contraventions of 
the United States Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
287
, an extra-territorial application 
of US domestic law that American courts have held “can be applied against Stateless 
vessels on the high seas irrespective of any direct nexus between the conduct and the 
United States”.
288
  This broad interpretation of lawfulness relies in part on US judicial 
interpretation of UNCLOS by reasoning that stateless vessels are subject to all states’ 




This system of embarking LEDETs was subsequently expanded beyond the use of 
USN vessels to include Dutch, British and French government ships
290
 as part of what is 
referred to as the ‘West Indies Guard Ships’ (WIGS),
291
 frequently through the use of 
existing or amended bilateral agreements that specifically contemplated the use of these 
foreign warships.
292
  Persons and suspects detained by the LEDETs deployed onboard 
                                                 
286 Ibid (J. Kramek) at 139. 
287 Supra note 87. 
288 Supra note 77 at 81. 
289  Allyson Bennett, “That Sinking Feeling:  Stateless Ships, Universal Jurisdiction, and the Drug 
Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act” (2012) 37 Yale J. Int’I L. 433 at 443, citing United States v. Caicedo, 
47 F.3d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1995)  
290 Supra note 285 at 139-140, citing U.S. Coast Guard Memorandum from Commandant of Coast 
Guard, 272353Z, on LEDET Embarkation Aboard WIGS (May 1993) and the U.S. Coast Guard 
Memorandum from American Embassy in Caracas, 101753Z, on U.S./V.E. Maritime Counter-Drug 
Shipboarding Agreement-Protocol Initialed Covering U.S. Coast Guard boardings from U.K., Dutch and 
French Warships (July 1997). 
291 Ibid. 





these foreign warships then continue to be prosecuted by US courts, the foreign warships 
exercising no claim of jurisdiction in the matter.
293
 
As can be seen, Canada would be engaging in what has become a well accepted 
practice by entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements with other affected States to 
determine issues of jurisdictional claim over vessels and their crews suspected of 
trafficking on the high seas, or within territorial waters if so provided.  Likewise, by 
embarking USCG LEDETs onboard RCN Ships,
294
 Canada would be following in the 
wake of other affected States who have chosen to work with American law enforcement.  
Either course of action will bring about further issues of extra-territorial jurisdiction, as 
will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
3.3.4  Jurisdiction in Counter-piracy Operations  To begin to understand the 
contemporary issue of piracy it is first necessary to review what piracy is, not only in 
customary and treaty law but also domestic laws and contemporary international 
practices.  The most widely accepted definition of piracy at international law is found in 
UNCLOS
295
 at Article 101, which states that piracy consists of: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed 
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private 
aircraft, and directed: 
                                                 
293 No instance of claims under any European law was found – which accords with anecdotal 
statements made by USCG officials working at the Joint Interagency Task Force South in July 2007 
that should such a claim arise, the agreed course of action was to simply ‘release’ the individual 
(having seized the narcotics) rather than see any chilling effect to this fragile international agreement 
and cooperative action created by human rights litigation.  
294 One bilateral treaty contemplating such an arrangemen is the Framework Agreement on 
Integrated Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations Between The Government of Canada 
and The Government of the United Staets of America, Can TS 2012 No 25 (entered into force 11 
October 2012). 




(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or 
property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft 
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in 




At international law therefore an act of piracy is one that first incorporates an 
illegal act of violence, detention or depredation.
297
  Next, this illegal action must be 
committed for private ends – this excludes individuals acting on behalf of a State.
298
  This 
definition of piracy also excludes piracy-type acts taken for political motives, including 
terrorism.
299
  The third requirement is that it must be a private vessel used to commit the 
acts of piracy – again, unless a State vessel’s crew mutinies and then converts the vessel 
to a pirate vessel, State vessels (either warships or government ships) will not meet this 
requirement.  Lastly, and as will be seen critical to this discussion, to fit within the 
                                                 
296 Ibid, art 101. 
297 Alfred Rubin, The Law of Piracy, 2d ed. (Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: Transnational, 1998) c.1 at 366-
367.  Rubin points out that the question of by whom, and under what law are these acts found 
“illegal”, was left unstated.  In Canada little clarity is also found in criminal law as within the Criminal 
Code, supra note 20 at art. 74, piracy is simply defined as “(1) Every one commits piracy who does 
any act that, by the law of nations, is piracy.” 
298 Supra note 3 at 284.  The private ends requirement was first incorporated into an international 
treaty in the United Nations Convention on the High Seas, 29 April 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 at art. 15.  
Reasons for the persistent inclusion of this requirement are uncertain, however supra note 212 at 
144-145 speculated this was done for reasons of drafting expediency and not out of a considered 
decision. 
299 Michael Passman, “Protections Afforded to Captured Pirates Under the Law of War and 
International Law”, 33 Tul.Mar. L.J. 1 2008-2009 at 12.  As Passman points out however, such acts are 
captured under the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 




definition of piracy for the purposes of international law the impugned act must occur 
beyond any coastal State’s territorial sea and thus outside of the territorial jurisdiction of 
any particular coastal State.
300
  A fourth requirement known as the “two ship” rule is also 
commonly cited, namely that a pirate act cannot occur on a single vessel but must involve 
two or more vessels or aircraft.
301
  
Having defined what constitutes piracy, Article 110 of UNCLOS then authorizes 
State warships to board suspected pirate vessels on the high seas, other than those 
enjoying complete immunity, where it is reasonably suspected the vessel is:
302
   
(a) engaged in piracy; 
(b) engaged in the slave trade; 
(c) engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of the warship has 
jurisdiction under Article 109; 
(d) is without nationality; or 
(e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, 
of the same nationality as the warship. 
 
                                                 
300 The High Seas are defined in Supra note 38 (UNCLOS) art 69 and 86 to comprise all parts of the 
sea that are not included in the EEZ, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the 
archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.  This exclusion of the EEZ from the high seas is not 
universally held as accurate, by operation of article 58(2) which provides that Articles “88 to 115 and 
other pertinent rules of International Law apply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are 
not incompatible with this Part”, thus permitting that provisions applicable to the high seas, 
including piracy, apply to the EEZ provided they are not in conflict with UNCLOS provisions 
respecting the EEZ; see Douglas Guifoyle, Treaty Jurisdiction over Pirates: A Compilation of Legal Texts 
with Introductory Notes, prepared for the 3rd Meeting of Working Group 2 on Legal Issues of the 
Contact Group off the Coast of Somalia, Copenhagen, 26 – 27 August 2009 at 4, available at 
http://www.academia.edu/195470/Treaty_Jurisdiction_over_Pirates_A_Compilation_of_Legal_Texts_
with_Introductory_Notes.  This requirement that international piracy only be found outside the limits 
of territorial sovereignty can be traced to State desires to maintain control over illegal acts occurring 
within their sovereign waters; ibid at 146. 
301 Supra note 213 at 147-148 where the author traces this “two vessel” requirement to a States 
desire to maintain sole jurisdiction over incidents occurring solely onboard their own flagged 
vessels.  The author opined that by limiting the definition of piracy to exclude incidents, however 
violent, that did not involve another States flagged vessels the community of nations signaled that it 
was not concerned with otherwise criminal conduct whose effect did not spread beyond the hull of 
the concerned vessel. 




Where the warship reasonably suspects any of these infractions, verification by 
boarding, inspection of the ship’s documents and further investigation are permitted 
under Article 110, but must be completed “with all possible consideration”.
303
  
Complementary authority is provided at UNCLOS Article 105, which authorizes every 
“State, on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, to seize 
a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of 
pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board.”
304
   
Gaps in the restrictive UNCLOS definition of piracy, including the private ends 
requirement and the exclusion of incidents occurring within States’ territorial waters, 
were dramatically exposed on 7 October 1985 when the Italian cruise liner ACHILLE 
LAURO was hijacked by Palestinian terrorists.
305
  Demanding that Israel release fifty 
jailed Palestinians, including convicted terrorists, the terrorist hijackers held ACHILLE 
LAURO for 48 hours and killed a single American citizen.
306
  Although publically 
decried as piracy, this incident failed to meet the legal definition at international law for a 
number of reasons, including the political basis of the act (terrorism), the lack of a 
“second vessel”, and that the hijacking arguably occurred within Egyptian territorial 
waters.   Largely in response to this criticism, the Convention for the Suppression of 
                                                 
303 Ibid.  As will be further discussed, this universal enforcement jurisdiction is exercised by the flag 
State of the warship.  Therefore, naval commanders continue to require domestic legal authority, 
either standing or situational based, to conduct such actions. 
304 Ibid at art. 105. 
305 The President of the UN Security Council, writing for the Council, condemned “this unjustifiable 
and criminal hijacking as well as other acts of terrorism, including hostage-taking.”  United Nations 
Security Council Statement, 24 I.L.M. 1565 1985, S/17554. 
306 Helmut Tuerk, “Combating Terrorism at Sea-The Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety 
of Maritime Navigation”, 15 U. Miami Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 339 (2007-2008) at 338-339 describing 




Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
307
 (SUA) was negotiated and 
concluded.
308
   
The SUA addresses violent acts carried out onboard seagoing vessels which 
amount to threats against the safety of navigation, and prohibits the use of force to seize 
ships, acts of violence against persons onboard or destruction of vessels or cargo likely to 
endanger the safe navigation of the ship, and the placing of devices onboard ships which 
are likely to damage or destroy the vessel.
309
  By addressing piracy-required elements 
found in UNCLOS such as the oft quoted “two-ship rule”,
310
 “private ends 
requirement”
311
 and the “high-seas rule”,
312
 the SUA provides for arguably broader 
enforcement jurisdiction – requiring States party to criminalize those specific acts within 
their domestic legislation and thus achieving the jurisdictional nexus between the act and 
the prosecuting State.
313
  The SUA also obliges contracting States to either prosecute or 
extradite alleged offenders,
314
 and to settle any disputes via arbitration or referral to the 
                                                 
307 Supra note 299 (SUA). 
308 Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantanamo on the Sea: The Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates and 
Terrorists”, Northwestern Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Series No. 09-10, at 254 citing Malvina 
Halberstam “Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on 
Maritime Safety”, 82 Am. J. Int’l L. 269, 270-72 (1988).   
309  Supra note299 (SUA) at art. 3. 
310 Ibid at arts. 1(7) and 3.  See also supra note 59 at 42. 
311 Ibid (SUA) at art 3.  See also R. Beckman Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security, “Tools to 
Combat Piracy, Armed Robbery, and Maritime Terrorism”, (2008, Auerbach Publications) at 192. 
312 Ibid at art 4.  See also supra note 59. 
313 Ibid (SUA) at art 6.  SUA currently has 158 contracting States / parties comprising 94.66% of the 
world’s shipping tonnage while the SUA Protocol 1988 boasts 146 contracting signatures.   (IMO, 
Status of Conventions Summary, Online: http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOf 
Conventions/Pages/Default.aspx) 






  While certainly broader in terms of the ‘piracy - like’ acts prohibited, the SUA is 
at the same time jurisdictionally more restrictive than UNCLOS, specifically by limiting 
its jurisdictional reach to those bases found in Article 6.
316
  The SUA therefore seeks to 
address, through treaty law, gaps found within the UNCLOS and customary international 
law prohibition on piracy.
317
 
Adding further complexity to this issue, counter-piracy operations conducted 
under UNCLOS or SUA authorities alone exercise universal enforcement jurisdiction but 
with significant limitations.
318
   These limitations are partially the result of definitions, 
seizure and investigative authorities provided by customary international law and at 
UNCLOS
319
 which define but do not prohibit or prescribe punishment for transgression, 
and therefore leave the burden of prosecuting and punishing piracy as a State concern.
320
  
The application of universal jurisdiction over the crime of piracy is also somewhat 
limited, as it applies “only to the definition of piracy jure gentium”.
321
  As a result, a 
State’s prosecution of this crime under its municipal laws cannot exceed the crime of 
                                                 
315 Ibid at art. 16. 
316 Ibid at art 6.  Section 1 requires states “shall take measures as may be necessary to establish its 
jurisdiction over the offence set forth in Article 3 when the offence is committed: (1) against or on 
board a ship flying the flag of the State at the time the offence is committed; or (2) in a territory of 
that State, including its territorial sea; or (3) by a national of that State”.  Section 2 further provides 
that “A State party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such offence when: (a) it is committed 
by a Stateless person whose habitual residence is in that State; or (b) during its commission a 
national of that State is seized, threatened, injured or killed; or (c) it is committed in an attempt to 
compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act”. 
317 In Canada the SUA is incorporated into criminal law at supra note 20, section 78.1. 
318 Supra note 59 at 141. 
319 Specifically Articles 101, 103, 105 and 110. 
320 Supra note 38 (UNCLOS) at art. 101. 




piracy as defined at international law.
322
  From this it has been proposed that piracy, 
while jurisdictionally a universal crime at international law, is the narrowest of 
international crimes
323
 as it requires municipal prosecutorial authority.
324
  In a similar 
vein to piracy, operations in support of the SUA must also rely upon a State’s exercise of 
extra-territorial jurisdiction.
325
  This is in contrast to other recognized international crimes 
such as genocide
326
 or war crimes,
327
 which provide both definitions of prohibited acts as 
well as requiring those found guilty to be punished by the respective tribunal.      
From this, counter-piracy type operations conducted simply pursuant to 
UNCLOS, SUA or customary international legal authorities carry with them the 
requirement that States have enacted required domestic legal authorities.  As has been 
                                                 
322 Such an act would go beyond the universal jurisdiction provided by the international definition.  
This is why States are normally barred from arresting, and typically refrain from criminally 
proscribing, those suspected of acts of piracy occurring within another State’s territorial waters – 
even if that other State is unable or unwilling to take action itself.  In Canada, piracy is defined at 
supra note 20 at s. 74(1) as “Every one commits piracy who does any act that, by the law of nations, is 
piracy”, and is punished at s. 74(2) with “Everyone who commits piracy while in or out of Canada is 
guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life.”   
323 Supra note 59 at 139-140. 
324 Ibid, at 139, and is reflected in United Kingdom’s domestic law Merchant Shipping and Maritime 
Security Act 1997 (c.28)  1997 which prohibits and prescribes punishment for piracy based in part 
upon the definition found at Supra note 38 (UNCLOS), or Kenyan law which largely incorporates the 
text of Article 101 UNCLOS into its domestic criminal legislation without specifically referring to 
UNCLOS in the Kenyan Merchant Shipping Act, 2009, section 369. 
325 Ryan Kelley, “UNCLOS, but No Cigar:  Overcoming Obstacles to the Prosecution of Maritime Piracy, 
95 Minn. L. Rev (2011) 2285, 2293 (2011).  This is due to the SUA not providing universal 
jurisdiction, as explained by Eugene Kontorovich, “The Piracy Analogy:  Modern Universal 
Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation” (2004) 45 Harv. Int’L L.J. 183, 188. 
326 Convention on the Prevention and Repression of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (9 December 
1948) (“Genocide Convention”), art. 2 defines genocide much as defined at supra note 38 (UNCLOS) 
art. 101 defines piracy.  Art. 1 of the Genocide Convention confirms that contracting parties recognize 
genocide as a crime under international law which they will undertake to prevent and punish, while 
art. 3 sets out which acts will be punishable and art. 4 states that those committing these prohibited 
acts will be punished. 
327 Supra note 214 (Rome Statute) defines war crimes at art. 8(2) and provides to the International 
Criminal Court jurisdiction over these offences at art. 8(1), and establishes individual liability for 




described, however, such missions do not form a significant portion of the contemporary 
operations of the RCN, in contrast to counter-piracy missions underpinned by UN 
Security Council Resolutions.  Attention must be turned, then, to the effect of the UN 
Charter and Security Council resolutions on the conduct of counter piracy operations as 
recently conducted off the coast of Somalia. 
In a recent international response to acts of piracy the UN Security Council 
arguably combined the authorities found within customary international law, UNCLOS, 
and the SUA through a series of UN Security Council resolutions to address acts of 
piracy.
328
  These resolutions have been described as example of “extreme universal 
jurisdiction”, or universal jurisdiction to enforce laws against piracy with effect even 
within the sovereign territory of another State.
329
  These UNSCRs permit previously 
unheard of authority for foreign States and IOs to operate not only within Somali 
territorial waters, but also in the territory and internal waters of Somalia itself.  As of 22 
February 2012, over 20 States had or were engaged in prosecuting 1,063 alleged Somali 
pirates, of which over 900 had been prosecuted within 11 regional States including 
Somalia (Puntland and Somaliland semi-autonomous regions), Yemen,
330
 Kenya, 
                                                 
328 Ibid  (S.C. Res 1816, 1846, 1851) directing action to address acts of “piracy and armed robbery at 
sea” off of the coast of Somalia.   
329 Supra note 213 at 160-164, where Madden does not go so far as to opine that this new practice is 
in any way creating an unqualified right under customary international law to enter another State’s 
territorial waters to capture suspected pirates.  He does however point to this as a single instance 
where the international community has recognized that in some instances a coastal State cannot, or 
will not, effectively police this activity in their own waters. 
330 Glenn Ross, “Prosecuting Somali Pirates: Challenges for the Prisons”, in Selected Briefing Papers, 
Conference on Global Challenge, Regional Responses: Forging a Common Approach to Maritime 
Piracy (April 18-19, 2011 Dubai, United Arab Emirates), at 111(citing UNDOC Counter-piracy 




Mauritius and the United Republic of Tanzania.
331
   Without this expanded jurisdiction, 
another State’s enforcement against crimes of piracy and “armed robbery at sea”
332
 that 
occur within Somali territorial waters would be barred, as they would not meet the 
UNCLOS
333
 definition of piracy and would constitute an impermissible intrusion into 
another State’s territorial jurisdiction.  Likewise, international prohibitions against piracy 
would not be enforceable by third party States against pirates hiding within Somalia or 
Somali territorial or internal waters, nor would SUA based prosecutions be permitted as 
Somalia is not a contracting State.
334
   While of limited applicability given the reality that 
most Somali-based pirates are operating well outside of Somali territorial waters, this 
modern application of extreme universal jurisdiction
335
 demonstrates the flexibility of 
international law where the nations of the world deem such action necessary.
336
   
3.3.5  Jurisdiction and Lawfully Detaining Ships at Sea  A number of international 
treaties include provisions authorizing the detention of ships in specified circumstances.  
                                                 
331 Human Cost of Piracy off Somalia Coast ‘Incalculable’, Full Range of Legal, Preventative Measures 
Needed to Thwart Attacks, Security Council Told, Security Council, 6719th Meeting (AM) 22 February 
2012. 
332 Supra note 68  (S.C. Res 1816, 1846, 1851). 
333 Supra note 38 (UNCLOS) at art. 101. 
334 Supra note 313. 
335 Supra note 213, for Madden’s discussion of “extreme universal jurisdiction”. 
336 S.C. Res 1836, U.N. Doc.S/RES/1836 (Oct. 7 2008) at para 3 permits use of ‘necessary means, in 
conformity with international law, as reflected in [UNCLOS]’ to repress piracy’.   While ‘necessary 
means’ has ordinarily been interpreted to authorize military force, in the context of these UNSCRs 
‘means’ is restricted to actions conforming to international law with regards to piracy, and no more – 
see supra note 67 at  147 discussing the preambles for UNSCRs 1848, 1851 (2008) and 1897 (2009) 
which all reaffirm ‘that international law, as reflected in [UNCLOS], sets out the legal framework 
applicable to combating piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as other ocean activities’.   At supra 
note 68  (UNSCR 1950) para 12, all states with “relevant jurisdiction under international law and 
national legislation” were called upon to to cooperate in determining jurisdiction, and in the 
investigation and prosecution of all persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery off the 
coast of Somalia consistent with applicable international law including international human rights 




Of particular application to this paper are the authorizations under UNCLOS in the case 
of offences committed within a coastal State’s territorial sea and EEZ, piracy and hot 
pursuit,
337
 under the SUA for any of the prohibited acts endangering the safety of a 
vessel, persons onboard or navigation,
338
 and under the 1995 European Agreement
339
 and 
as encouraged by the UN Narcotics Convention
340
 for trafficking in prohibited 
substances.  As also previously discussed, at international law States are competent to 
prescribe law of domestic and limited extra-territorial effect, and to then in limited 
circumstances enforce those laws.  From this, lawful authority to detain ships is an 
expression of enforcement jurisdiction and must therefore first flow from a valid 
prescriptive jurisdiction.
341
  Enforcement actions can range from “surveillance, stopping 
and boarding vessels, search or inspection, reporting, arrest or seizure of persons and 
vessels, detention, and formal application of law by judicial or other process, including 
imposition of sanctions”.
342
    
The question of the sufficiency of an authority to detain a ship (and by extension 
those onboard the ship) at international law alone has not been examined within the 
Canadian context, thus reference to international jurisprudence is required.  In Medvedyev 
v France
343
 the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR examined this question in the context of 
                                                 
337 Supra note 38 at art.  27 (Territorial sea), 73 (EEZ), 105 (piracy), 111. 
338 Supra note299 (SUA) at art 3, 7, 9. 
339 Supra note 267 at art 9, 10  
340 Supra note 264 at art 3, 4 and 17.  
341 Supra note 145 at 63. 
342 Ibid, citing William Burke, The New International Law of Fisheries: UNCLOS 1982 and Beyond 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994) 303. 




international co-operation on the high seas when a French warship stopped and boarded 
the Cambodian flagged vessel Winner, with the consent of Cambodia, as part of a 
counter-drug smuggling operation.  At the time of the boarding and detention only France 
had incorporated international legal prohibitions into their domestic legislation
344
 and 
therefore the boarding was conducted pursuant to a diplomatic note between Cambodia 
and France.
345
  Once boarded, all of those embarked in Winner were detained onboard 
their own ship while it was sailed to a French port under the escort of a French warship.  
As will be explained, the Grand Chamber ultimately held that international legal 
authority to detain, by itself, is insufficient lawful authority without supporting domestic 
authority.   
In a portion of its ruling the majority of the Grand Chamber very strictly 
interpreted the diplomatic note between Cambodia and France as viewed through the lens 
of ECHR art 5(1)
346
 and held that the detention was “arbitrary”.  While diplomatic notes 
were recognized as valid international legal authority in general, within the specific 
circumstances of this case the note was narrowly interpreted and deemed insufficiently 
                                                 
344 Ibid at para 22, noting Cambodia was not signatory to any international instruments regarding the 
transportation of narcotics.  At paras 34-37 the Grand Chamber noted France was party to the United 
Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 30 March 1961, 520 U.N.T.S. 204; Supra note 38 
(UNCLOS); and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, 20 December 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95. (the “Vienna Convention”) 
345 Ibid at para 54. The note authorized “the stopping of the ship and all ‘its consequences’ ” and was 
granted “without restrictions or reservations by the Government of Cambodia for the planned 
interception and all its consequences”. 
346 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended 
by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 213 UNTS 221 (“ECHR”) states at art. 5.1(c) “the lawful arrest or 
detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority of 
reasonable suspicion of having committed and offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary 




clear in its grant of authority to detain the vessel’s crew.
347
  The Grand Chamber further 
held that lawful authority to detain a person on the high seas must flow from the 
detaining State’s domestic law, stating: 
[A]s Cambodia was not a party to the conventions transposed into [French] 
domestic law, and as the Winner was not flying the French flag and none of its 
crew members were French nationals – even assuming that the nationality of the 
crew members could be pleaded as an alternative to the principle of the flag State 




From this decision it can be surmised that within the context of an RCN detention 
made upon the high seas, authority must be found under Canadian domestic law and, in 
some circumstances, also under international law.  Absent these dual sources of lawful 
authority, the detention itself will likely be held unlawful and further legal action against 
those detained will be complicated, if not barred completely.  The lawfulness of the 
detention then becomes further complicated by the question of what rights are owed to 
those detained and the corresponding State obligations triggered in such situations.  This 
question is the subject of the next section, beginning with an overview of International 




                                                 
347 Supra note 343 at paras 22 and 96 stating “diplomatic notes are a source of international law 
comparable to a treaty or an agreement when they formalize an agreement between the authorities 
concerned”.  At para 99 the majority held that the text of the note, which referred to the “ship Winner, 
flying the Cambodian flag”, contemplated the vessel alone and did not encompass those persons 
onboard and therefore “the fate of the crew was not covered sufficiently clearly by the note and so it 
is not established that their deprivation of liberty was the subject of an agreement between the two 
States that could be considered to represent a “clearly defined law” within the meaning of the Court's 
case-law”. 




3.4  Detainee Rights and State Obligations under IHRL 
 
Once an individual has been detained, International Human Rights Law (“IHRL”) 
can become engaged.  IHRL has traditionally been the main source of international law 
applicable to State actions affecting detained individuals occurring outside of situations 
of armed conflict, and is that body of international law that binds States and “explicitly 
governs the relationship between a State and person(s) on its territory and/or subject to its 
jurisdiction (an essentially ‘vertical’ relationship), laying out the obligations of States vis 
à vis individuals across a wide spectrum of conduct.”
349
  Broadly stated, the goal of IHRL 
is the protection of lives, health and dignity of individuals,
350
 and as will be seen it 
engages both individual rights and State obligations.  
IHRL is grounded in international treaty law, beginning with protection of 
minorities within a State’s own borders, and from this has evolved to the current web of 
normative IHRL agreements governing State treatment of all individuals.
351
  Before 
examining the current international framework, a number of principles should be borne in 
mind.  The first principle is that of complementarity which acts to resolve conflict 
between different bodies of law by interpreting rules of general application in light of 
relevant laws of specific application, and vice versa – provided there is no conflict 
                                                 
349 International Humanitarian Law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts, 
31IC/11/5.1.2 for the 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, 
Switzerland 28 November-1 December 2011 (“ICRC Report”) at 14. 
350 Ibid. 
351 Supra note 94 at 538, citing protections of religious minorities found within the Westphalia 
treaties, at 539-544 regarding protection towards foreign nationals, and 545-8 discussing 




between the two bodies of law.
352
  Where a conflict between competing sources of 
international law is found, the principle of lex specialis derogate legi generali then 
applies.
353
  Lex specialis holds that within any particular situation, rules of general 
application are to be interpreted with reference to rules of specific application.  For 
example, this concept was applied by the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear 
Weapons advisory opinion, where the court held that the arbitrary deprivation of life, 
normally an IHRL non-derogable right protected under the ICCPR, was properly 
determined through the lens of IHL applicable during times of armed conflict.
354
 
With these principles in mind I will now review a number of contemporary 
treaties to which Canada is party, and which may affect those detained in the RCN 
operations being discussed.  The first of these treaties is the Charter of the United 
Nations,
355
 which although not generally considered a specific IHRL instrument itself is 
credited as the origin of modern IHRL
356
  and does have a significant impact upon other 
IHRL instruments.  The next treaty that will be discussed is the Refugee Convention,
357
 
followed by the Convention against Torture (‘CAT’)
 358
 and the International Covenant 
                                                 
352 Supra note 12 at 236. 
353  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion [2004] ICJ Rep 135 at para. 106. 
354 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, [1996] ICJ Rep. 240 at para 25. 
355 Supra note 99 (UN Charter). 
356 Supra note 94 at 552. 
357 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28 1951 189 U.N.T.S. 137, [1969] 
Can. T.S. No. 6 (“Refugee Convention”). 
358 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1465 




on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’).
359
  In reviewing these IHRL treaties I will refer 
to both Canadian and international treatment, particularly that of the ECHR.
360
 
3.4.1  Charter of the United Nations and Security Council Resolutions  As an 
international agreement of constitutional character
361
 with the purpose of supporting 
fundamental human rights, equality and respect for justice, the UN Charter codifies many 
customary international law norms including the right of sovereign equality and non-
interference in sovereign States, the prohibition on acts of aggression and the inherent 
right of self defence.
 362
  The UN Charter also qualified, and in some instances limited, 
the way in which States may do some things such as requiring that inter-State disputes be 
brought before the Security Council for settlement by peaceful means (pacific settlement) 
rather than through the use of international armed conflict.
363
  While the obligations 
imposed by the UN Charter apply directly to States and their conduct vis-à-vis other 
States, their indirect effect as expressed in the preamble “affirm(ing) faith in fundamental 
human rights … establish conditions under which justice and respect for … treaties and 
                                                 
359 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol to the above-
mentioned Covenant, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.  Can.T.S. 1976 No. 47 (“ICCPR”). The ICCPR 
entering into force for Canada 19 August, 1976. 
360 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (opened for signature 
4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 221. 
361 Matthias Herdegen, “Constitutionalization of the UN Security System”, 27 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 135 
(1994) at 135, describing the Charter as “a kind of constitution for the community of States with the 
International Court of Justice as the ultimate guardian of its legality vis-a-vis the Council” 
362 Supra note 99 (UN Charter ), preamble “We the Peoples of the United Nations determined … to 
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the 
equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under 
which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international 
law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom”.  See also arts 2, 33 and 51. 




other sources of international law”
364
 is to support respect for human rights generally and 
further to encourage the creation of international agreements directly aimed at human 
rights.  One such example of this is the non-binding Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,
365
 passed by the UN General Assembly to deal with issues including civil and 




3.4.2  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees  At international law the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
367
 and the Protocol to that Convention,
368
 
were drafted for the purpose of recognizing the social and humanitarian plight of refugees 
and the international tension created by refugee crises.
369
  The key protection provided 
under the Refugee Convention is that from being “expel[led] or return[ed] (“refouler”) in 
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where a refugee’s life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or by political opinion”.
370
  Also provided for within the Refugee 
Convention is the right of access to courts of law within the host country.
371
 
                                                 
364 Supra note 99 (UN Charter) preamble. 
365  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Res. 217(III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess, Supp. No. 13, UN 
Doc. A/810 (1948) 
366 Supra note 94 at 552. 
367 Supra note 357.  
368 UN General Assembly, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,  31 January 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 
267. 
369 Supra note 357 preamble. 
370 Supra note 7 at p. 153.  In the Note on International Protection (submitted by the High 
Commissioner) A/AC.96/643 At Article 17 (online:  http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68c040.html 
accessed 29 Dec 2012), the High Commissioner stated that the “observance of the principle of non-
refoulement is closely related to the determination of refugee status”. 




While the UN High Commissioner for refugees has expressed that the Refugee 
Convention applies without geographic restriction
372
 this is not universally accepted, 
either in Canada or abroad.
373
  The UN’s broad interpretation of the non-refoulement 
obligation within the maritime environment has met with resistance by coastal States, in 
particular those dealing with illegal entry of migrants.
374
  Douglas Guifoyle has summed 
up the rational for this resistance, together with acknowledgement of the international 
obligation, as: 
Maritime interdiction of irregular migrants without providing some form of 
refugee screening process is strictly incompatible with the Refugee Convention 
and Protocol.  However, as irregular migration by sea increases worldwide there 
appears a growing perception among ‘point of entry’ States that they are unable to 
cope with the numbers arriving and preventative maritime patrols are a legally 
permissible response.
375
   
 
3.4.3  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment  The CAT
 
was drafted in recognition of the “inherent dignity 
of the human person” and with a desire to “make more effective the struggle against 
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the 
                                                 
372 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Advisory Opinion on the Extra-territorial Application of 
Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 Protocol (26 January 2007) para 26, (online: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld) citing that the 
convention is directed not at where the refugee is sent from but rather where a refugee may not be 
sent to. 
373 R (on the application of European Roma Rights Centre and Others) v Immigration Officer at Prague 
Airport [2004] UKHL 55 para 15 - 21 per Lord Bingham, where he acknowledges the longstanding 
sovereign right to deny entry to non-nationals which was never derogated from in the signing of the 
Refugee Convention.   This opinion is supported within Canadian jurisprudence, including Chiarelli v. 
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1992 CanLII 87 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711, at p. 
733 where Sopinka J states “[t]he most fundamental principle of immigration law is that non-citizens 
do not have an unqualified right to enter or remain in the country”. 
374 Supra note 145 at 124. 






  In reaching these goals the CAT requires that parties not engage or permit 
torture, and obliges them not to “expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another 
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of 
being subjected to torture”.
377
   
The CAT also provides for an international review mechanism by the Committee 
against Torture for individual and State petitions, as well as investigation of systemic 
violations and review of periodic reports.
378
   In a review of those provisions within the 
CAT that expressly apply to ‘territory under [the State party’s] jurisdiction’, the 
Committee has opined that these include
 
all areas under de facto effective control of the 
State party, regardless of whether this is maintained by military or civil authorities.
379
  
This opinion was later renewed by the Committee to include all areas where a “State 
party exercises, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, de jure or de facto effective 
control, in accordance with international law” including State registered ships and 
aircraft, military bases, detention facilities and other areas over which a State exercises 
factual or effective control during military occupation or peacekeeping operations.
380
  
While this view of the extra-territorial reach of the CAT has not been examined in 
                                                 
376 Supra note 358. 
377 Ibid at part I, art 1, 3(1). 
378 Supra note 94 at 658, referring to ibid part II.  At 663 Canada is noted for receiving just over a 
dozen allegations of breach of the CAT.  However, only one finding against Canada has succeeded to 
date (Tahir Hussain Khan v. Canada, Communication No. 15/1994, U.N. Doc. A/50/44 at 46 (1994).  
379 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Conclusions and Recommendations of the 
Committee Against Torture (Unites States of America)(25 July 2006) UN Doc CAT/C/USA/CO/2 
(‘Committee Against Torture(USA Recommendations)) at para 15, referring to ibid arts. 2, 5, 13-16 
and 20, and that that any view to limit these provisions geographically with regards to non-
refoulement obligations for detained persons are “regrettable”. 
380 Committee Against Torture, General Comment No 2 (24 January 2008) UN Doc CAT/C/GC/2 (‘CAT 




Canada, it was reviewed by the Committee in the case of P.K. et al v. Spain
381
 where 
Spanish maritime forces rescued Asian and African foreign-nationals from their vessel 
which had floundered in international waters.  While processing asylum and other claims 
over a period of months, those rescued were detained outside Spanish territory and in 
conditions alleged to amount to torture under the CAT.
382
  In the course of defending its 
actions, Spain argued that the detainees lacked competence to advance their claim, as the 
matter occurred outside of Spanish territory.  The Committee disagreed, finding that CAT 
General Comment No. 2 applied, which stated “the jurisdiction of a State party refers to 
any territory in which it exercises, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, de jure or de 
facto effective control, in accordance with international law” and in particular “situations 
where a State party exercises, directly or indirectly, de facto or de jure control over 
persons in detention”.
383
    
3.4.4  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  The ICCPR and Optional 
Protocol
384
 were drafted to recognize the “inherent dignity” of people, and that the “equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, 
justice and peace in the world”.  These ideals hold that civil and political freedom, and 
freedom from fear and want, are achieved “if conditions are created whereby everyone 
may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural 
                                                 
381 P.K. et al. v. Spain, Communication No. 323/2007, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/41/D/323/ 2007 (2008) 
(online: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cat/decisions/323-2007.html) 
382 Ibid at paras 2.1-2.9. 
383 Ibid at para 8.2 – although it should be noted that the Committee cannot make legally binding 
determinations, but fills an advocacy role only. 






  In recognizing the desirability of these rights, the ICCPR emphasizes the 
liberty interests of individuals accused of a crime at the pre-trial stage at Article 9(3) 
requiring that those arrested or detained for criminal matters must be promptly brought 
before judicial authorities, be entitled to a trial within a reasonable time, and that pre-trial 
release be the norm.
386
   
As the interpretation of these pre-trial rights under the ICCPR have not been 





 involving detainees seized by European 
warships.  As in Medvedyev, Rigopolous involved the boarding and detention of a 
suspected drug smuggling vessel and its crew on the high seas and in both instances 
ECHR Article 5, worded similarly to the ICCPR in this regard, was interpreted.  The 
period taken to sail the vessels to port was examined, 13 days in Medvedyev and 16 days 
in Rigopolous, after which the suspected smugglers were brought before judicial 
authorities.  In both instances the Court held the delays, being as they were practically 
impossible to avoid, were not in violation of the ECHR.
389
   
                                                 
385 Ibid  preamble. 
386 Ibid, at art. 9(3) stating that “Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought 
promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be 
entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons 
awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at 
any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgment.”  
This emphasis on the pre-trial rights of detainees was cited with approval by the SCC at Mills v. The 
Queen, [1986] 1 SCR 863, 1986 CanLII 17 (SCC) at para 143, while examining the nature and purpose 
of s.11(b) of the Charter supra note 4. 
387 Supra note 343. 
388 Rigopolous v Spain, ECtHR, Application No 37338/97, 12 January 1999. (“Rigopolous”) 




Much as with the CAT, the ICCPR also explicitly prohibits the use of torture or 
“cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.
390
  Having set these lofty goals 
and requiring signatory States to recognize detainee liberty interests at the pre-trial stage 
as well as the right to be free from torture and similar treatment, the ICCPR then limited 
its jurisdiction over parties at Article 2(1): 
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to 
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.”
391
 (emphasis added) 
 
 
 This apparent territorial requirement can be then contrasted, both with the Second 
Optional Death Penalty Protocol
392
 to the ICCPR, which broadened the language of its 
jurisdictional limit to simply “no one within the jurisdiction of a State Party”, and 
provided that parties take necessary measures to effect the agreement “within its 
jurisdiction”,
393
 and with interpretations of the treaty that demonstrate a modern trend 
towards extraterritorial application.
394
  As with the CAT, the ICCPR provides for a treaty 
                                                 
390 Ibid at art 7 which states “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical 
or scientific experimentation” 
391 Ibid at art. 2(1). 
392 Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the 
abolition of the death penalty, 15 December 1989, 1642 U.N.T.S. 414.  Canadian accession 25 
November 2005. (ICCPR Second Protocol) 
393 Ibid at art. 1 
394 Robert J. Currie and Hugh M. Kindred, “Flux and Fragmentation in the International Law of State 
Jurisdiction: the Synecdochal Example of Canada’s Domestic Court Conflicts Over Accountability for 
International Human Rights Violations” in O.K. Fauchauld and A. Nollkaemper, eds., The Practice of 
International and National Courts and the (De-) Fragmentation of International Law (Oxford: Hart 




body, through the first Optional Protocol,
395
 known as the Human Rights Committee, 
whose purpose is to ensure compliance with treaty obligations.  With regards to Canada it 
can accept periodic reports as well as inter-State and individual complaints.
396
   
3.4.5  Refoulement of Detainees  Common to all IHRL instruments discussed is the 
general requirement that individuals not be subjected to cruel or inhumane treatment, and 




 further prohibit the transfer 
of individuals to States where their life or freedom  would be threatened  as the result of 
race, religion, nationality, social group membership or political opinion.  The modern 
examination
399
 of such prohibitions, in the context of EHRL obligations incurred by a 
State extraditing an individual to another State where they faced risk of such 
mistreatment, was examined by the ECtHR in Soering v. United Kingdom where the 
court held that decisions to extradite must taken into account basic human rights 
considerations.
400
  This view was later adopted by the SCC in United States of America v. 
                                                 
395 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 / [1991] ATS 39.  Canadian accession 19 May 1976. (ICCPR Optional Protocol) 
396 Supra note 94 at 658, referring to ibid and supra note 359. 
397 Supra, note 357 at art. 1 and art. 32 which states “Contracting States shall not expel a refugee 
lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public order”, and that any such 
expulsion “shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with due process of law”.  
This is somewhat tempered at art 33 which states “no Contracting State shall expel or return 
(refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion”, but that this protection may not properly be claimed by a refugee 
where “there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in 
which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, 
constitutes a danger to the community of that country” 
398 Supra note 358 at art 3 
399 J. Johnson, “The Risk of Torture as a Basis for Refusing Extradition and the Use of Diplomatic 
Assurances to Protect against Torture after 9/11”, International Criminal Law Review, Vol 11 (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff 2011) 1-48 at 4. 




Burns where the court held “The “responsibility of th[e] State” is certainly engaged under 
the Charter by a ministerial decision to extradite without assurances. While the Canadian 
government would not itself inflict capital punishment, its decision to extradite without 
assurances would be a necessary link in the chain of causation to that potential result.”
401
  
In examining the question of refoulment the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, again in 
Saadi v Italy,
402
 reviewed the applicability of international conventions and whether the 
giving of assurances to observe international human rights by a receiving State could, by 
itself, provide sufficient guarantee so as to permit the transfer.  In making this decision in 
Saadi the Grand Chamber reviewed a number of Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGO) reports regarding prevailing human rights circumstances in Tunisia.
403
  The Grand 
Chamber held that that they could properly review applicable inter-State transfer 
agreements incorporating refoulement guarantees to ensure the guarantees were 
sufficient,
404
 and that signatory States were prohibited from exposing detainees to torture 
which included  prohibiting them from sending individuals to non-signatory States that 
might inflict this treatment.
405
  The Grand Chamber further held that “mere words of 
                                                 
401 United States of America v. Burns [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, para 54. 
402 Saadi v Italy, ECtHR, Application No 37201/06, 28 February 2008 
403 Ibid at paras 65 – 93 and 128, where it was held that the Court could properly review all material 
placed before it in determining if substantial grounds have been shown to find a real risk of 
treatment incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention, and in that case reviewed reports prepared 
by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the International Committee of the Red Cross to 
determine the status of Tunisian observations of Human Rights. 
404 Ibid at para 148, stating the court retains the obligation to “examine whether such assurances 
provided, in their practical application, a sufficient guarantee that [the transferee] would be 
protected against the risk” of treatment prohibited by the Convention... The weight to be given to 
assurances from the receiving State depends, in each case, on the circumstances prevailing at the 
material time”. 




assurance are insufficient” and transferring States could still face liability in the event of 
abuse.
406
   
More recently in the case of UK v. Othman (Abu Qatada),
407
 the Grand Chamber 
examined the proposed refoulement of Mr. Othman from the UK to Jordan.  The Grand 
Chamber acknowledged that while a State which fails to comply with multilateral 
obligations, here Jordan’s non-compliance with the CAT, it may still enter into bilateral 
assurances, the extent of non-compliance with its multilateral obligations then becomes a 
determining factor as to whether the bilateral assurance is sufficient.
408
 In reviewing the 
evidence of non-compliance in this matter, set against the strong bilateral relationship 
between the two States and an MOU that was found to be both important to the 
relationship and “superior in both its detail and its formality to any assurances which the 
Court has previously examined”,
409
 the Grand Chamber determined that in this instance 
the MOU was sufficient and refouling the Applicant to Jordan would not be in breach of 
Article 3 of the CAT.
410
 
In summary, State practice has established that reliance upon such diplomatic 
assurances does not run afoul of any emerging customary international law norm,
411
 and 
neither Article 3 of the CAT nor Article 7 of the ICCPR have been interpreted to preclude 
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408 Ibid at para 193. 
409 Ibid at para 194. 
410 Ibid at paras 197 – 207. 




reliance on these assurances as a condition precedent to such transfers.
412
  This apparent 
acceptance by the international community is not without criticism however, as the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights has consistently advocated against their 
acceptance on the basis that if a State does not adhere to the lawful requirements of a 
multilateral treaty, then a bilateral agreement by itself cannot be relied upon.
413
  In 
support of this criticism, arguments include the insufficiency of post-transfer reviews, 
inadequacy of post-transfer inspections and legal unenforceability of the agreements.
414
   
In the end, the making and accepting of such assurances is one of policy choice, 
reviewable by the courts, and for which failure by the receiving Stage to abide by its 
IHRL obligations could implicate the sending State for complicity in the mistreatment.
415
 
3.4.6  Effect of UN Security Council Resolutions on IHRL  Of particular note to 
international human rights and IHRL instruments are the legal effects of resolutions 
passed by the UN Security Council.  While it has been opined that Security Council 
resolutions passed under the authority of Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) of 
the UN Charter are subject to judicial review by the ICJ, those passed pursuant to Chapter 
VII (Action Taken With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts 
of Aggression) are accorded greater deference and are seen as both binding on all and 
                                                 
412 Ibid at pp. 14-17. 
413 Ibid at pp. 18-20 citing former High Commissioner Louis Arbour and current High Commissioner 
Navanetham Pillay, as well as the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture. 
414 Ibid at pp. 22-25. 
415 Ibid at p. 1, citing the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to 
Maher Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar – Factual Background (Ottawa: Minister of 




potentially beyond review even by the ICJ.
416
  The legal effect of such a finding has 
enormous consequence – UNSCRs may have the legal effect of making what would 
otherwise be a breach of international law lawful,
417
 and may also override other 
international agreements including protections found within IHRL instruments following 
the application of the principles of complementarity or lex specialis.
418
 
 UN Security Council resolutions commonly authorize missions under Chapter VII 
authority, authorizing the use of ‘all necessary’ means or measures but without further 
qualification.
419
  Such authority includes the right to detain either for force-protection and 
security reasons or as part of normal combat operations inherent in such an authority, 
although this argument does not enjoy universal acceptance.
420
  When such language is 
contained within the applicable UNSCR(s), the argument has been made that this 
language combined with Article 103 of the UN Charter can displace, or at the least 
qualify, conflicting treaty-based human rights obligations.
421
  The counter-argument 
holds that implicit within the language of the authorizing UNSCRs lies an unspoken, but 
                                                 
416 Supra note 361 at 142-145, referring to ibid, at art. 39, 24(2) and in particular art. 25 which states 
“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security 
Council in accordance with the present Charter”.   
417 Supra note 94 at 841, stating “A State using force against another State pursuant to [a UNSCR 
authorizing States to use “all necessary means” or substantially similar wording under art 42] is 
acting lawfully”. 
418 Ibid, at art. 103 which holds that “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the 
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail”. 
419 See S.C. Res 794 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (3 December 1992) para 10 (Somalia); S.C. Res 678 
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International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities (Judgment) paras 306, 310-314. 




ever present, requirement that ‘applicable’ human rights law applies.
422
  These nuanced 
views require that the competing bodies of international law be examined through this 
lens, and will be further discussed. 
 
3.4.7  Conclusion  The application of IHRL where individuals are detained can engage a 
number of State obligations and detainee rights, and in the context of RCN detentions on 
the high seas can be found within a limited number of instruments.  The Refugee 
Convention, CAT and ICCPR all speak to protecting individuals within the power of a 
State, and are largely focused on preserving basic human rights for those individuals by 
imposing co-existent obligations on States.  While the ICCPR provides for pre-trial 
obligations on detaining States, the Refugee Convention and CAT restrict the ability of 
States to refoule detainees to places where they might reasonably face the risk of torture.  
Apart from all these protections found in IHRL, the UN Charter also empowers the 
Security Council to authorize State actions with the effect of potentially limiting, or even 
displacing entirely, otherwise applicable IHRL.  Having outlined these various authorities 
I will now move on to summarize the obligations imposed on States with regards to the 
rights of those detained and created by these instruments. 
3.5 State Obligations under IHRL and Detainee Rights to Remedies 
 The concept of sovereign equality includes the principle of State immunity, 
meaning that no one State can assert jurisdiction over another State, even when that other 
State acts improperly within its jurisdiction.  Customarily, where one State’s actors had 
committed an allegedly wrongful act within the jurisdiction of another, aggrieved State, 
                                                 




the aggrieved State would notify the other State of the wrongful act and demand 
reparations, failure of which would entitle the aggrieved State to ‘self-help’ ranging from 
economic measures to the use of armed force.
423
  There were no codified rules governing 
what actions an aggrieved State could take in any particular situation; however, the 
customary law required that any such actions taken by an aggrieved State were only to be 
done in pursuit of that State’s community interests, and not for any individual’s personal 
interests.
424
  From this origin current practices regarding State remedies for international 
wrongdoings have evolved and taken on a more structured form, recognizing that State 
responsibility remains a “general set of rules governing the international legal 
consequences of violations, by States, of their international legal obligations”.
425
 
As discussed, article 33 of the UN Charter further requires States to settle disputes 
peacefully before resorting to counter-measures and obliges States to take measures in a 
graduated form, commencing with a request for reparation followed by mediated 
resolution and lastly, only if resolution is not achieved, the use of counter-measures.
426
  A 
foreign State may also be permitted to bring legal action, or consent to have legal action 
brought on the international plane against it, although there is no power to compel the 
foreign State to submit to the jurisdiction of another State’s courts.
427
  In addressing the 
lack of a single, comprehensive and binding source of international law on the subject of 
                                                 
423 Supra note 204 at 183. 
424 Ibid, at 185-186. 
425 Ibid at 761. 
426 Supra note 204 at 186, citing negotiation, conciliation, arbitration and compulsory settlement 
mechanisms.  It was also noted that these graduated measures do not preclude the use of self-
defence either individually or collectively as permitted at art. 51 of the UN Charter.  See also ibid at 
235 discussing the use of compulsory dispute resolution including the referring of matters to the ICJ. 




responsibility, and after many years of development, the International Law Commission 
(ILC) in 2001 approved the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
428
 
and in 2011 the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations.
429
  
These articles and draft articles, while non-binding as they are not the subject of any 
international treaty, are however codifications of customary international law.  In many 
respects they deal with issues such as general State responsibility, internationally 
wrongful acts, the effect of lex specialis, and attribution of conduct to a State or 
international organization.
430
   
Wrongful acts by States fall into two categories; ordinary and aggravated.  
Ordinary wrongful acts involve a State agent acting contrary to, or omitting to act as 
required by, international obligations.
431
  Where a State is found to have committed a 
wrongful act it must cease the wrongdoing, assure the aggrieved State of non-repetition 
and either provide reparation for the injury or otherwise accede to pacific settlement of 
the dispute.
432
  Aggravated State responsibility is found where gross and large-scale 
human rights violations or other State actions contrary to fundamental values owed to the 
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obligations, that material or moral damages to another international subject resulted from the 
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rest of the international community occur.
433
  In consequence of an aggravated breach 
corrective action includes barring other States from assisting the offending State and 
requiring that they support ending the breach, up to the point of using armed force when 
so authorized by the international community.
434
  For individuals accused of such 
egregious acts, personal criminal liability for serious breaches of international law 
including war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide arise from customary 
international law and are now codified in the Rome Statute.
435
   
3.5.1  State Responsibility for Wrongful Detentions  As discussed, with few exceptions 
international customary and treaty law provide that a vessel’s flag State exercises 
exclusive jurisdiction over that vessel, and therefore where a vessel and those onboard are 
detained without jurisdiction at international law, an ordinary breach may occur.  As was 
seen in the case of Medvedyev
436
 where authority is found at international law, co-existent 
domestic legal authority is also required.  Any detention made without such lawful 
jurisdiction would form an ordinary breach, and could result in State responsibility both 
to the flag State of the detained vessel and to the detained individuals onboard that 
vessel.
437
  Again, under both international customary and treaty law, only the vessel’s 
                                                 
433 Ibid at 200-201.  Such breaches must be ‘gross or systematic’ and entail a violation of a 
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434 Ibid, at 202-204. Corrective action is taken on behalf of the community of nations and not simply a 
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435 Supra note 214. 
436 Supra note 343. 
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flag State or the affected crew member’s State of nationality can exercise diplomatic 
protection on behalf of the detained vessel as individuals lack standing to grieve any 
interference with freedom of navigation.
438
 
As an example of recognition and codification of potential ordinary breaches, 
UNCLOS Article 110 authorizes warships to stop and search foreign vessels on the high 
seas where reasonable belief exists that they are engaged in a prohibited activity such as 
piracy.  Article 110 goes on then to establish that where such action is taken and the 
allegation is unfounded, the detaining warship’s State must pay compensation for any 
loss or damage sustained.
439
  Likewise, UNCLOS Article 292 requires that where State 
authorities have detained a vessel flying another State’s flag and have not otherwise 
complied with UNCLOS provisions regarding prompt release of the vessel or its crew 
upon posting of a reasonable bond or other financial security, this issue must be 
submitted to a competent court or tribunal.
440
   
                                                 
438 Supra note 289 at 439, citing supra note 2 at 257. 
439 Supra note 38 (UNCLOS) art 110. 
440 Ibid, stating in full:   
1. Where the authorities of a State Party have detained a vessel flying the flag of another 
State Party and it is alleged that the detaining State has not complied with the provisions of 
this Convention for the prompt release of the vessel or its crew upon the posting of a 
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Where gross violations of IHRL or serious violations of IHL are found, the UN 
General Assembly has also adopted a series of basic principles and guidelines regarding 
remedies and reparations for victims.
441
  These guidelines, although not themselves 
binding on States, are again reflective of existing customary international law and 
emphasize that reparations and even compensation to aggrieved victims should be made 




3.5.2  Breach of IHRL Standard of Treatment  Where a State is alleged to have 
committed an ordinary or gross breach of an individual’s human rights, depending upon 
the circumstances, an affected State may bring a number of actions as previously 
described.  In the case of individuals detained at sea, an affected State could be either the 
flag State of the detained vessel or the State of nationality of the detained crew members.  
In addition, however, a number of human rights treaties also contain specific mechanisms 
to redress allegations of breach of the protected rights, although few also provide for 
international venues within which remedies may be sought.
443
  The ICCPR requires State 
parties to ensure an effective remedy overseen by a competent State legal authority is 
available to those whose rights or freedoms are breached.
444
  Compliance is overseen by a 
                                                                                                                                                 
4. Upon the posting of the bond or other financial security determined by the court or 
tribunal, the authorities of the detaining State shall comply promptly with the decision of the 
court or tribunal concerning the release of the vessel or its crew. 
441 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law, resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 21 March 2006, A/RES/60/147, available at: 
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442 Ibid at art. 8 – 23. 
443 Supra note 94 at 599. 
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specialized international committee, or treaty body, known as the Human Rights 
Committee, which requires periodic reports from the State in addition to reports on issues 
of particular concern as required and are made publically available and ultimately 
submitted to the UN General Assembly.
 445
 
In the case of the CAT, States are required to criminalize all acts of torture and 
take necessary measures to establish jurisdiction over such offences carried out in State 
territory (including State ships), for all State nationals regardless of location and, where 
appropriate, where the victim is a State national.
446
  Given that provisions of the CAT are 
incorporated into domestic criminal law, allegations that it has been breached may be 
proceeded with through the State’s criminal process.  Another venue for individuals and 
States
447
 to allege breach of the CAT is through an international treaty body known as the 
Committee against Torture, responsible for monitoring compliance with the CAT and 
permitting investigation where systematic violations are alleged.
448
   
In seeking redress individual petitions, or ‘communications’, may be brought 
before the Human Rights Committee (in the case of the ICCPR) and the Committee 
against Torture (in the case of the CAT) by victims, family members and NGOs.
449
  
Petitions are reviewed for admissibility and then consideration of the merits, and require 
                                                 
445 Supra note 94 at 657-658, noting also that Canada is subject to the inter-State complaint and 
review mechanism under the ICCPR. 
446 Supra note 358 at art 4 and 5.  States are also required to either prosecute domestically or 
extradite those alleged to have committed such offences, where the alleged offender is apprehended 
by the State. 
447 Ibid at art 20 providing for confidential inquiries of a State’s alleged activity, and art 21 for inter-
State complaints. 
448 Supra note 94 at 658.  As a signatory, Canada is subject to investigation for systemic violations of 
human rights as well as for the CAT inter-State and individual complaint and review mechanism. 




a formal submission in order to be considered which is then done in confidence.
450
  
Conclusions, or ‘views’, of the body are then provided to the complainant and State, and 
eventually to the UN General Assembly.  These are not binding in any legal sense, but 
may create sufficient public pressure to encourage States to change practices or redress 
individual wrongs.
451
   
Within Canada, domestic criminal prosecutions and civil litigation against 
individuals and the Canadian government are an available means of seeking redress 
where the rights of a detainee are alleged to have been breached.  Although unsuccessful, 
an the case of Amnesty International Canada v. Canada (Chief of the Defence Staff), an 
application for judicial review of CAF detainee transfer practices in Afghanistan was 
brought against, among others, the Chief of Defence Staff and Minister of National 
Defence.
452
   Likewise, complaints by and against individuals may be forwarded to the 
Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court,
453
 who is responsible for 
                                                 
450 Ibid at 662-663 describing that anonymous submissions are typically barred; petitions must be 
reduced to writing and provide facts occurring after the petition procedure came into force and not 
have been previously examined by the committee; the committee will only examine issues not before 
another international procedure, and most importantly the petitioner must have exhausted all 
available domestic procedures. 
451 Ibid at 663-664 citing Ahani v. Canada (2002), 58 O.R. (3d) 107 (C.A.) where the Human Rights 
Committee requested that Canada cease deportation of an individual until it had reviewed his claim 
that the deportation would violate Canada’s international obligations due to likelihood of torture.  At 
para 32 the court held that by signing the ICCPR Optional Protocol, Canada did not also agree to be 
bound by the views of the committee, thus their views and interim measures or requests were non-
binding. 
452 Amnesty International Canada v. Canada (Chief of the Defence Staff) 2008 FC 336, [2008] 4 FCR 
546, affirmed 2008 FCA 401, [2009] 4 FCR 149 (“Amnesty Canada”), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 
2009 CanLII 25563 (SCC).  The remedy sought was a halt to such transfers. 
453 Supra note  14 8:20.40(c) at 8-22, describing the allegations of command responsibility made 
against the (then) Chief of Defence Staff and Minister of National Defence to the International 
Criminal Court by Prof. Michael Byers and Prof. William Schabas regarding CAF detainees being 
transferred to Afghan authorities without adequate safeguards against possible abuse or torture.   




investigating allegations (also known as a ‘communication’) to confirm if they meet the 
ICC jurisdictional requirements.
454
   During the years 2011, 2012 and 2013 the ICC 
Office of the Prosecutor reported no allegations that crimes had been committed and no 
investigations were commenced with regards to the actions of any individuals contrary to 
the Rome Statute.
455
   
3.6  Conclusion 
 International law governs the relations between nation States and emanates from 
the will of States, either through their generally accepted practices and opinion juris as 
customary international law or as expressed through agreements in the form of treaty law.  
These overlapping sources of law combine to govern international relations and within 
the maritime environment in particular form a complex legal regime of jurisdictional 
entitlements and responsibilities.  Unlike territorial boundaries found ashore which are 
easily determined, maritime zones and the activities that are regulated within those zones 
create a heightened complexity for naval operations, which must be recognized in any 
discussion of detainee rights and State obligations.  Layered onto this complex scheme 
are various international legal authorities to conduct maritime operations and the resultant 
                                                 
454 Ibid, permitting preliminary examination of situations initiated by the Prosecutor based on 
allegations sent by individuals or groups, States, intergovernmental or non-intergovernmental 
organizations, as well as referrals by State parties or the UN Security Council.  The Prosecutor may 
also act on a declaration under art. 12(3) based on information provided by a State not party to the 
statute.  Identified situations then undergo a preliminary examination pursuant to art. 53(1)(a)-(c) to 
determine if jurisdiction exists (art. 12), followed by analysis of the alleged gravity and 
complementarity with national investigations, followed by an examination of the interests of justice.  
See the Nineth Report of the International Criminal Court, A/68/314 (13 August 2013) [Online: 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/reports%20on%20activities/court%20reports%20and 
%20statements/Documents/9th-report/N1342653.pdf, viewed 23 July 2014).   
455 Ibid, see also International Criminal Court Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2011 (31 




detainee rights and State obligations arising under international law as the result of 
detaining ships and individuals during these operations. 
  At this point it becomes necessary to examine the co-existent Canadian domestic 
legal authorities engaged during these maritime operations and affecting any resulting 
detentions.  While international law guides the actions of States, with few exceptions it is 
a State’s domestic law that regulates the actions of individuals and therefore the interplay 
between international and domestic law is important.  The implementation of 
international law in Canadian domestic law will therefore now be examined, while 
looking at the same questions of jurisdiction, rights, and obligations owed to those 




CHAPTER 4:  CANADIAN LAW AND HIGH SEAS DETAINEES 
 
Having reviewed the international law setting out rights and obligations incurred 
during a detention by the RCN on the high seas, I will turn now to domestic Canadian 
law.  In order for Canada’s international treaty obligations to have effect within Canada 
and upon Canadian State agents, these treaties must be properly implemented in 
Canadian law.  The reception of international treaties and customary law and how 
Canadian courts have treated these authorities will therefore be canvassed.  I will then 
move on to the topic of the Crown prerogative, the major underlying source of lawful 
authority to deploy the RCN on most missions.  While legislative authorities may also be 
brought to bear upon missions, it is the Crown prerogative that most commonly provides 
the necessary authority to conduct contemporary operational missions.  
Next I will turn to Canadian law specifically engaged by these RCN detentions, 
beginning with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  This constitutional 
document guides and constrains, informs and critiques the actions of all branches of the 
Canadian government and Canadian State actors and is therefore pivotal to any 
discussion of rights and obligations triggered in detention situations.  The Charter will 
therefore be discussed in some depth both with regards to domestic case law but also with 
respect to its extra-territorial application. Following this discussion of Canadian Charter 
law I will review the various domestic authorities authorizing and engaged by extra-
territorial detentions.  This legislation will be important to the subsequent analysis, as 
while many of RCN operations arguably take place under the domestic authority of the 
Crown prerogative, the exercise of this power is not without limits and can affected or 




Lastly, I will introduce the topic of remedies available domestically to those 
whose rights have been affected due to an unlawful detention, as well as the 
corresponding jeopardy facing individual sailors and the command authorities of HMC 
Ships implicated in such breaches.  
4.1  Incorporating International Law into Canadian Domestic Law 
Having canvassed what international law is and how it is created, it is necessary 
to examine the manner in which international law takes domestic effect.  The Canadian 
application of international law looks at the domestic effect of international law.
456
   
Conceptually there are two doctrines in this regards – ‘incorporation’  meaning “the rules 
of international law are incorporated (into domestic law) automatically and considered to 
be part of (domestic law) unless they are in conflict with an Act of Parliament”; versus 
‘transformation’ meaning “rules of international law are not (incorporated into domestic 
law) except in so far as they have been already adopted and made part of our law by the 
decisions of the judges, or by an Act of Parliament, or long established custom.”
457
  In 
Canada both of these means are used to fold international law into domestic law, as 
incorporation is used in the case of customary international law
458
and transformation 
                                                 
456   J. Jackson, “Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis ”, 86 Am. J. Int’l L. 310 
(1992) at 314-316 where the author describes this approach as the “direct applicability” of 
international law on a State’s domestic law.   
457 Lord Denning in Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 2 W.L.R. 356, [1977] 
Q.B. 529 at 364 (C.A.). 
458 Pierre-Hugues Verdier, “R. v. Hape. 2007 SCC 26 “, 102 Am. J. Int’l L. 143 2008 at 146.  See also R. v. 
Rumbaut, 1998 CanLII 9798 (NB QB) at p. 25, where the court cites with approval R. v. Kirchhoff, 
(1996) 172 N.B.R. (2d) 257 in finding that art. 23 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, 13 UST 
2312 / 450 UNTS 11 and art. 111 of UNCLOS, are both related to this issue, stating “extensive 
constructive presence are declaratory of existing customary international law and that such a law is 




must occur to give domestic effect to treaty or conventional international law.
459
  In 
Baker, the court examined whether an obligation imposed by Canada’s signing of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child [1992] Can T.S. No. 3, had any domestic effect.  
Despite noting the general principle that “courts should interpret all other legislation so as 
to avoid, if possible, interpretations which would put Canada in breach of its international 
obligations”, the court held that treaties signed by the executive branch of the Canadian 
government do not have legal effect over rights and obligations within Canada absent 
implementation by statute, and the general principle stated could not properly be applied 
to bring about such unconstitutional results. There are exceptions to these doctrines 
however, as in the narrow range of ‘self-executing’ treaties.  Self-executing treaties 
include those involving defence or peace, and, although normally requiring 
transformation through legislation, functionally dispense with this because they affect the 
conduct of Canadian international relations and not Canadian internal law and thus do not 
require transformation into Canadian domestic law.
460
    
4.2  The Crown Prerogative and Military Deployments Outside of Canada 
 Elements of the CAF, including the RCN, deploy internationally under the 
domestic authority of the Crown prerogative – a source of executive power and privilege 
that refers to the powers of the executive branch of Canadian government.
461
  The term 
“Crown prerogative” has variously been described in the Canadian context as “the 
residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any given time is left in the hands 
                                                 
459 Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] 2 FC 127, (“Baker”). 
460 Ibid at 206-207. 






 and also as “the powers and privileges accorded by the common law to 
the Crown”.
463
  In either event, the Crown prerogative simply means that the Crown 
enjoys “certain authority ahead of other entities” in addition to “special privileges and 
immunities that are properly classed with that authority”.
464
  The Crown prerogative can 
be traced from Canada’s English and French legal traditions, whereby the power of the 
Crown was slowly eroded by legislation and common law decisions, and now is found in 
part or in full where (in this case federal) legislation does not speak.
465
  This concept of 
Crown prerogative was retained in section 9 of the British North America Act, 1867
466
 
and following Canada’s evolution to full statehood exercise of the Crown prerogative 
shifted from the U.K. to the Canadian executive branch of the government.
467
   
 Contemporary instances of Crown prerogative include: foreign affairs; war and 
peace; treaty-making; other acts of State in matters of foreign affairs; and defence and the 
                                                 
462 Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1959) 
at 424. 
463 Black v. Chretien et al., (2001), 54 O.R. (3d) 215 (C.A.) (“Black”) at 224, and the S.C.C. in Ross River 
Dena Council Band v. Canada (2002), 213 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (“Ross River”) at 217, citing Peter W. Hogg, 
“Constitutional Law of Canada”, Loose-leaf ed. (Scarborough: Thomson Carswell, 1997) at 1.9. 
464 Major Alexander Bolt, The Crown Prerogative in Canada and its use in the Context of International 
Military Deployments (Office of the Judge Advocate General Strategic Legal Paper Series – Issue 2 (A-
LG-007-SLA/AF-002) (4 June 2008) at 2  (Online: http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/publications/oplaw-
loiop/slap-plsa-2/chap1-2-eng.asp). 
465 Ibid, citing Prohibition del Roy, 77 E.R. 1342 where the ability of the King to administer justice was 
lost to the courts, followed by the Bill of Rights of 1688 which denied the King the right to suspend or 
dispense with a law or the ability to tax.  See also supra note 427 at 1.5(b) stating “The prerogative 
can also be displaced, abolished or limited by statute, and once a statute has occupied the ground 
formerly occupied by the prerogative, the Crown must comply with the terms of the statute… 
however the weight of authority seems to support the view that a statute will only displace the 
prerogative with respect to powers or matters that the statute deals with expressly or by necessary 
implication”. 
466 Now the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c.3. 
467 Ibid, at s.9 which states “The Executive Government and Authority of and over Canada is hereby 






  Within the Canadian context of responsible government these 
prerogatives, among others, are left to the executive branch of the Canadian government 
to be exercised
469
 and are in fact exercised by the Cabinet, individual ministers (including 
the Prime Minister), and Cabinet Committees.
470
  While Parliament is not mandated to 
play any actual role in exercising the Crown prerogative, consultation is frequently 
engaged where subsequent parliamentary support is desirable.
471
 
Because the Crown at law is a legal person and subject to all valid statutory 
laws,
472
 exercise of the Crown prerogative is reviewable by the courts to determine at the 
outset if it is justiciable
473
 and, if so, to confirm it is Charter
474
 compliant.  If, having first 
                                                 
468 Supra note 464 at 7, citing Paul Lordon, Crown Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991) at 75.  With 
regards the armed forces, at 6 the direction on management and control of the CAF as found in supra 
note 13 (NDA) are discussed however it is argued that none of these provisions displace Crown 
prerogative. Further, at 20 the House of Lords decision Chandler v. D.P.P., [1962] 2 AII E.R. 142 at 146 
is cited:  “the disposition and armament of the armed forces are, and for centuries have been, within 
the exclusive discretion of the Crown”. 
469 Ibid at 8-14. 
470 Ibid, at 12-15.  In actually exercising the Crown prerogative, Cabinet or Cabinet Committees follow 
a formalized process that can include Orders in Council, Memorandums to Cabinet, a letter from the 
Minister of National Defence or other means of bringing business, recommendations and draft orders 
from this recommendation stage to the actual Record of Decision, which is the formal exercise of the 
associated Crown prerogative 
471 Ibid, at 15-16 stating “The government does not have to consult, or even inform, Parliament 
before exercising prerogative powers.  This is convenient, for many matters falling within the 
prerogative are not suitable for public discussion before the decision is made or the action 
performed” although such license may be infrequently exercised as “on the other hand, the 
government must feel assured of parliamentary support [after a Crown prerogative decision is 
made], especially in a matter like war or where money will be required.”, citing O. Hood Phillips, Paul 
Jackson, O. Hood Phillips’ Constitutional and Administrative Law, 7th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
1987) at 269. 
472 Supra note 463 (Hogg) at 10.8(a). 
473 Supra note 464 at 16-18.  The doctrine of justiciability within the sphere of judicial review looks at 
the action taken against a spectrum of reviewability, with non-reviewable decisions of ‘high policy’ 
such as signing treaties or declaring war on the one hand, and reviewable decisions affecting “rights 
and legitimate expectations of an individual” such as the “issuance of a passport or an exercise of 




found a valid Crown prerogative power, the exercise of the prerogative is then examined 
under the doctrine of justiciability to confirm if its exercise is reviewable by the courts, 
and if found to be justiciable it is examined against potentially applicable legislation and 
the Charter to determine if the prerogative has been limited or displaced.
475
   This 
involves a two-step analysis: first, does the statute in question bind the Crown; if yes, 
does the statute merely limit, or fully displace the Crown prerogative?
476
  Existence of a 
Crown prerogative is normally presumed at this first stage but the second stage requires 
additional inquiry.
477
  Legislation may permit some exercise of the Crown Prerogative 
but within limits,
478
 or completely displace any exercise of this prerogative where the 
                                                                                                                                                 
474 Supra note 4.  In Operation Dismantle v. The Queen (1985), 18 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (S.C.C.) the 
government’s decision to permit air-launched cruise missile tests by the American military within 
Canadian airspace was challenged as a violation of section 7 Charter rights.  The court accepted that 
the Charter could apply to an exercise of the Crown prerogative, however rejected its application in 
this case and stressed that such reviews must be restricted to the Charter argument alone, and not 
into the soundness of such a decision by the executive branch of the government. 
475 Supra note 463 (Black) at 225 where the SCC majority stated “despite its broad reach, the Crown 
prerogative can be limited or displaced by statute”, based upon the Parliament of Canada Act, R.S.C. 
1985, c. P-1 at s.4 which confirmed to Canada’s Houses of Parliament the same powers and privileges 
held by the U.K. Commons House in 1867. 
476 Supra note 464, citing the process engaged at supra note 463 (Ross River) at 217 where LeBel J. 
termed the process the “interplay of royal prerogative and statute”. 
477 Ibid, at 4 citing supra note 24 (Interpretation Act) s.17, which states “No enactment is binding on 
Her Majesty or affects Her Majesty or Her Majesty’s rights or prerogatives in any manner, except as 
mentioned or referred to in the enactment.”  While words of express intent within a statute will bind 
the Crown (supra note 463 (Ross River) at 199 and 217), it is less certain whether a statute without 
this express intention but which, as a matter of fact implies such an intent (the doctrine of necessary 
implication), will also bind the Crown.  Also discussed are questions of whether simply referencing 
the Crown in a statute can be held to bind the Crown, and the Canadian Constitutional issue of 
federalism – both of which are inapplicable to the present investigation and will not be further 
discussed. 
478 Ibid, citing supra note 468 (Paul Lordon) at 67, stating “Parliament may by statute preserve the 
prerogative but regulate the manner in which it is to be exercised”.  This question was reviewed in 
Vancouver Island Peace Society v. Canada, [1994] 1 FC 102, 1993 CanLII 2977 (FC); affirmed (1995), 
16 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 24 (Fed C.A.); leave to appeal dismissed (1995), 17 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 298 (S.C.C.).  Here 
the Society applied to quash two Orders in Council authorizing nuclear powered and nuclear armed 
vessels to enter Canadian ports, arguing that the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, R.S.C., 1985 
(4th Supp.), c.16, the Atomic Energy Control Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. A-16 and the Canada Shipping Act, 




clear and unambiguous words of legislation demonstrate that intent.  One example of 
such clear language is found in the federal Crown Liability and Proceedings Act which 
states the Crown “is liable for the damages for which, if it were a person, it would be 
liable” including “a tort committed by a servant of the Crown”.
479
  
Authority for the CAF to engage in international deployments is squarely found to 
be an exercise of the Crown prerogative.
480
  The nature of contemporary Canadian 
deployments combined with recent judicial treatment of similar decisions by the 
Canadian government also indicate that such deployments enjoy a large degree of 
freedom from judicial scrutiny.  Judicial reasoning has consistently followed the ‘subject 
matter test’ to determine justiciability, which excludes exercises of Crown prerogative 
related to ‘high policy’ – an area which likely covers military deployments outside of 
Canada.
481
  Bearing this in mind, contemporary operational deployments may still be 
                                                                                                                                                 
dismissed as the court held the Crown prerogative, here exercised “in light of Canada’s international 
relations, national security and defence interests” was unaffected by these statutes, holding that 
neither the purpose of the statutes nor Parliaments intent in these legislative acts was directed at 
regulating the matters at hand (para 45). 
479 Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50 at s.3 
480 Supra note 464 at 21-22.  It is noted that several sections of the NDA, in particular s. 31(1) which 
provides the authority for placing CAF on “active service”, and s. 33(1) which requires all regular 
force elements, units and members to be “liable at all times to perform any lawful duty” do appear to 
circumscribe this otherwise unfettered discretion of the Crown prerogative.  As is explained 
however, being placed on “active service” merely has as a consequence an expanded level of 
disciplinary authority by the CAF over the member, and restrictions upon a member’s ability to 
voluntary release.  Regardless, all regular force CAF personnel and all reserve force members serving 
beyond Canada are on active service by virtue of an Order in Council, P.S. 1989-583 (6 April 1989) 
which was issued under statutory authority, not Crown prerogative.  Likewise, being liable to 
perform “any lawful duty” would include those duties assigned by exercise of the Crown prerogative. 
481 Ibid, at 22-23 citing supra note 463 (Black) and Chaisson v. Canada (2003), 226 D.L.R. (4th) 351 
(F.C.A.), a case involving the governments decision regarding issuance of a decoration for bravery for 
acts taken during WWII.  The court found at 356 that in this instance regulations did exist governing 
“a set of rules which provide criteria for a Court to determine” if the procedure had been followed, 
and it is these regulations setting out how the Crown prerogative is to be exercised that distinguish 




reviewable for Charter compliance, limited through this to a review of alleged Charter 
rights violations and not the deployment decision itself.
482
 
Having found that CAF deployments themselves are properly authorized through 
the use of the Crown prerogative, the lawful underpinning of detentions and seizures 
made during these deployments is also a consideration.  As already proposed, the Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR held in Medvedyev that international law required concurrent 
domestic and international authorities to detain.
483
  While this decision relied upon the 
ECHR, an instrument to which Canada is not a party, Canada has ratified the ICCPR
484
 
                                                 
482 Ibid, at 23-24, citing Wilson J at p. 518, supra note 474 (Operation Dismantle) “that is not to say 
that every governmental action that is purportedly taken in furtherance of national defence would be 
beyond the reach of s.7.  If for example, testing the cruise missile posed a direct threat to some 
specific segment of the populace – as, for example, if it were being tested with live warheads – I think 
that might well raise different considerations”. 
483 Supra note 343 at para 7, stating that “Cambodia’s diplomatic note did not explicitly mention the 
fate of the ship’s crew… It would not be logical, however, to interpret this note so narrowly as to 
exclude the possibility for the French authorities to take control of the ship and its crew were the 
inspection to reveal (as it did) the presence of a consignment of drugs”.  See also supra note 67 at p. 
153, citing B Van Schaak, ‘Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of Law and 
Morals’ (2008) 97 Georgetown Law Journal 118, 136.  D. Guilfoyle opined that “it is erroneous to 
assume that such treaties (necessarily drafted for implementation in various legal systems) can 
realistically incorporate detailed human rights guarantees.  To assume treaties cannot justify pre-
trial detention without express words contemplating criminal penalties risks sweeping away 
enforcement powers under treaties ‘drafted without the precision we now expect from modern penal 
codes’.  While UNCLOS provisions on piracy do contemplate criminal law sanctions… the UN 
Narcotics Convention only refers to ‘taking appropriate action’ with flag State consent in cases of 
maritime drug smuggling.  Until Medvedyev, such ‘action’ had always been interpreted as 
encompassing arrest and prosecution where there was flag State consent.  While the Strasbourg 
Court is right to insist on the principle of legality… in national implementation of law enforcement 
treaties, to apply a principle of strict legality … to the treaties themselves is to needlessly undermine 
the enforcement provisions of other treaty regimes.  It is erroneous to assume (these principles 
apply) in the same manner at the international level as at the national level.”   
484 Supra note 359.  The ICCPR was adopted on 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 23 
March 1976, with Canada acceding to the Covenant 19 May, 1976 and it entering into force for 
Canada 19 August, 1976 and states at art. 9(1) “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or 
detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with 
such procedure as are established by law”.  The text of the ECHR found at Art 5 states “No one shall 
be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed 
by law”, and goes on to require that all arrests and detentions, regardless of pre or post conviction, 





which has been interpreted similarly to the ECHR and therefore the Medvedyev decision 
provides useful guidance.  In short, Canadian warships do not enjoy ‘carte blanche’ 
authority on the high seas to detain or seize other vessels, much less detain persons 
onboard, absent both international and domestic authority.   
In the operational context this domestic authority is provided in part through 
“Rules of Engagement” or ROE, which are defined as “Orders issued by competent 
military authority, which delineate the circumstances and limitations within which force 
may be applied by the CF to achieve military objectives in furtherance of national 
policy”.
 485 
 The Canadian Forces Joint Publication Canadian Military Doctrine further 
expands on this definition, stating that ROE  
Delineate the circumstances and limitations under which armed force may be 
applied throughout the range of military operations. They are formulated as 
permissions and prohibitions and are considered as lawful orders and not 
guidelines for interpretation. They must take into account all political, military, 
physical, and legal constraints ensuring that forces are not left vulnerable to attack 
or inadvertently harm political or operational imperatives. They must be 
developed in concert with operational commanders, including coalition 
commanders, and be neither too restrictive nor too permissive to allow effective 
and efficient operations and achievement of the aim. ROE must coordinate the use 
of force appropriate to the mission assigned, ensure compatibility amongst 





                                                                                                                                                 
 
485 Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels (13 August 2001), Office of the Judge 
Advocate General B-GJ-005-104/FP-021 at p. GL-17 
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As a partial expression of Crown prerogative,
487
 ROE are issued “under the 
authority of the Chief of Defence Staff”, generally are mission specific and “are drafted 
with input from commanders, planners and legal officers using a developed framework 
and template of numbered authorizations and prohibitions common to land, sea and 
air”.
488
  From this, any RCN operation contemplating the detention of ships and / or 
persons as part of the mission must be properly authorized from the executive level 
through the Crown Prerogative, with corresponding ROE permitting such actions, in 
order to ensure adequate international and domestic Canadian legal authority is present.    
4.3  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
There is a degree of uncertainty regarding the applicability of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms
489
 to maritime operations and those detained by ships of 
the RCN.  The territorial scope of Charter guarantees has been discussed by the Supreme 
Court in the two leading cases of R. v. Cook and R. v. Hape.
490
    Starting from a broad 
interpretation of Charter applicability with regards to the conduct of Canadian agents 
acting abroad in Cook, the SCC subsequently has moved towards a far more restricted 
view of Charter application in these circumstances in Hape, a view that has been 
followed by the SCC and lower courts in subsequent decisions.
491
  This restricted view of 
Charter applicability has been criticized as being more restrictive than required by 
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 and is for this reason alone deserving of discussion.  I will therefore 
begin by discussing those Charter rights primarily engaged in detention situations and of 
particular interest to RCN operations.  Next I will trace the evolution of the jurisdictional 
reach of the Charter, particularly with regards to extra-territorial application.  As will be 
demonstrated, interpretation of Charter rights has both expanded with regards to the 
actions over which protection will be provided, while at the same time contracted in its 
scope of extra-territorial application.   
4.3.1  Charter Protections in Detentions  As a constitutional document the Charter sets 
out a number of State obligations and protections for individuals; but within the context 
of detention situations only a limited number of these are potentially of direct application.  
Section 7 of the Charter sets out the right not to be deprived of “life, liberty and security 
of the person … except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice”.
493
   
This general Charter right has been used to determine the government’s power to 
regulate non-citizens right to enter or remain within Canada
494
 and, as will be discussed 
                                                 
492 Ibid at 81. 
493 Supra note 4 at s.7. 
494 Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711, [1992] 1 R.C.S. 
(“Chiarelli”). at 733-736 stating ““The most fundamental principle of immigration law is that 
non-citizens do not have an unqualified right to enter or remain in the country.  At common law an alien 
has no right to enter or remain in the country”, and that the right "to enter, remain in and leave Canada" 
as guaranteed at s.6(1) of the Charter applies to citizens while non-citizens including permanent resident 
only enjoy a right to move to, take up residence in, and gain a livelihood in any province, as set out at 
s.6(2) of the Charter, and that Parliament was competent to adopt immigration policies and enact 
legislation setting out conditions under which non-citizens will be permitted to enter and remain in 
Canada, which it had done through the Immigration Act .  See also Catherine Dauvergne, “How the 
Charter has failed non-citizens in Canada:  Reviewing Thirty Years of Supreme Court of Canada 
Jurisprudence”, 58 McGill L. J. 663 (2012-2013) at 680-682, discussing that absent valid refugee 




further, Canada’s obligations towards persons detained by foreign governments with the 
support and assistance of Canadian agents.
495
 
Section 9 of the Charter is also potentially of direct application to RCN detention 
situations, and provides that “Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or 
imprisoned”.
496
  Following this, Section 10 then entrenches the right to challenge the 
lawfulness of a person’s detention.
497
  It is therefore necessary to further examine the 
meaning of detention as contemplated by the Charter, as this is a critical point at which 
further legal rights and obligations on the detaining HMC Ship are triggered.  The 
meaning of detention was explored in the 1985 decision of Therens
498
 where the court 
viewed Section 10 as broader than simply applying to a law enforcement “arrest or 
detention”, and included any restrictions imposed by a State agent upon a person’s liberty 
where they may reasonably require legal assistance.
499
  This broad interpretation in 
                                                 
495 Supra note 490 (Keitner) at 89 referring to Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 
S.C.R. 44 (“Khadr II”).  This issue was also examined in Purdy v. Canada (Attorney General), 2003 
BCCA 447 (CanLII) where a Canadian citizen, living in Canada, was investigated by both RCMP and 
American authorities for transnational money laundering based primarily on Canadian gained 
evidence.  Mr. Purdy was lured into the United States where he was arrested and charged, thus 
avoiding the requirement for extradition.  The Court of Appeal at para 17 cited Cook for the 
proposition that s.7 of the Charter was engaged if “Canada’s participation is causally connected to the 
deprivation of a liberty interest in a foreign state” (emphasis in origional), which rejected previous 
‘territorial application’ interpretations as will be discussed in Hape and Terry. 
496 Supra note 4 at s 9 
497 Ibid at s.10 which states “.everyone has the right on arrest or detention (a) to be informed 
promptly of the reasons therefore; (b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be 
informed of that right; and (c) to have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas 
corpus and to be released if the detention is not lawful”. 
498 R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 SCR 613, 1985 CanLII 29 (SCC) at paras 1 and 5, where the court agreed 
with Le Dain and Estey JJ (dissenting) in their reasons relating to finding a person to be detained as 
contemplated within the Charter.  
499 Ibid at paras 52-53 stating it comprised “a restraint of liberty other than arrest in which a person 
may reasonably require the assistance of counsel but might be prevented or impeded from retaining and 
instructing counsel without delay but for the constitutional guarantee”, and could include a situation 
where an agent of the State “assumes control over the movement of a person by a demand or direction 




Therens was subsequently refined in Grant
,500
 where the SCC ruled that a person was 
detained only where their liberty was controlled due to “significant physical or 
psychological restraint”.
501
  The court enumerated factors to be considered where 
psychological compulsion was alleged, including the circumstances of the encounter 
from the perspective of the person; the nature of the State agent’s actions ranging from 
presence through general inquiries to focused State attention upon the individual for 
further inquiry; and the nature of the State agent’s conduct including language used, 
physical contact, location of the interaction, presence of others and duration of the 
incident.   
These decisions were both made within the context of acts taken within Canadian 
territory and by Canadian police investigating alleged criminal acts.  As a result, the 
reasoning used by the Court cannot be transposed into the situation of detainees taken by 
Canadian naval forces operating on the high seas until the question of Charter 
applicability in these situations is examined.  Such reasoning is not without precedent, as 
will be demonstrated when reviewing Canadian court decisions regarding extra-territorial 
effects of the Charter. 
4.3.2  Extra-territorial Application of the Charter  An examination of the extra-
territorial reach of the Charter begins with Section 32(1), which states that the Charter 
applies both federally and provincially in respect of all matters given to these two heads 
                                                 
500 R. v. Grant, [2009] S.C.C. 32 where the majority held that section 9 guarantees against arbitrary 
detention manifested section 7 general principles and therefore “a person's liberty is not to be curtailed 
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice”, and at para 54 held that Individual 
liberty is protected by section 9 against unlawful State interference, found where “the law 
authorizing the detention is itself arbitrary” or the detention itself is not authorized by law 
501 Ibid at para 44.  This includes where the detained person is lawfully obliged to comply with the 
restrictive request or demand, or the conduct of the State actors would lead a reasonable person to 






  As a starting point, the SCC has long held that the Charter applies 
broadly to the actions of Canadian police, and by extension other Canadian government 
agents, within the territory of Canada.
503
  Such has also been held true of the protections 
of the Charter in the context of claimants under federal legislation such as the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
504
 (“IRPA”), again long applied only to those 
making their claim while physically in Canada.
505
  It is with respect to Canadian actors, 
or others acting on behalf of the Canadian government but outside of Canada, that the 
question of Charter applicability in the context of RCN operations most directly arises.   
                                                 
502 Supra note 4, stating the Charter applies to (a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in 
respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon 
Territory and Northwest Territories; and (b) to the legislatures and government of each province in 
respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each province. 
503 R. v. Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597 at para 124 where Bastarache J, concurring in the result, observed 
that: "By its terms, s. 32(1) dictates that the Charter applies to the Canadian police by virtue of their 
identity as part of the Canadian government." 
504 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, C. 27 (“IRPA”) at sections 2, 97, 102 and 
schedule 2(1).   
505 Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, 1985 CanLII 65 (SCC), [1985] 1 SCR 177 at para 
35, when Maitland J stated for the court “I am prepared to accept that the term [everyone] includes 
every human being who is physically present in Canada and by virtue of such presence amenable to 
Canadian law”.  This decision was based on the [then in force] Immigration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-2, 
however in the subsequent decision of  Jallow v. the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Court File 
IMM-2679-95, November 6, 1996 (unreported) (F.C.T.D.) the court held that 
 “In reviewing Singh, ... it is clear to me that the process which was eventually put in place in 
Canada is not applicable to claimants outside the country … [and]… that other consequences 
which flowed from the decision are only applicable to Refugee claimants within Canada… 
[Immigration Act procedures] ...  for the adjudication of the claims of persons claiming 
refugee status in Canada deny such claimants rights they are entitled to assert under s. 7 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms …   First, the Court should decide whether 
refugee claimants physically present in Canada are entitled to the protection of s.7 of the 
Charter. ... The Act envisages the assertion of a refugee claim under s. 45 in the context of an 
inquiry, which presupposes that the refugee claimant is physically present in Canada and 
within the jurisdiction of the Canadian authorities.”   
This holding has been subsequently upheld in Oraha v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), 1997 CanLII 5223 (FC) where changes to Canadian immigration law since Singh were 
examined and found to be of no impact on this aspect of determining Convention refugee claims for 




The issue of extra-territorial application of the Charter can be traced from 
Harrer,
506
 a case that examined the admissibility of statements gathered by U.S. marshals 
from an accused in the United States, but used in a Canadian prosecution.  Although the 
statements were admitted, the majority carefully noted that this admission should not be 
“interpreted as giving credence to the view that the ambit of the Charter is automatically 
limited to Canadian territory", and further noted that "the automatic exclusion of Charter 
application outside Canada might unduly restrict the protection Canadians have a right to 
expect against the interference with their rights by our governments or their agents".
507
  
This decision was quickly followed in Terry, another instance where U.S. authorities 
gathered evidence in a manner that did not meet the requirements of the Charter yet was 
subsequently used in the Canadian prosecution.
508
  Following on the principles expressed 
in Harrer, the court resolved that foreign State sovereignty was exclusive and the Charter 
would not apply to foreign actors working on the behalf of Canadian authorities. 
Of greater relevance to the issues being examined here is the extra-territorial 
application of the Charter when the actions are taken by Canadian State agents 
                                                 
506 R. v. Harrer, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562 
507 Ibid at para 10-12 where the majority concluded that either as the U.S. marshals were not acting 
on behalf of the Canadian government, or that s.32(1) did not apply at all to foreign authorities 
regardless of whether they acted on behalf of Canadian actors, the Charter did not apply to their 
conduct. 
508 R. v. Terry, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 207 at paras 19-20.  The unanimous court held that in keeping with the 
concept of State sovereignty, the Charter did not govern foreign law enforcement officers, even when 
acting as agents of Canadian police who themselves were bound by the Charter as these foreign 
actors are governed solely by the "exclusivity of the foreign State's sovereignty" and the "the rules of 
that country and none other".  Subsequently this reasoning was followed by the SCC in R. v. Schreiber, 
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 841 where at para 27 the majority of the court held that the search of foreign bank 
institutions by foreign authorities, even at the request of Canadian authorities, did not cause the 




themselves.  In the case of Hape
509
 the SCC examined the extra-territorial effect of the 
Charter in the context of an RCMP investigation conducted in the territory of another 
State.  There, Canadian investigators working with local police conducted warrantless 
searches of Mr. Hape’s business premises in the Turks and Caicos Islands.  Those 
searches were lawful within that country but not in accordance with Canadian Charter 
requirements.  The SCC majority decision outlined a 2 part test necessary to determine 
whether subsection 32(1) of the Charter applied, inquiring first into whether the activity 
could be attributed to a Canadian actor such that it is within subsection 32(1) of the 
Charter.
510
  The court confirmed that s.32(1) of the Charter applied only to “Parliament, 
the government of Canada, the provincial legislatures and provincial governments” – and 
thus Canadian State agents – and answered this in the affirmative.
511
    
Part two of the test then sought an exception to the customary international law 
principles of sovereignty and equality of nations
512
 to justify the Charter’s application to 
the extra-territorial activities.
513
   Interpreting s.32(l) through the lens of international law 
and comity, the majority found that most extra-territorial applications of the Charter 
would be barred due to the presumption at international law precluding such action
514
 
                                                 
509 Supra note 490. 
510 Ibid at para 103. 
511 Ibid at para 94. 
512 Supra note 204 at 88-91 referring to a State’s right to exclusive control over domestic affairs.  
Sovereignty includes the exercise of authority over all living within the State; the power to use and 
dispose of State territory; the right to exclude foreign States from State territory; immunity of State 
representatives for their official acts and State immunity from foreign court jurisdictions; and respect 
for the lives and property of State nationals and officials abroad.   
513 Supra  note 490 at para 113, directed at those “matters within the authority” of the Canadian State 
government, when acting beyond Canadian territory.  
514 P.H. Verdier, “R.v. Hape”, (2008) 102 Am. J. Int’l L. 143 at 144, discussing three reasons provided 




absent "an exception to the principle of sovereignty that would justify the application of 
the Charter to the extra-territorial activities of the State actor".
515
  The court then 
examined the specific jurisdiction in question, in this case enforcement jurisdiction,
516
 
and provided the only exception to this rule was found where host-nation consent was 
received or in situations involving "clear violations of international law and fundamental 
human rights”.
517
   
This decision recognized for Canadian courts two key features of international 
law: respect for sovereignty and the equality of all States.  Jurisdiction as a component of 
State sovereignty was held as a “quintessential feature” of this recognition, with the only 
imposable limits created through State consent or international law, whether customary or 
conventional.
518
   The court went on to explain that the principle of non-intervention was 
critical to maintaining this recognition of State sovereignty and equality, and therefore 
States were bound to refrain from interfering in the affairs of other States.  Further, these 
principles of non-intervention and territorial sovereignty were adopted into Canadian 
common law
519
 and thus informed the limitation of extra-territorial Charter 
                                                                                                                                                 
international law, implying that “customary principles of territorial sovereignty and non-
intervention are part of Canadian common law”.  Second was the principle of comity as guidance to 
the interpretation of Canadian laws impacting on foreign sovereignty.  Lastly, IHRL treaties were 
canvassed as the majority adopted the presumption that interpretation of statutes, and thus the 
Constitution, must conform to international law. 
515 Supra  note 490 at para 113. 
516 Supra note 514 at 144-145.   
517 Supra  note 490 at para 52. 
518 Ibid at paras. 41-46. 
519 Ibid at para 37 citing with approval Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 675 at 
para. 65, leave to appeal refused, [2005] 1 S.C.R., where Justice Goudge explained "customary rules of 
international law are directly incorporated into Canadian domestic law unless explicitly ousted by 






  Also recognized by the majority of the court was the interpretative 
principle of comity or the “desire for States to act courteously towards one another”, 
critical to issues of State cooperation and deference to sovereignty.
521
  This majority 
conclusion clearly underscored the SCC’s respect for the principle of comity where an 
application of the Charter, in the territory of another State and as an extension and 




This respect for comity as a bar to the application of Charter rights abroad was 
not shared by the entire court.  In a concurring dissent Justice Bastarache prophetically 
disagreed with the majority approach, stating “that the Charter’s reach does not end at 
the ‘water’s edge’.  It is less clear, however, when and how the Charter applies 
abroad”.
523
  Bastarache J. rejected the majority’s “co-operation” approach
524
 in favour of 
                                                                                                                                                 
those obligations."  This doctrine of adoption provides that so long as domestic legislation does not 
conflict with customary international law, those laws are “absorbed” into our common law.  
520 Ibid at para 46. 
521 Ibid at para 50 and 52, emphasising that in the modern world where transnational criminal 
activity and rapid transportation and communication was possible, the principle of comity 
encourages inter-State cooperation in the investigation of these crimes absent lawful compulsion.  
Likewise, where such assistance by another State within its own territory was sought or provided the 
principle of comity would guide States to respect the manner in which this assistance was provided.  
This deference to the means by which a foreign State assisted the requesting State ended only where 
“clear violations of international law and fundamental human rights” occurred in the manner of 
assistance given, and that Canadian courts should interpret “Canadian law, and approach assertions 
of foreign law” respectful of the spirit of international co-operation and the comity of nations”.  
Comity has also been described as “the deference and respect due by other States to the actions of a 
State legitimately taken within its territory” in Morguard Investments Ltd. V. De Savoye, [1990] 3 
S.C.R. 1077, at p. 1095. 
522 Supra note 514 at 147. 
523 Supra  note 490 at paras 125 and 139. 
524 Ibid at paras 139 - 179.  Bastarache J reviewed and rejected this test based on the “factors” 
approach as vague, the question of who initiated the investigation in question as unprincipled, 
“foreign control”  (would always apply to Canadian officials working in foreign jurisdictions), and 
imposing Canadian standards until they interfere with foreign sovereign authority as inconsistent.  




a sliding-scale of review, reviewing only substantial differences between the alien State’s 
fundamental human rights laws and Canadian Charter protections and potentially 
justifying differences through the principle of comity and the need to fight transnational 
crime.
525
  Justice Binnie also expressed his concern with the majority approach, opining 
that international legal obligations and specifically IHRL were “weaker and their scope 
more debatable than Charter guarantees”, and thus the majority decision “would 
substitute Canada’s ‘international rights obligations’ as a source of limitation on State 
power”.
526
  With this limited guidance Canadian courts have continued to face questions 
of extra-territorial Charter application, with mixed results.  
Moving forward from Hape, the Federal Court in Amnesty Canada
527
 examined 
the extra-territorial effect of the Charter with respect to CF operations in the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan.  Amnesty Canada involved a challenge to the lawfulness of CF 
transfers of detained individuals, most often on the battlefield but in any event as the 
result of operations in Afghanistan, to the custody of Afghan authorities where it was 
                                                                                                                                                 
or proscriptively (para 166), and thus would seldom interfere with foreign laws as stressed by the 
majority decision.  He felt instead that a principled approach to the application of individual Charter 
rights, such as s.10(b), should be applied and thus Charter rights should be observed where they 
could be, but where such rights would interfere with the conduct of foreign officials acting within the 
lawful ambit of their jurisdiction these rights gave way (paras 168-179). 
525 Ibid at para 174.  The onus will be on the claimant to demonstrate that the difference between 
fundamental human rights protection given by the local law and that afforded under the Charter is 
inconsistent with basic Canadian values; the onus will then shift to the government to justify its 
involvement in the activity. In many cases, differences between protections guaranteed by Charter 
principles and the protections offered by foreign procedures will simply be justified by the need for 
Canada to be involved in fighting transnational crime and the need to respect the sovereign authority 
of foreign States. On account of this, courts are permitted to apply a rebuttable presumption of 
Charter compliance where the Canadian officials were acting pursuant to valid foreign laws and 
procedures. Unless it is shown that those laws or procedures are substantially inconsistent with the 
fundamental principles emanating from the Charter, they will not give rise to the breach of a Charter 
right. 
526 Ibid at para 186. 




alleged the detainees were subjected to mistreatment and even torture.  Within a rule 107 
motion, the court determined that the two questions to be addressed were:  
1. Does the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms apply during the armed 
conflict in Afghanistan to the detention of non-Canadians by the Canadian Forces 
or their transfer to Afghan authorities to be dealt with by those authorities? 
 
2. If the answer to the above question is “no” then will the Charter nonetheless 
apply if the applicants were ultimately able to establish that the transfer of the 




  In addressing the first question, the Applicants argued that the Charter should 
apply at all times during the armed conflict in Afghanistan to non-Canadians detained by 
CF and then transferred to Afghan authorities, using what can be termed the “control of 
the person” test.  Second, if the Charter did not always apply, then it should apply in 
circumstances where the transfer of these detainees subjected them to a substantial risk of 
torture.
529
    Following an extensive review of both extra-territorial application of the 
Charter and international law, and in particular IHL, Mactavish J. ultimately disagreed 
with both of the applicant’s propositions.
 530
 
The court recognized that the CF could validly claim a broad discretion to detain 
Afghan civilians, including those not taking an active role in hostilities,
531
 and then 
applied the test in Hape to determine potential extra-territorial Charter application.  The 
first part of the Hape test was quickly answered in the affirmative as CF personnel were 
                                                 
528 Ibid at para 13. 
529 Ibid. 
530 Ibid, at paras 100 – 301, with IHL examined in particular at paras 216 – 266.  At para 346 both 
arguments by the applicant were denied. 




not surprisingly found to be “State actors” for the purpose of the Charter.
532
  The next 
consideration was the “effective military control of the person” argument, suggesting that 
the Charter would apply once the CF exercised complete control of a person in their 
custody.
533
  This argument was also rejected by the court, which adopted the reasoning 
used by the ECtHR Grand Chamber in Banković
534
 which had held that extra-territorial 
jurisdiction of a State’s law is exceptional, and is only found where effective control of 
the territory exists.
535
  Lastly the court also recognized the practical effects of this test, in 
that it would impose a “patchwork” of legal norms within the coalition operation.
536
 
Turning then to the second question linking the applicability of the Charter to 
allegations of detainee mistreatment or the reasonable likelihood of mistreatment, the 
court again cited Banković in rejecting this “cause and effect” argument.
537
  The court 
rejected this approach as unprincipled, reasoning “that it could not be that it is the nature 
or quality of the Charter breach that creates extra-territorial jurisdiction, where it does 
not otherwise exist”
 538
 – either the Charter would apply or it would not.  The court thus 
                                                 
532 Ibid at paras 102 – 105, finding s.32(1) of the Charter applied to CF personnel. 
533 Ibid at paras 187-298. 
534 Supra note 217. 
535 Supra note 490 at 88 where the court cited the SCC’s apparent rejection of a control-based test in 
Hape.  See also supra note  452 at paras 221 – 235 finding effective control could apply to relevant 
territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the consent, 
invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, and where all or some of the public 
powers normally exercised by the controlling Government are in fact exercised. 
536 Ibid, at para 274 where the court rejected the “control of the person” test as “the practical effect 
would be problematic in the context of a multinational military effort such as the one in 
which Canada is currently involved in Afghanistan. Indeed, it would result in a patchwork of different 
national legal norms applying in relation to detained Afghan citizens in different parts of Afghanistan, 
on a purely random-chance basis”. 
537 Ibid, at paras 309-328. 




accorded great weight to the value of certainty in the application of the Charter over 
Canadian “State actors ‘on the ground’ in foreign countries”,
539
 while obliging those 
same actors to act in accordance with Canada’s international human rights obligations – 
independent of any Charter obligations.
540
  Thus Canadian jurisprudence would see 
Canadian State actors adhere to international human rights norms, but without engaging 
Canadian State responsibility to extend the protection of the Charter.
541
 
In Canada (Justice) v. Khadr
542
 the argument regarding the problematic nature of 
using the “control of the Person” test was similarly discussed and acknowledged by the 
SCC.  Khadr examined the activities of Canadian intelligence agents who interviewed 
Omar Khadr while he was in American detention, and then shared the information 
learned with U.S. authorities for the purpose of the American prosecution.  The SCC, 
again citing Banković, rejected the “cause and effect” argument and found that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 “Surely Canadian law, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, either applies 
in relation to the detention of individuals by the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, or it does 
not. It cannot be that the Charter will not apply where the breach of a detainee’s purported 
Charter rights is of a minor or technical nature, but will apply where the breach puts the 
detainee’s fundamental human rights at risk.  That is, it cannot be that it is the nature or 
quality of the Charter breach that creates extra-territorial jurisdiction, where it does not 
otherwise exist. That would be a completely unprincipled approach to the exercise of extra-
territorial jurisdiction.” 
539 Ibid at para 314. 
540 Ibid at para 316.  At para 328 the court went on to deny the application, holding that “the Charter 
would not apply to restrain the conduct of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, even if the applicants 
were ultimately able to establish that the transfer of the detainees in question would expose them to 
a substantial risk of torture”. 
541  Supra note 495 (Khadr II) at para 14 where the SCC affirmed that as a general rule Canadians 
abroad are bound by the law of the country in which they find themselves and cannot avail 
themselves of their rights under the Charter, based on customary international law and the principle 
of comity of nations which generally prevent Charter application to the actions of Canadian officials 
operating outside of Canada, with the possible exception in the case of Canadian participation in 
activities of a foreign State or its agents contrary to Canada’s international obligations or 
fundamental human rights norms. 
542 Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, 2008 SCC 28 (CanLII), [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125; (2008), 293 D.L.R. (4th) 629; 




presence of IHRL obligations which might constrain Canadian actors does not 
necessarily imply Charter applicability to these same actions.
543
  The court then applied 
the same reasoning as seen in Amnesty International to invoke the Hape human rights 
exception but with a different result, having noted that Khadr’s detention and the 
proposed means of trial he faced were contrary both to US law and the Geneva 
Conventions.
544
  The Court then reasoned that Canada too was bound by the Geneva 
Conventions, and that “if Canada was participating in a process that was violative of 
Canada’s binding obligations under international law, the Charter applies to the extent of 
that participation”.
545
  It may be observed though that this decision was careful to state  
“it was simply participation in the illegal process that entitled Khadr to a remedy 
under section 7, and it was not necessary to conclude that handing over the fruits 
of the interviews in this case to U.S. officials constituted a breach of Mr. Khadr’s 
s.7 rights.  It suffices to note that at the time Canada handed over the fruits of the 
interviews to U.S. officials, it was bound by the Charter, because at that point it 





A second case involving Omar Khadr and the extra-territorial application of the 
Charter was subsequently brought before the SCC when he requested a judicial order 
compelling the Canadian government to seek his repatriation from U.S. custody back to 
Canada.
547
  The court found that the actions of Canadian State agents established a 
                                                 
543 Ibid, at paras 309-328. 
544  Currie, Robert J., and Rikhof, Joseph, International and Transnational Criminal Law, 2/e, (Toronto, 
ON, CAN: Irwin Law 2014) at p. 563. 
545 Supra note 490 at 88-89, citing supra note 542 at 33. 
546 Supra note 544 at 563, citing supra note 490 at para 27. 




sufficient connection by contributing to a breach of Mr. Khadr’s Charter rights.
548
  As 
with their earlier decision in Khadr, the SCC first ruled that Mr. Khadr’s claim was based 
on the facts of that first case and therefore their earlier ruling stood, and the Charter 
applied under the Hape “human rights exception”.
549
  As a result the Court granted a 
declaration of infringement, advising the Canadian government of this opinion but 
refraining from ordering the government to actually remedy the situation.
550
  This line of 
reasoning by the SCC, that Charter infringement will be found where Canadian State 
agents participate in a process that in whole or part violates Canada’s obligations under 
international law, is potentially applicable to RCN operations.  
 Canadian jurisprudence regarding the application of the Charter to actions by 
State actors has seen a fundamental shift towards a bright-line approach, barring 
application of the Charter in all but exceptional circumstances.
551
  While this approach 
does provide clarity in most extra-territorial situations, the court’s treatment of what 
constitutes an exceptional circumstance is far less clear and has been inconsistently 
applied by lower courts.
552
  This focus on a bright-line by Canadian courts has also failed 
to consider many of the factors present within the maritime environment, and therefore is 
of limited assistance and application in contemporary RCN operations.  In particular, 
given the lack of judicial scrutiny regarding ships, either flagged or unflagged, and 
individuals detained by Canadian warships, much less individuals brought onboard HMC 
                                                 
548 Ibid at paras 30, 48. 
549 Supra note 544 at 564. 
550 Supra note 490 at 90. 





Ships, the application of the bright-line in these situations is uncertain to say the least.  In 
keeping with the practice of Canadian courts, I will therefore seek guidance from 
international tribunals that have addressed these unique circumstances, which together 
with Canadian jurisprudence will inform my subsequent analysis and form the basis of 
my concluding recommendations. 
4.4 Canadian Legislative Authorities Impacting on Extra-Territorial Detentions 
Generally speaking, Canadian police agencies and courts have no investigative or 
adjudicative jurisdiction over any person for offences committed “outside Canada”, 
defined as Canadian internal waters plus Canada’s territorial sea.
553
  A relatively modest 
number of exceptions to this general principle are provided for primarily within two 
sources of authority, the Criminal Code
554
 and the Oceans Act.
555
  Beyond this limit 
Canadian enforcement powers continue to exist but are reduced as one moves further out 
                                                 
553 Supra note 20 at s.6(2), which is reflective of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-21 at s. 8(1) 
which states “Every enactment applies to the whole of Canada, unless a contrary intention is 
expressed in the enactment”.  Among the few exceptions to this general rule, the Criminal Code art 
477.3 proscribes police powers in Canada’s maritime zones but with exceptions, including offences 
“deemed” to have been committed within Canada such as found at s.465(4) of the Criminal Code 
which establishes “Where a person conspires to commit a crime in Canada, but does the conspiracy 
outside of Canada, they are deemed to have committed the offence in Canada.”  These examples of 
extra-territorial enforcement jurisdiction through the Criminal Code however are beyond the scope 
of this paper and will not be included in this examination.  Canadian territory is defined at s. 35 
which is then further defined in supra note 25 at s.4 as the Canadian coastal waters extending to 12 
nautical miles from the baseline, itself found at the low-water line on the coast. This mirrors supra 
note 38 (UNCLOS) arts 3-16. 
554 Ibid. 
555 Supra note 25 (Oceans Act), setting out jurisdiction of Canadian courts with regards to Canadian 
registered ships, offences by ships outside of Canada in the course of hot pursuit and by Canadian 
citizens outside the territory of any State.  Criminal Code arts 477.2 and 477.4 establish limitation s 
on prosecutions that may be brought under these sections.  Art 7(2.1) further sets out jurisdiction 
over offences in relation to fixed platforms attached to the continental shelf and art 78.1 establishes 
offences committed in relation to ships or fixed platforms; art 7(3.1) establishes as an offence any 
hostage-taking activity committed outside Canada on a Canadian registered vessel.  This list is a 








 to the edge of the 
continental shelf
558
 and onto the high seas.  
4.4.1 The Criminal Code  The Criminal Code does provide for some extraterritorial 
enforcement jurisdiction with respect to offences specified in the SUA.  Section 78.1 of 
the Criminal Code incorporates SUA prohibitions against seizing by force or threat of 
force, acts of violence against persons on board and damage to (including embarked 
cargo) ships or fixed platforms; interference with maritime navigational facilities or 





  The extra-territorial enforcement jurisdiction over 
offences under s.78.1 is then established at Section 7(2.2) of the Criminal Code, which 
provides that such offences shall be deemed to have been committed within Canada 
provided the offender is found within territory of a State, other than the State in which the 
act or omission was committed, that is party to either the SUA or the Protocol for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the 
Continental Shelf.
561
  While there are select, additional Criminal Code provisions that 
                                                 
556 Discussed in chapter 2.2.1 Coastal State Jurisdiction – Internal waters and Baselines  and chapter 
2.2.5 Contiguous Zone.   
557 Discussed in chapter 2.2.6 Exclusive Economic Zone.   
558 Discussed in chapter 2.2.7 Continental Shelf.      
559 Supra note 20 at s. 78.1. 
560 As required at Supra note 299 (SUA) art. 8(3), 7, 10(1), requiring signatory States to create 
criminal offences, establish jurisdiction and accept delivery of persons responsible for or suspected 
of seizing or exercising control over a ship by force or threat. 
561 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the 




would permit for extra-territorial exercise of Canadian jurisdiction,
562
 many of these 
offences are beyond the scope of RCN operations being discussed within this paper and 
will not be further explored. 
4.4.2 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act  While not of immediate and obvious 
application to the issue of individuals detained by the RCN in contemporary operations, 
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA”) does potentially speak to this 
area.
563
 The IRPA has as one of its objectives the transformation of Canadian 
commitments to international human rights agreements into domestic law
564
 including the 
Refugee Convention
565
 and the CAT.
566
  Of significance the IRPA adopts the Refugee 
Convention definition of a “refugee”
567
 and the court in Li v. Canada recognized its 
consolidation of the grounds for extending protection under Article 3 of the CAT to 
those: 
                                                 
562 Supra, note 20.  For example s. 477.1 sets out Canadian jurisdiction for offences occurring in the 
Canadian EEZ, on or with regards to marine installations on the Canadian continental shelf, offences 
onboard Canadian flagged vessels, offences committed in the course of hot pursuit, and offences 
committed by Canadians anywhere while outside the territory of another State.  See also s.7 which 
extends enforcement jurisdiction over a host of offences related to cultural property, fixed platforms 
affixed to the continental shelf, aircraft, ships and even onboard space stations.    
563 Supra note 504.  Torture is defined within art 1 of the CAT as “any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a 
third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a 
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is 
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent 
in or incidental to lawful sanctions.” 
564 Catherine Dauvergne, “International Human Rights in Canadian Immigration Law – The Case of 
the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada”, 19 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 305 (2012), at 310, citing 
ibid at section 3(3)(f) “[t]his act is to be construed and applied in a manner that … complies with 
international human rights instruments to which Canada is a signatory.”  
565 Supra note 357. 
566 Supra note 358. 




in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of nationality or, if they do 
not have a country of nationality, their country of former habitual residence, 
would subject them personally 
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the 
meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or 





Thus while an individual can apply for refugee status from within the territory of 
Canada,
569
 there is no concurrent right to make such claims extra-territorially.   
Once a claim is accepted and in order to determine the likelihood of danger or risk 
required in order for the IRPA to apply, the court in Li referred to jurisprudence 
interpreting Article 3 of the CAT
 570
 finding that the claimant must establish this risk 
along a balance of probabilities.
571
 Based upon this analysis, the court proposed a 
spectrum extending from “mere possibility” through to “highly probable”
572
 and 
ultimately held that to benefit from the protection of IRPA the likelihood an individual 
would be subjected to torture upon return to another State, “The requisite degree of 
                                                 
568 Supra note 564 at 311-312.  See also Li v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 
FCA 1 (CanLII), (“Li”) at para 17.  Also incorporated into the IRPA is the prohibition against using 
information reasonably believed to have been obtained as the result of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment within the meaning of  art. 1 of the CAT. 
569 Supra note 504 at art. 99. 
570 Supra note 568 (Li) at para 18, noting that Parliament gave domestic effect to art 3 of the CAT at 
IRPA art. 97(1)(a).  The court further cited at para 20-24 a number of comments made by the UN 
Committee Against Torture regarding the required standard of proof to establish the application of 
CAT Article 3, stating at para 27 that “the words in paragraph 97(1)(a) and Article 3 are almost 
identical and deal with the same subject-matter, they should be interpreted the same way.” 
571 Ibid at para 14, following the reasoning set out at supra note 459 (Baker). 




danger of torture envisaged by the expression ‘believed on substantial grounds to exist’ is 
that the danger of torture is more likely than not”.
573
 
In Canada, the ability to deny aliens entry into Canadian territory is also governed 
by the IRPA,
574
 and in the context of an HMC Ship is possibly engaged where individuals 
are detained onboard.  Canadian courts have established that an alien person has no right 
to enter or remain in Canada except by grant of the Crown.
575
  In Hagos v. Kirkoyan the 
Federal Court examined the IRPA and the meaning of being “lawfully present” with 
regards to being in Canada, and determined these words should retain their common 
meaning.
576
  The court further held that the concept of residence is not akin to “lawful 
residency”, as residency status under the IRPA is not determinative with regards to an 
individual who has lived in a location for a sufficient period of time so as to “live” in the 
community – whether long term or temporarily.
577
  The Federal Court then went on to 
explain that “the requirement for lawful presence is intended to exclude only those situations 
                                                 
573 Ibid at para 36, applying this test both to section 97(1)(a) and (b) equally at para 39. 
574 Supra note 504 at art 6, which empowers the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to designate 
any person or class of persons as officers generally empowered under the Act.  At arts 20.1,  34(2), 
35(2) and 37(2)(a) and art. 77(1) general delegation of authority is specifically excluded with 
regards to designating irregular arrivals or issue a certificate stating that the individual is 
inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or 
organized criminality, as well as the ability to make determinations of admissibility for those 
otherwise inadmissible by virtue of possible security, human or international rights violations or 
organized crime affiliation. 
575 Prata v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration, 1975 CanLII 7 (SCC), [1976] 1 S.C.R. 376.  At p. 380 
Martland J. for the court held that  "The right of aliens to enter and remain in Canada is governed by the 
Immigration Act" and s.5(1)  states that "No person, other than a person described in section 4, has a 
right to come into or remain in Canada”. 
576 Hagos v. Kirkoyan, 2011 FC 1214 (CanLII) at para 79-80 referring to Prosecutor v. Popovic, IT-05-
88-T, Final Judgment (10 June 2010) (para 900) interpreting the words “lawfully present” as retaining 
their common meaning and not be equated to any concept of lawful residency, as the prohibition against 
forcible transfer and deportation is intended to prevent civilians from being uprooted from their homes 





where the individuals are occupying houses or premises unlawfully or illegally and not to 
impose a requirement for ‘residency’ to be demonstrated as a legal standard”.
578
   
From this it would appear that individuals brought onboard HMC Ships have no 
concomitant right to remain, nor do they necessarily gain the right to submit a claim of for 
refugee status and the attendant protections under the IRPA.  Should, however, refugee 
status be sought in this circumstance and granted, any attempt to return the refugee to 
another State where a risk of torture is claimed would need to examine this claim on a 
standard of  balance of probabilities. 
4.4.3  Other Canadian Acts  A number of additional Canadian Acts could also play a 
role in situations where HMC Ships detain individuals at sea.  The Emergencies Act is 
one such Act as it partially incorporates into Canadian law the ICCPR, requiring in 
particular that a number of fundamental rights set out in the ICCPR are not to be limited 
or abridged even in a national emergency.
579
  Likewise, the Canadian Multiculturalism 
Act
580
 recognizes the ICCPR provision requiring persons of ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities be permitted the right to enjoy their culture, religion and language.  In large 
part the remainder of the ICCPR has been incorporated into Canadian law through the 
Charter, thus the ICCPR may have some impact upon Canadian actions within the 
international forum. 
                                                 
578 Ibid at para 80. 
579 Emergencies Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 22 preamble. 
580 Canadian Multiculturalism Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 24 preamble stating that “persons belonging to 
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities shall not be denied the right to enjoy their own culture, to 




Similar to Charter requirements for life, liberty and security of the person, not to 
be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned,
581
 article 9 of the ICCPR provides that those 
detained “shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may 
decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the 
detention is not lawful”.
582
  The ICCPR further requires that any subsequent judicial 
proceeding be held within a reasonable time, and that detainees are normally to be 
released pending this trial.
 
  These obligations under the ICCPR for limiting pre-trial 
detention and the liberty interests of an accused were cited with approval by the SCC in 
Mills v. The Queen
583
 where the court acknowledged Canada’s international obligations.  
The court then further drew guidance from the ECtHR decision in the Wemhoff Case,
584
 
referring to ICCPR Article 5(3) to decide the issue of unreasonable delay and the right to 
be tried within a reasonable time.  The majority of the SCC acknowledged the Wemhoff 
Case in recognizing that investigative difficulties, circumstances and the nature of the 
case including complexity of the facts, number of witnesses or need for evidence found 
abroad are proper factors to consider when determining if rights to be brought to trial 
within a reasonable time were observed.
585
   
In the extra territorial context of RCN maritime operations, there is regrettably a 
distinct lack of judicial discussion on the applicability of the ICCPR to Canadian 
operations involving extra-territorial detentions.  Guidance can be found however in 
                                                 
581 Supra note 4 at ss 7 and 9 respectively. 
582 Supra note 359 at art 9(1) and (2). 
583  Supra note 386 (Mills v. The Queen) at para 143. 
584 Ibid at para 182. where the court referred to the ECtHR decision in Wemhoff case, judgment of 27 
June 1968, Series A No. 7. 




General Comment 31 of the Human Rights Committee,
586
 which provides that States 
party to the treaty shall respect and ensure that the rights set out in the ICCPR are 
extended to all persons subject to their jurisdiction, including those not within the State’s 
territory but within the “power or effective control of that State Party”, and specifically 
contemplates expeditionary deployments of military forces.
587
  This guidance, while 
helpful, is not the final word in this matter however, as the degree to which the ICCPR, 
implemented in this context through the Charter and other legislation as described, has 
been held to apply is still open to interpretation.  Where jurisdiction extra-territorially is 
being argued on the basis of authority and control over a person alleged to have suffered 
a violation, the “ECtHR has effectively required a more stringent test of State 
involvement in the alleged violation”.
588
  This requirement for State involvement would 
require more than the mere assertion that the State was exercising authority and control 
                                                 
586 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States 
Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004). 
587 Ibid at art 10, stating that “States Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to 
ensure the Covenant rights to all persons who may be within their territory and to all persons subject 
to their jurisdiction”, that these rights must be respected by States with regards to “anyone within 
the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State 
Party”, and that the benefit of these rights  
“is not limited to citizens of States Parties but must also be available to all individuals, 
regardless of nationality or statelessness, such as asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers 
and other persons, who may find themselves in the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of 
the State Party. This principle also applies to those within the power or effective control of 
the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in 
which such power or effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a national 
contingent of a State Party assigned to an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement 
operation.” (emphasis added). 
588 Raffaella Nigro, “The Notion of ‘Jurisdiction’ in article 1:  Future scenarios for the extra-territorial 
application of the European Convention on Human Rights” (2010) 20 Italian Y.B. Int’l L. 11 at 17, 




over the alleged victim, but also would require evidence linking involvement of the State 
actors in the alleged violation itself “beyond a reasonable doubt”.
589
 
The concern is therefore raised that under both the Charter and Canada’s 
international obligations, particularly the ICCPR, Canadian warships should act with all 
reasonable haste in observing the rights of detainees taken on the high seas to be 
promptly brought before judicial authorities, if subsequent Canadian legal action is to 
succeed.  Although some contextual interpretation will occur to accommodate the 
circumstances of a given situation, these circumstances should not be interpreted so as to 
permit bringing detainees before judicial authorities “when convenient”.  While 
obligations in this regard are not directly imposed on naval commanders, depending upon 
the objectives of the mission they may be asked to account for any delay in delivering a 
detainee to judicial authorities at a subsequent proceeding. 
4.5  Breaches of Detainee Rights and Remedies 
Under Canadian constitutional and statutory law those detained unlawfully, or in 
breach of their rights, may seek redress based upon that breach.  Such redress involves a 
number of requirements including the venue, available lawful remedies and recognition 
that the Crown enjoys a large measure of immunity when acting under the authority of 
the Crown prerogative.  I will therefore discuss several avenues of legal redress 
applicable to alleged breaches of detainee rights, beginning with civil remedies and 
followed by criminal sanctions.   
                                                 





4.5.1  Crown and Agent Civil Liability for Breaches of Detainee Rights  The Crown 
Liability and Proceedings Act
590
 provides one avenue of redress for those alleging that 
the federal Crown is vicariously liable at tort for the wrongdoings of its ‘servants’.  Legal 
claims brought under this Act must, however, be brought in Canada for claims arising in 
Canada
591
 in either the Federal or respective provincial courts,
592
 and with few exceptions 
the Crown is immune from court orders directing or prohibiting actions.
593
  Crown 
servants acting beyond their authority under statute or Crown prerogative are not immune 
to these court orders.
594
  However, provided they acted reasonably, in good faith and 
within the scope of their duties the Crown servant may benefit from the Treasury Board 
policy on Legal Assistance and Indemnification.
595
  In order for the federal Crown to be 
found vicariously liable the tortuous act must be sufficiently connected with the servant’s 
employment by the Crown, but not where the servant exercised ‘independent discretion’ 
or a power or duty conferred directly upon them by law when they committing the tort.
596
   
                                                 
590 Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50 (“Crown Liability Act”). 
591 Ibid at s.3, and supra note 427 at 6.2(d) where the meaning of Crown servant is discussed. 
592 Ibid (Hogg) at 4.1, citing ibid s.21. 
593 Ibid (Hogg) at2.4(i) discussing constitutional injunctions as preventing a violation of the 
Constitution, which includes the Charter.  Likewise Crown immunity from constitutional mandamus 
is not complete, particularly when a duty is imposed by virtue of the Charter for which relief is 
provided under s.24 (ibid (Hogg) at 2.6(d)). 
594 Ibid (Hogg) at 2.4(c). 
595 Treasury Board policy on Legal Assistance and Indemnification effective 1 September 2008 (Online: 
http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=13937&section=text ).  This policy applies to Crown 
servants acting in good faith, not against Crown interests, and within the scope of their duties of 
employment. 
596 Ibid (Hogg) at 6.2(k) and (m).  Independent discretion is commonly found in police officers when 
“acting in exercise of statutory or common law powers vested in him or her personally and must be 
exercised according to his or her independent discretion”, however is not found when performing 
“general police duties under the direction and control of his superiors”.  Should independent 




In the event sufficient lawful authority is found to support a governmental act then 
liability in tort does not arise, however compensation under either the statutory authority 
or the prerogative may still be available
597
 and while the Crown is immune from 
enforcement of a court’s judgment, the Crown Liability Act does account for court-
determined damages.
598
   
Despite these various legal avenues available to pursue a tort claim against the 
Crown, members within the CAF are granted sweeping immunity “for military activity, 
drawing no distinction between war and peace; between combat, training and discipline; 
or between injured civilians and injured members of the forces”.
599
  This carte blanche 
approach to questions of civil negligence where defence matters are involved is unique, 
as Canada stands alone among her allies in providing this sweeping grant of statutory 
immunity.
600
     
4.5.2 Crown and Agent Criminal Liability for Breaches of Detainee Rights  While in 
theory the Crown may be liable for offences contrary to Canadian criminal law provided 
the statute is sufficiently broad, in practice such prosecutions are rare.
601
  Such a 
prosecution could potentially be made where acts constituting torture occur, bearing in 
                                                 
597 Ibid (Hogg) at 6.4 (a) – (c).  
598 Supra note 590 at ss.29-30, and at common law as discussed at ibid (Hogg) 3.1(b).   
599 Ibid (Hogg) at 7.6(b), referring to ibid section 8 exemption of the Crown from tortious liability “in 
respect of anything done or omitted in the exercise of any power or authority exercisable by the 
Crown, whether in time of peace or of war, for the purpose of the defence of Canada  or of training, or 
maintaining the efficiency of, the Canadian Forces”. 
600 Ibid (Hogg), citing the lack of a similar blanket immunity by the U.K., Australia, New Zealand and 
the U.S. who by contrast have adopted the common law to the unique environment of military 
activity. 




mind that Canada has ratified the CAT,
602
 and incorporated the offence into Canadian 
law.
603
  The “question of how States ought to treat detainees must never be confused with 
the question of what detention practices are so egregious as to subject the captor to 
criminal liability”.
604
  In order to find potential liability against the Crown, therefore, an 
‘egregious’ detention practice constituting torture and sanctioned by government policy 
would need to be established.  While such an offence is unlikely this factor must still be 
borne in mind by all members of the chain of command, and appropriate safeguards and 
oversights be enforced to ensure that those detained are cared for in an appropriate and 
lawful manner. 
In contrast, Canadian Crown servants are unlikely to benefit from any protection 
of Crown immunity where their actions breach statutory law, regardless of whether by 
way of criminal charges or if named in civil proceedings.  While Crown servants named 
in civil proceedings may be entitled to the protection offered under the Treasury Board 
provisions, provided they meet applicable criteria,
605
 only those charged under the 
National Defence Act Code of Service Discipline enjoy the right to be represented, at 
Crown expense, for any charges so brought.
 606
  In such circumstances the defence of 
                                                 
602 Supra note 358. 
603 Supra note 20 at s.269.1, and in particular defined “official” as (2)(c) to include “a member of the 
Canadian Forces”. 
604 Supra note 14, 8:20.40(a) at 8-18 citing B.R. Roth, “Just Short of Torture: Abusive Treatment and 
the Limits of International Criminal Justice”, JICJ 6 (2008), 215-239. 
605 Supra note 595. 





superior orders could conceivably be available,
607
  as was argued in a previous 
prosecution alleging torture by deployed CAF personnel.
608
  It is therefore incumbent 
upon individual sailors and the members of their chain of command immediately 
responsible for the care and treatment of detainees to be well advised of applicable rights 
and obligations owed in the situation. 
4.6  Conclusion 
 Giving effect to international law in Canada’s domestic law is accomplished in 
one of two ways – by incorporation in the case of customary international law, and by 
transformation in the case of treaty law.  This melding of international and domestic law 
is important to the RCN’s international deployments as both sources of lawful authority 
are normally required given the nature of operations conducted.  In the context of 
contemporary Canadian naval operations, the domestic authority to conduct the 
operations themselves is most often derived from exercise of the Crown Prerogative, with 
potential exceptions grounded in statutory authority when the CAF acts in support of 
other Canadian governmental departments.   
 The application and effect of the Canadian Charter, if found to apply 
extraterritorially, is of equal importance to these contemporary missions where 
deprivation of liberty is present.  Recent decisions in Canadian courts, including the 
                                                 
607 Supra note 427  at 11.15 (c), describing that merely by acting in the course of employment a 
Crown servant is not rendered immune from  statutory law, and criticizing the obedience to superior 
orders doctrine as insufficiently prejudicial to the Crown to shield a perpetrator of a wrongful act 
while the superior remains liable. 
608 Supra note 14, 8:20.40(b) at 8-20 describing court martial convictions of a CF officer and two 
subordinates for assaulting a detained foreign national while on a peacekeeping mission.  The 
subordinates were convicted of assault contrary to supra note 20 s.266 , while charges against the 




Supreme Court, have evolved to restrict the extra-territorial reach of the Charter, but to 
date have only examined situations of Canadian law enforcement and CF deployments 
occurring in another State’s territory.  As a result of the Court’s profound respect for 
comity and the territory of these foreign States, these decisions have largely limited 
Charter attribution for acts by Canadian State actors, rulings in contrast to the holdings of 
the ECtHR with respect to the extra-territorial reach of the ECHR.  Given that Canadian 
Courts have not (yet) adopted the approach of the ECtHR in this regard, and the 
differences inherent in naval operations as compared to the law enforcement and military 
questions examined in the context of the Afghanistan conflict, these decisions cannot 
simply be taken as the final word in this regards.   
 Lastly, criminal or civil legal actions taken where a detainee’s rights are alleged to 
have been breached, as well as possible sanctions against those held responsible and 
remedies for the victim, must be recognized.  While some protection exists for Canadian 
State agents acting within the normal scope of their duties, not all breaches will fall 
within this range, and it becomes important for the chain of command to understand fully 
the nature of potential breaches and resultant consequences.  Failure to do so can place 
both the mission, and individual sailors, in jeopardy. 
 I will therefore now turn to extrapolating Canadian domestic protections and 
obligations towards detainees, and their co-existent rights, to the sphere of contemporary 
RCN missions.  This analysis will refer to a number of international decisions that 
provide useful guidance in this area and will assist in my subsequent analysis of those 
legal considerations present in these operations, and the considerations that I will propose 




CHAPTER 5:  ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL WATERS SURROUNDING 
CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONS  
 
 I will now analyze international and domestic law, in particular international and 
domestic human rights obligations, as they apply to contemporary operations of the RCN.  
In order to frame this analysis I will begin by setting out in greater detail a central issue, 
that being the reach of Canada’s extra-territorial jurisdiction in the maritime environment.  
In analyzing this question I will again refer to the rationalization seen in a number of 
international decisions, followed by a proposed new way to view the question in the 
maritime environment – that being the adoption of concepts surrounding frontier zones 
and borders.  These concepts frame my analysis, as they engage the issue of when a 
person may be considered to be within the critical aspects of Canadian jurisdiction and 
thus may perhaps engage extra-territorial application of Canadian IHRL obligations.  By 
virtue of the nature of the maritime environment, HMC Ships regularly interact with 
other ships and those embarked on them.  This interaction varies from hails involving 
simple passage of information but no physical contact, to intrusively boarding these ships 
and potentially bringing individuals back onboard the Canadian warship.
609
 Given this 
range of possible actions it is critical to examine the point at which an individual is 
considered detained, and whether this is affected by the situation or mission being 
conducted.  It is through this lens that I suggest a rational and predictable set of norms 
can be most easily established, providing predictability to HMC Ships while ensuring 
Canada properly observes her human rights obligations.  In conclusion on this point I will 
                                                 
609  Maritime Command Boarding Operations Manual CFCD 108 (B), (DMPOR 4-4-4) at 3-5/10 – 3-
7/10, noting that the holding of detainees onboard HMC Ships will normally be done on an 




examine what actions can subsequently be taken towards those that are found to have 
been detained by HMC Ships, and any attendant obligations and rights likely found in 
these situations. 
 Lastly I will apply this analysis to the various RCN contemporary operations and 
how each mission may affect the status of a person detained onboard a Canadian warship, 
together with possible rights and obligations owed to the detainees in those situations.  
This will begin with missions conducted in support of OGDs in their law enforcement 
mandate, and as discussed are centered on support to the RCMP for criminal law 
enforcement action and the DFO for enforcement of Canadian legislation of the fishing 
industry.  Next I will examine contemporary counter-piracy operations, both those 
conducted under UNCLOS alone as well as those performed in support of UN Security 
Council Resolutions.  Lastly, I will discuss contemporary counter-narcotics operations 
being conducted by ships of the RCN.   
5.1  What Determines Canadian Jurisdiction over Maritime Detainees?  
 In answer to this question I will first turn to international responses regarding the 
reach of extra-territorial jurisdiction.  As was seen in R(Al-Saadoon) and Al-Saadoon, and 
in Al-Skeini and Al-Skeini and Others, the reach of a State’s extra-territorial jurisdiction, 
and thus responsibility for the application of IHRL obligations at international law is far 
from settled.  While the ‘effective control, displacing other existing (domestic) law’ 
approach to extend domestic human rights obligations extra-territorially was adopted in 
R(Al-Saadoon), critics point out that this unfairly borrowed from the LOAC concept of 
occupation in favour of the more general public international law field, and that the 




triggered extra-territorially when State forces exercised control of an area.
610
  One 
proposed solution would instead revisit the “Sliding Scale/Cause and Effect” idea 
proposed by the applicants in Banković, that “Obligations apply insofar as control is 
exercised; their nature and scope is set in direct proportional relation to the level of 
control”.
611
  One positive aspect of this approach, although it is based on recognized 
LOAC laws of occupation (not IHRL), is that it is triggered where territory is “placed 
under the authority of the hostile army” and extends “to the territory where such authority 
has been established and can be exercised”.
612
  This proposal suggests that where such 
control is exercised extra-territorially by State forces, “a relatively modest set of 
substantive obligations would actually subsist, qualitatively and quantitatively different 
from those in play in the State’s own territory, even if derived from the same legal 
source”.
613
  This means of extending a State’s domestic human rights obligations extra-
                                                 
610 R. Wilde, “Triggering State Obligations Extra-territorially:  The Spatial Test in Certain Human 
Rights Treaties”, 40 Isr. L. Rev. 503 2007at 515-523, and in particular at 520 - 523 where Wilde takes 
exception to the two arguments used in the Court of Appeal stage of Al-Skeini, supra note 218 against 
this concept – that being the cooling effect such a blanket assumption of legal authority would have 
on indigenous efforts to achieve self-governance; and the ‘cultural imperialism’ argument of 
importing foreign ideals into the controlled territory.  His response rests on the argument that self-
determination is itself an un-enumerated human right that must co-exist with other areas of 
international law, and that rather than demonstrating cultural imperialism such an approach would 
permit distinctions between the law as applied within a State’s own territory and foreign territory 
under its effective control.  Although certainly useful as an academic viewpoint for further discussion, 
it provides little in the way of concrete guidance for operational commanders. 
611 Ibid at 524-525, citing Banković, supra note 217 at para 75. 
612 The test for occupation is found in the Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 
October 1907 (“Convention IV”) art. 42(1) and more generally at art. 42-46. 
613 Supra note 610 at 519, citing Lord Justice Sedley in the Court of Appeal decision Al-Skeini v. Sec. of 
State for Defence [2005] EWCA 1609 (Civ.) at paras 196-197 when he opined “No doubt it is absurd 
to expect occupying forces in the near-chaos of Iraq to enforce the right to marry vouchsafed by Art. 
12 or the equality guarantees vouchsafed by Art 14.  But I do not think effective control involves 
this… it involves two key things:  the de facto assumption of civil power by an occupying State and a 
concomitant obligation to do all that is possible to keep order and protect essential civil rights.  It 
does not make the occupying power the guarantor of rights; nor therefore does it demand sufficient 




territorially suffers however from a flaw already identified in the purposive approach 
found in other, and most particularly Canadian, judicial decisions, that being the lack of 
predictability in its application.  Such an approach would also permit the tailoring of a 
State’s approach to IHRL, an outcome that facially appears normatively suspect. 
The ‘sliding scale’ approach to the extra-territorial application of the Charter has 
received little acceptance in Canadian jurisprudence.  Such a methodology would be a 
markedly different way of viewing Charter rights from the SCC’s current approach, as 
will be discussed, and pays less attention to the reality and historical evolution of 
sovereign jurisdiction exercised extra-territorially as a customary international norm 









  Although it may be pointed out that these established 
principles are all examples of legislative jurisdiction over individuals, and not human-
rights based rules applied to enforcement jurisdiction which could inform the “substantial 
and bona fide connection between the subject-matter and the source of the jurisdiction”, 
critics of this approach continue to argue it is unworkable due to the imprecise degree of 
jurisdiction granted in any particular situation.
618
  The sliding-scale approach would see 
extra-territorial jurisdiction “divided and tailored in accordance with the particular 
                                                                                                                                                 
right, it is not enough to say that the U.K., because it is unable to guarantee everything, is required to 
guarantee nothing.”  This reasoning is also picked up by the ECtHR in Al-Skeini and Others, supra note 
221 at paras 138-140 when discussing pre-conditions and factors to be considered in finding a State 
to exercise “effective control over an area” extra-territorially. 
614 Supra note 198 and discussed at supra note 209. 
615 Ibid, discussed at supra note 210. 
616 Ibid, discussed at supra note 212. 
617 Ibid, discussed at supra note 211. 
618 Supra note 198 at 1028, citing Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 297-98 (6th ed. 




circumstances of the extra-territorial act in question”,
619
 and while satisfying to the 
universal human rights advocate, would provide little certainty for those executing 
missions at sea.    
5.1.1  Human Rights Obligations towards those onboard HMC Ships  A second 
alternate approach found within international jurisprudence would combine the ‘effective 
control’ and ‘authority and control’ branches of reasoning seen in Al-Saadoon
620
 to 
determine when State domestic obligations are found extra-territorially, but again 
ambiguity is present.  The suggested ‘authority and control’ test to establish extra-
territorial control over individuals held by State agents, and the ‘effective control’ over 
territory outside of a States’ own borders requirement,
621
 were used in combination by the 
Strasbourg Court without settling to what degree either arm of the test bears the greatest 
weight.  The court in that matter held that in the situation of total and exclusive de facto 
and de jure control exercised by State authorities over the place in question, the person 
would be within that State’s jurisdiction.
622
  This decision was based however on a very 
narrow and technical reading of the facts of that case, which may have given insufficient 
weight to tactical realities in favour of a narrow and precise reading of one of the U.K. 
rules in force at that time in the Iraq Theater.  As may be noted from this decision, the 
ruling does not clearly set out which branch of the tests, ‘authority and control’ over the 
individual or the ‘effective control’ over a space, bear greatest weight in determining 
jurisdiction. Regardless, both tests may at some point apply in the situation of a warship – 
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the question operationally becomes at what point in the encounter either or both tests are 
sufficiently met.   
In the Canadian domestic context, Canadian courts are noted for employing a 
flexible and progressive interpretation to the Charter together with a ‘purposive 
construction’ approach when examining Charter rights against government actions, 
largely driven by the desire for predictability.
623
  This concern for predictability can be 
seen in both the Hape and Amnesty SCC decisions, where the court commented on the 
lack of certainty the “Sliding Scale/Cause and Affect” approach would involve.  While 
recognizing that the wording of Article 32(1) of the Charter and Article 1 of the ECHR 
are completely dissimilar, both have been interpreted to (normally) confine the 
enforcement jurisdictional reach of these two instruments on a territorial (or regional) 
basis, recognizing that extra-territorial enforcement jurisdiction is an uncommon event.  
In the result, Canadian courts in Hape and Amnesty did not fully resolve this question by 
finding that human rights protected by the Charter could exist where Canadian agents 
exercise both ‘effective control’ over territory outside of Canadian borders, and where 
detained individuals come under the ‘authority and control’ of Canadian agents acting on 
behalf of Canada.  It may be noted that these decisions do not fully square up with the 
SCC’s decisions in Khadr and Khadr II, which by using the Hape “human rights” 
methodology found that Canada’s international obligations had been breached by State 
agents and in the result found his s.7 Charter rights were engaged extra-territorially.
624
  
While extra-territorial application of the Charter was found in these two instances, it can 
                                                 
623 Richard Clayton and Hugh Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights (Oxford: University Press 2000) 
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be argued that due to the narrow basis used by the Courts in finding Canada’s agents had 
breached Canada’s international obligations, they are of little precedential or instructive 
value.
625
   
While effective control over territory and authority and control over a person 
remains broadly defined within international law, in the context of naval operations this 
question can most easily be established at one point - when a person is detained onboard 
the effective control of a Canadian warship, thus also finding themselves under the 
authority and control of Canadian agents.  At this point, strong argument exists to support 
the view that those detained could be entitled to IHRL protections triggered by their 
detention, and likewise Canada could become obligated to observe those rights, as 
Canadian warships remain subject to Canadian law to the exclusion of all other State 
claims of jurisdiction.    
5.1.2  Human Rights Obligations towards those not onboard HMC Ships   
 Such a jurisdictional nexus is not so clearly found, however, prior to embarking 
individuals onboard Canadian warships.  In those situations where Canadian warships 
have boarded another vessel, while arguably Canadian sailors are exercising a measure of 
authority and control over the crew onboard of that vessel, exercise of effective control is 
in question, particularly where the target vessel is a foreign flagged ship.  As discussed, 
UNCLOS recognizes that in most circumstances it is the law of the flag State that is 
applied onboard flagged ships, thus on the high seas to find effective control over persons 
onboard would require a displacement of flag State law.  While it must be acknowledged 
that the degree of jurisdiction exercised by a flag State over its vessels is not the same as 
                                                 




sovereignty exercised over its territory, while on the high seas it nevertheless falls to the 
flag State to exercise legislative, enforcement and adjudicative jurisdiction over the 
vessel and, in most circumstances, those onboard.  Such a displacement of this law of the 
flag would therefore likely require an exception to the principle of sovereignty, and as 
explored in Hape
626
 and Amnesty Canada
627
 would also likely not accord with Canadian 
judicial respect for comity.  Thus, absent an express intent to displace flag State 
jurisdiction (likely pursuant to enforcing Canadian domestic law or where law of the flag 
protection is lost, as in cases of piracy), effective control will not be found and the crew 
will continue to enjoy the protection of the ship’s flag State. 
In those situations where RCN sailors board flagless vessels, finding effective 
control sufficient to extend Canadian State obligations is still not certain.  While it has 
been stated that within the context of counter-piracy operations the holding of pirates 
onboard their own vessel vs. the warship is a distinction without a difference,
628
 such an 
argument ignores the UNCLOS Articles on this subject.  UNCLOS is manifestly silent 
with regards to what is required to “seize” a pirate vessel and “arrest the persons” under 
the authority of Article 105.  This silence may then be contrasted with UNCLOS Article 
110, authorizing the boarding of suspected vessels in order to make a determination of 
their status.  This limited investigative authority has been described as insufficient to 
argue de jure control over those onboard the vessel in order to engage international 
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 thus leaving bare this required arm of the test.  Therefore it is likely that 
while boarding flagless vessels for the purpose of simply investigating and determining 
the status of those onboard, de jure control is not exercised to the extent required to 
establish effective control over the vessel. 
In partial response to this question of the extent and nature of extra-territorial 
jurisdiction a State assumes during maritime operations, I would propose to adopt a 
number of terms and concepts that already see widespread acceptance.  Special 
Rapporteur M. Kamto for the United Nations General Assembly set out these terms in his 
2006 Second Report on the Expulsion of Aliens when discussing the nature of State 
territory, and it is to these that I will now refer. 
5.1.3  Re-Conceptualizing Naval Operations through Frontiers and Borders   
Common to the issue of Canadian human right obligations due to detainees in 
maritime operations is the situation of an individual, held under constraint and within the 
known limits of one place (the ‘sending State’), and possibly their compelled movement 
to the ‘receiving State’ or ‘receiving entity’.  This circumstance as it has been examined 
through Canadian and international jurisprudence and writings therefore rests upon the 
concept of a State’s territory.  As will be explained and applied in my analysis, a State’s 
territory is bounded by a territorial frontier, and thus the concepts of what constitutes a 
State’s territory and its frontier will be examined with a view to extrapolating this idea to 
the context of HMC Ships operating on the high seas. 
A State’s territory is that space where “the State exercises all of the powers 
deriving from sovereignty”, and “excludes spaces where it exercises only sovereign rights 
                                                 




or functional jurisdiction, such as the continental shelf and the contiguous zone, fishing 
zone and exclusive economic zone.”
630
  It has been proposed that while a strict 
delineation of State territory is not required at international law for that State to exist, a 
recognized frontier must be found that “carries with it legal consequences from its 
existence”, and “imports … a definite boundary line throughout its length”.
631
  The 
boundary of State territory consists of a frontier line, with its sharp geographic 
delineation of sovereignty, and what has been conceptually proposed as a multi-
functional “frontier zone” made up of delineated areas with varying legal status that 
“generally only happens through official points of entry and departure, including ports, 
airports and land frontier posts”.
632
   
A State’s ability to refuse an alien’s entry to its territory is well established at 
international law, expressed in the preamble to the International Rules on the Admission 
and Expulsion of Aliens adopted by the Institute of International Law, and every State 
has as a consequence of its sovereignty and independence the right to admit, deny 
admission, conditionally admit or expel aliens.
 633
  This right is not unqualified though, as 
                                                 
630 M. Kamto, Special Rapporteur, Second Report on the Expulsion of Aliens  (20 July 2006 UN General 
Assembly) (Online: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49997af60.html, accessed 29 December 
2012)  ‘Second Report’ at para 179.  At para 181 he goes on to point out that there is no requirement 
at international law that only a single State possesses the territory in question, or that the constituted 
components (either land or islands) be co-located, much less be geographically close to the main part 
of the State. 
631 Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 7 (Feb 3) at paras 42, 47.  Ibid at paras 183-184, this 
boundary can exist both on land and into the maritime zone for riparian States, and as a creature of 
both international and a States domestic law is a geographic delineation of the limit to which a State 
may fully enforce its laws. 
632 Ibid (Kamto) at para 185-186.  These are all considered ““checkpoints and, in international 
airports and certain ports, special areas for the detention of aliens denied entry or in the process of 
expulsion, and international areas where aliens are considered still outside the territory”. 
633 M. Kamto, Special Rapporteur Third Report on the expulsion of  aliens A/CN.4/581 at para 4, 




universal concepts of humanity and justice require States to also respect “the rights and 
freedom of foreigners who wish to enter their territory or who are already in it”, to the 
extent compatible with State security.
634
  Thus a State retains the ability to refuse an 
alien’s entry, even one who has formally filed an application for refugee status, provided 
they are not yet within the State’s territory or remain within “centers where candidates for 
admission to the country’s territory are detained”.
635
   This territorial distinction is 
critical, as aliens who have traversed beyond a State’s immigration control barriers and 
into the State’s territory are no longer subject to non-admission and may only be 
subjected to expulsion as will be further defined below.
636
   
Returning then to the territorial frontier zone of a State, it is conceptualized as 
more than a physical line separating territorial areas, but an international limit of State 
sovereignty and jurisdiction
637
 formed by a series of points delineating the furthest limits 
within which the legal order of a State is applicable, either on land or within the maritime 
environment.
638  Within this zone the State continues to exercise legislative, enforcement 
and adjudicative jurisdiction and can regulate activities therein, as it exists “at the limits 
of the territory of a State in which a national of another State no longer benefits from the 
status of resident alien and beyond which the national expulsion procedure is completed”, 
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although respect for dignity and fundamental human rights must still be observed.
639
  
In Canadian jurisprudence, Charter rights as they apply to individuals traversing 
or being held within such border crossing points or zones has been examined.  In the case 
of Dehghani v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), the SCC reviewed 
whether Mr. Dehghani was detained for the purposes of s.10(b) of the Charter, and 
whether he enjoyed s.7 rights with respect to access to legal counsel during this period 
and in the circumstances.
640
  Mr. Dehghani was seeking to enter Canada and while 
undergoing a secondary screening process his cell phone and laptop computer were 
searched.  In reviewing first whether this secondary screening procedure was a detention, 
the Court affirmed that there is no right for non-citizens to enter or remain in Canada.
641
 The 
Court then further held that within the context of a person seeking to enter Canada through a 
border crossing, the manner of search conducted was a relevant factor in determining what, if 
any, constitutional issues arose.
642
    In the circumstances the Court held that Mr. Dehghani’s 
liberty was restrained but he was not detained in the sense contemplated by s.10(b),
643
and 
then turned to the question of whether he had a right to counsel as a matter of fundamental 
                                                 
639 Supra note 630.  Therefore an alien subject to expulsion and present within one of these special 
areas is already considered expelled, as “the frontier cannot be treated as a line, but as a zone with 
limits fixed by State regulations according to the areas that are established there”. 
640 Dehghani v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 1053 
641 Ibid at 1070, citing Chiarelli v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1992 CanLII 87 
(SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711, at p. 733 where Sopinka J. stated that "[t]he most fundamental principle of 
immigration law is that non-citizens do not have an unqualified right to enter or remain in the country." 
642 Ibid at pp. 1069-1070, citing R. v. Simmons 1988 CanLII 12 (SCC), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495.  The court 
held that there were three disctinct forms of search that could be conducted, ranging from routine 
questioning and possibly an over-the-clothing pat down search, through to a secondary search that 
might involve a strip search, and culminating in an intrusive search of the person including body 
cavity searches, and reasoned that the more intrusive the search the justification required and 





justice under s.7.  The Court again noted that the concept of fundamental justice varied 
according to the circumstances, and that in these circumstances no such right was triggered 
and thus s.7 of the Charter did not apply to Mr. Dehghani.
644
   
From this I suggest that a number of critical issues are identified within the context of 
a frontier zone.  Foremost among these issues is the contextual nature of the application of 
the Charter, in that it may apply in certain circumstances but not in others.  Relevant factors 
that would assist in determining when Charter protections would apply include the reason for 
the restraint on liberty, what if any form of search is conducted and for what purpose 
(intrusiveness of the search), and what if any stigma arises from any search conducted.  In 
answering these questions, the presence and degree of Charter protections available to those 
within a frontier zone may be identified and conceptualized. 
I therefore propose that flagged and unflagged vessels stopped and boarded by 
Canadian warships, and individuals embarked onboard Canadian warships as the result of 
these boardings, should be considered to be within a Canadian maritime frontier zone.  
Despite the warship not forming an ‘official port of entry’ directly akin to a port, airport 
or land frontier post, this reasoning would recognize a number of interrelated issues that 
are then more easily addressed in determining what, if any, rights and obligations are 
triggered in the circumstances:   
1) First, the issue of whether the stopped vessel is flagged or unflagged assists in 
informing the Hape analysis that would be required.  As discussed, unflagged vessels 
enjoy no flag state protection on the high seas, and thus any concern for comity and 
sovereign equality would be absent as a factor to be considered.  In the event the 
                                                 




stopped vessel is flagged, Hape’s respect for comity and sovereign equality provide 
legal argument against the extension of Charter protections, but in the circumstances 
of a maritime boarding would then have to recognize that unlike Hape and Amnesty 
the extent of sovereignty exercised over a flagged vessel is not as strong as the 
territorial sovereignty examined in those cases. 
2) Next, the reason behind the boarding and search of the vessel and potentially its crew 
must be considered.  Again as recognized by the SCC in Dehghani, the reasons for a 
search conducted at a boarder crossing – or, as in my proposed analogy a “Canadian 
maritime frontier zone” – are an important factor to inform whether Charter rights 
and obligations are triggered in the circumstances.  This would be particularly true 
where Canadian agents are exercising domestic law enforcement authority, as 
compared to simply exercising the right of visit and search as provided for under 
UNCLOS. 
3) Lastly, the fact of whether the stopped vessel is merely boarded, or whether members 
onboard are embarked onto the Canadian warship, is a factor to be considered.  This 
factor recognizes the varying degrees of control extended over the vessel and those 
onboard, both de facto and de jure.  As described by the SCC in Simmons the degree 
of restraint on a person’s liberty is a critical factor in determining whether they are 
detained, and in the context of a maritime boarding would take on added 
significance, as while embarked in the Canadian warship one’s liberty is significantly 
reduced.  Should an individual be embarked onboard a Canadian warship a stronger 
argument could be made that at that point they benefit from the ship’s sovereign 




observation of IHRL rights, but again this would only be a factor to consider.  Such a 
finding would again be subject to the circumstances of their presence onboard the 
warship, whether compelled or by other reasons (such as safety of life), and would 
not necessarily require that the Charter and other protections become engaged.  
5.2  Attribution Within Coalition Operations   
HMC Ships frequently work alongside with, or under some degree of authority 
exercised by, foreign allied forces or international organizations such as NATO, and the 
question of attribution arises when Canadian actions are taken at the direction of these 
non-Canadian authorities.  Such coalition operations are not novel and as already 
discussed in section 2.5 this question has been the topic of significant international 
discussion, resulting in the creation of Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organizations.
645
  These ILC Draft Articles include “rules of attribution, 
excuses precluding wrongfulness, effects of a breach, and principles of reparations”, but 
codify only some principles of responsibility under customary international law while 
otherwise only proposing novel approaches to issues.
646
  As a starting point then, the 
Draft Articles provide guidance for responsibility over acts contrary to international law 
which are alleged to have been taken by State forces acting in concert with or under the 
direction of other States, or under the direction of IOs such as the UN or NATO.
647
  The 
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Draft Articles guide determination of apportionment of responsibility jointly and singly, 
and where appropriate would hold responsible the IO, participating member State or any 
combination thereof.
648
  The Draft Articles also recognize the law of responsibility and 
the use of lawful excuses to escape liability,
649
 and contemplate financial obligations for 
those found responsible for these wrongful acts.
650
  
A number of recent international decisions have built on the useful guidance 
provided by the Draft Articles regarding the apportionment of responsibility for wrongful 
acts under international law.  I will review a select number of these decisions: first, the 
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR’s rulings in Behrami v. France
651
 and Saramati v 
France,
652
 followed by the U.K. House of Lords decision on this issue in Al-Jedda.
653
  
These decisions all examined the question of attribution within the context of 
multinational forces operating under the authority of the UN Security Council and 
                                                                                                                                                 
responsibility as between the UN, NATO and / or the troop sending nation(s) involved for alleged 
violations of the laws of war, or actions taken in excess of the use of force authorized within the 
UNSCR. 
648 Supra note 646 at 2. 
649 Supra note 429 at art. 20, stating “The wrongfulness of an act of an international organization is 
precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence under 
international law”. 
650 Ibid, at art. 33 stating “Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act 
shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination, in 
accordance with the provisions of this chapter”.  Such an arrangement is not completely novel, as the 
Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, 
June 19, 1951 (4 U.S.T. 1792) at art. 8 provides a claims process between the members of NATO. 
651 Behrami v. France (Application No 71412/01)(2007) 45 EEHR SE 85.  This decision incorporated 
Article 5 of the Draft Articles, conduct of organs placed at the disposal of an IO by a State or another 
IO. 
652 Saramati v France, Germany and Norway (2007) 45 EHRR SE10; 46 ILM 746; (2008) 133 ILR 1. 
653 Supra note 251.  The majority opinion was written by Lord Bingham, writing for Baroness Hale 




highlight the complexity of applying competing human rights obligations within the 
context of multinational forces operating under a supra-national command, versus where 
States act unilaterally but pursuant to international authority.
654
   
In Behrami the UN Security Council authorized multinational forces to deploy 
into Kosovo under Chapter VII authority as part of “effective international civil and 
security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing 
the achievement of the common objectives”.
655
  Following the deaths of several children 
due to unexploded NATO cluster bombs, the Grand Chamber examined the question of 
attribution and noted that effective control over the area was being exercised at the time 
by the international presence, rather than the Yugoslav government.
656
  Finding that de-
mining operations at the relevant time were included within the UN mission’s 
mandate,
657
 the Grand Chamber attributed responsibility for this accident to the UN.
658
  
In Saramati compensation was sought for an alleged extra-judicial detention by security 
forces purportedly acting on behalf of the UN authorized Kosovo international security 
force.  In that instance the Grand Chamber again held that the detention was attributable 
                                                 
654 Supra note 67 at 155 – 156. 
655 Ibid at para 18 quoting from S.C. Res 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (6 May 1999). 
656 Supra note 651 at paras 69-70. 
657 Ibid at paras 123 – 127. 
658 Ibid at para 129.  Here the court used “delegate” to refer to the Security Council’s empowerment of 
another entity to exercise S.C. functions, in contrast to “authorizing” another entity to carry out 




to the UN, this time because while operational command had been delegated to individual 
State authorities, ultimate authority and control was retained by the UN.
659
   
The U.K. House of Lords examined the reasoning employed in Behrami and 
Saramati in the case of Al-Jedda, and reasoned that wrongful acts would be attributable 
to an IO where it exercised effective control over the conduct in question, where the State 
agents are fully seconded to the IO, in contrast to peace keeping operations where the 
State continues to exercise disciplinary and criminal jurisdiction over its forces.
660
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“In the present case, Chapter VII allowed the UNSC to adopt coercive measures in reaction to 
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660 Supra note 251 at para 5, stating: 
“The conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an international organization that 
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in the case of military contingents that a State placed at the disposal of the [UN] for a 
peacekeeping operation, since the State retains disciplinary powers and criminal jurisdiction 
over the members of the national contingent. In this situation the problem arises whether a 
specific conduct of the lent organ or agent has to be attributed to the receiving organization 




Applying this reasoning to the facts, the majority determined that:  U.K. forces were not 
placed at the disposal of, nor was effective control over their conduct exercised by, the 
UN; that the UN did not have effective command and control over U.K. forces; and that 
U.K. forces were not part of a UN peacekeeping force.
661
   The Strasbourg Court and 
Grand Chamber adopted this reasoning and result in subsequently examining this same 
situation in Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom.
662
  
Together these decisions put “flesh on the bones” of the ILC Draft Articles and 
support the proposition that wrongful acts committed by State forces acting under UN 
Security Council Chapter VII authority could be attributable to the UN rather than their 
States.
663
  This reasoning is not universally accepted, however, as critics argue that such a 
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a proper delegation of authority in this instance, as it had been in Kosovo. 
662 Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom (Application No 27021/08), 147 INTL 107 (7 July 2011).  At para 80 
the Grand Chamber relied upon the unified command structure that pre-dated Security Council 
resolution 1511, the fact that both US and U.K. forces continued to exercise government powers in 
Iraq, and that merely by requiring periodic reports on activities of the Multi-National Force the UN 
did not thereby assume any degree of control over the force or executive functions of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority.  At para 82 they further reasoned that repeated protests by UN organs against 
the use of security internments was evidence that the UN did not exercise requisite command and 
control of the military forces. 
663 Supra note 67 at 156.  See also Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v 




result is contrary to the general principle of international law that attribution is only found 
against those IOs exercising effective control over the operation, and not simply holding 
the ultimate source of legal authority.
664
  Critics reject the ‘ultimate authority and control’ 
jurisdiction test as ‘Top Down’ centric, and while acknowledging few alternatives are 
apparent,
665
 have proposed instead a ‘Bottom Up’ approach, asking: 
1. Is the detained individual within the ‘control’ of a prima facie State agent 
such as a soldier or sailor; if so then  




Using the ‘bottom up’ approach, if the detained person is under the control of a 
State agent (such as a soldier or sailor) AND that State agent is following orders, or 
effectively being controlled by superior State agents, then the sending State retains 
responsibility and no attribution to the IO can be found.  Arguing that this approach is 
more practical than the “theoretical approach” of the House of Lords and Grand Chamber 
in Al-Jedda,
667
 critics suggest that by using this analysis wrongful acts would be more 
                                                                                                                                                 
arguing  that international operations could  attribute to [any IO] the UN where operating as 
“subsidiary organs created under Chapter VII . . . (or) within the exercise of powers lawfully 
delegated by the Security Council” and would rely upon a finding that the UN Security Council was 
exercising ultimate authority and control’ as provided for under Chapter VII .  It was further argued 
that UNSC Resolutions could not ground attribution where ‘fundamental rights’ were involved.   
664 G Gaja (ILC Special Rapporteur) ‘Seventh Report on Responsibility of International Organizations 
(27 March 2009) UN Doc A/CN.4/610, 10 citing the ILC Draft Article 6 which states “The conduct of 
an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an international organization that is placed at the disposal 
of another international organization shall be considered under international law an act of the later 
organization if the organization exercises effective control over that conduct”.  See also supra note 67 
at 156. 
665 M Milanovic and T Papic, ‘As Bad as it Gets:  The European Court’s Behrami and Saramati Decision 
and General International Law’ (2009) 58 ICLQ 267, 294-5 at 273 and D Van der Toorn, ‘Attribution 
of Conduct by State Armed Forces Participating in UN-Authorized Operations:  The Impact of 
Behrami and Al-Jedda’ (2009) 15 Australian International Law Journal 9. 
666 Supra note 67 at 156-157. 
667 Ibid at 157 citing P Klein, ‘Responsabilite pur les faits commis dans le cadre d’operations de paix 
etendue du pouvoir de controle de la Cour europeenne des droits de l’homme:  quelques 




likely found to engage international responsibility on the part of multiple bodies (i.e. both 
troop-sending States and the IO in overall control), possibly even under separate and 
distinct obligations.
668
  Another criticism holds that the Al-Jedda autonomous 
characterization of international responsibility would allow States to downplay effective 
control over their agents in favour of ultimate legal authority vested elsewhere, thus 
avoiding responsibility.
669
   
In applying this attribution analysis to contemporary Canadian naval operations, 
the question must determine which entity exercises sufficient ‘effective control’ or 
‘factual control’ over the conduct in question – ranging from Canadian-only operations, 
through operations conducted under the authority of UN Security Council Resolutions 
and ultimately to operations where Canadian Forces are placed under measures of control 
of another authority, either another State or an International Organization.
670
  This review 
                                                                                                                                                 
627, stating ”one cannot start with the legal authority of the international organization and work 
backwards:  to do so is to take a purely theoretical approach at the expense of any analysis of the 
facts.  Legal authority is not the same thing as effective control; the latter is a fact-driven inquiry.  The 
only thing that ultimate legal authority might suggest is the possibility of joint responsibility between 
a State and an international organization.  One might be directly responsible for the wrongful 
conduct (i.e. where the official is acting as its organ), while the other might be in breach of a separate 
‘due diligence’ or similar obligation to take positive steps designed to secure effective human rights 
protection.  Where, for example, an international organization is in a position to regulate acts in 
territory under its legal or effective control it might perhaps be held responsible for failure to take 
measures to prevent certain abuses”. 
668 Matthews v United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application No 24833/94 (Judgment) 18 February 1999 at 
para 32; Bosphorus Airways v Ireland, ECtHR, Application No 45036/98 (Judgment) 30 June 2005, 
paras 152-158; Supra note 651 at paras 125, 129-130 (legal control/administration of territory); and 
cf Ila cu and Others v Moldova and Russia (2004) 40 EHRR 1030 paras 3325, 392-4 (holding Russia 
and Moldova jointly responsible for events in Transdniestria, Russia due to de facto control and 
Moldova due to de jure control). 
669 Supra note 67 at 157.This argument reasons that a State acting at the bequest or under the 
authority of another State does not detract from the issue of factual control over persons detained, 
but even where detention is onboard a State warship (and thus factual control is a given) the 
argument can be made that the detention is outside of international human rights protections in 
certain multilateral operations. 




of command and control being exercised over a ship’s operations would focus 
specifically on any unified or bifurcated command structure between Canadian 
authorities and that of the IO or other State.  Examining this question in the context of an 
allied contemporary naval operation, the European Naval Force operating off the coast of 
Somalia (“EUNAVFOR”) under Op ATALANTA employs a unified EU command 
structure extending from the EU Political and Security Committee, through an EU 
Operational Commander and Force Commander, to theatre level operations.
671
  Should a 
detainee held by an Op ATALANTA warship be transferred to another State, this 
decision if exercised by the ATALANTA Operation Commander without input from the 
European warship’s flag State could avoid national responsibility and applicable HR 
international treaty jurisdiction in favour of EUNAVFOR responsibility, as this would 
likely satisfy the Behrami test.
672
  Operation ATALANTA transfers of detainees are not, 
however, conducted in this way.  Instead, ATALANTA transfers are conducted under 
joint responsibility by requiring agreement from both the EU Operation Commander and 
that of the warship flag State.
673
  This use of joint-responsibility over detainee transfers is 
unique, and is not followed within NATO operations which see coalition forces revert to 
                                                 
671 Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP (10 November 2008) arts 3 and 6, European Union on 
Military Operation to Contribute to the Deterrence, Prevention and Repression of Acts of Piracy and 
Armed Robbery off the Somali Coast [2008] OJ L 301/33 (‘EUNAVFOR Joint Action’).  Under this 
command and control system, Article 12 outlines the EUNAVFOR process regarding holding and 
transferring of suspected pirates, however the precise decision making procedure for transfers is not 
provided for.  Using the attribution analysis described, should a transfer decision be exercised.   
672 Supra note 651 at paras 132-139, and would ask who precisely holds the authority to order the 
transfer of detainees.   The Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-first session (4 May-5 
June and 6 July-7 August 2009) A/64/10 at pp. 69-70, citing with approval the majority of the House 
of Lords in Al-Jedda, supra note 251 apparently endorsing the ECHR decision in Behrami, supra note 
651, in that the conclusion reached “appears to be in line with the way in which the criterion of 
effective control was intended”. 








5.3 The Canadian Maritime Frontier Zone, Attribution and Contemporary RCN 
Operations 
 Given the significant differences between the three sets of contemporary naval 
operations being contemplated, I will now apply my proposal for a Canadian maritime 
frontier zone to these operations individually.  Lawful authority for each operation, as 
well as the context of the operations and degree of extra-State control over HMC Ships, 
varies and as a result each operation is deserving of separate consideration. 
  
5.3.1 Support to OGD As described, RCN support to OGDs recognizes that the 
individual federal departments will in most situations retain overall responsibility as lead 
for the operation, with the RCN frequently supporting with manpower, equipment and 
expertise.  RCN ships supporting these missions, either law enforcement or support to 
DFO, are therefore acting in accordance primarily with domestic statutory authority, and 
any resultant detentions will be authorized and governed first by this domestic authority.  
While international law will also play a part, particularly with regards to where the 
operation may occur and the basis for extra-territorial extension of Canadian jurisdiction, 
these requirements have in large part already been incorporated into Canadian legislation.  
Likewise any follow-on actions taken with regards to the detainees, ranging from 
decisions to release, where to hold the detainees (onboard their own vessel or embarked 
in the RCN warship) and subsequent disposition of the detainee, are again largely within 





the domestic authority of the lead OGD.  For these reasons, discussion of detainee rights 
and recommended mitigation strategies in the context of RCN support to OGD lead 
missions will be brief.  Detentions under the authority of domestic law enforcement 
agencies rely primarily on domestic legislation as permitted under international law, and 
are limited in purpose and jurisdictional reach by their enabling legislation.  Within the 
context of maritime operations such detentions would most likely range from brief 
“investigative” detentions onboard the target vessel to detaining suspects onboard an 
RCN warship for transit back to Canada for further law enforcement purposes.  While 
naval personnel might be employed in a sentry capacity, any such employment would 
most likely be in support of an embarked, lawfully appointed peace officer and the 
overriding purpose of such detentions would be to bring the prisoner back to Canada to 
commence criminal proceedings.  From the perspective of individual rights and State 
obligations however, regardless of the lead OGD agency involved it will remain a 
Canadian State responsibility to observe any rights and obligations engaged. 
 In these operations the purpose of the detention would of necessity drive 
the finding of when rights and corresponding obligations are triggered for those 
detained.
675
   Given that such an operation would be at the request of Canadian law 
enforcement these rights and obligations would be no different than those provided for in 
other Canadian criminal law contexts, with the sole exception of circumstances imposed 
by the location of the detention, i.e. at sea and away from Canadian courts.  In the case of 
DFO detentions, the most common activity would require only a brief period of 
investigative detention while evidence is gathered and, potentially, offence tickets are 
                                                 




issued.  Taking place onboard the target vessels for Canadian law enforcement purposes, 
such activity would provide sufficient control over the place and person as to extend 
Charter rights; however it would not necessarily entitle those onboard further rights 
under other Canadian Legislation.  In extreme situations like that of the ESTAI, however, 
detentions could include holding the suspects for longer periods in order to bring them 
back to Canada to be dealt with by Canadian courts.  Such detentions would most 
commonly be made onboard the detainee’s own vessel, but in situations where concerns 
exist for security and continuity of evidence, the prisoner could be embarked within the 
HMC Ship.  Again, as in situations of support to law enforcement, any naval personnel 
employed in a sentry capacity would be acting in support of an embarked, lawfully 
appointed fisheries officer and the overriding purpose of such detentions would be to 
bring the prisoner back to Canada to commence criminal proceedings.
676
  Likewise, 
detained individuals again would be able to raise allegations that any of their rights were 
breached during the course of their prosecution, remedy again ranging from criminal or 
civil sanction against those involved to exclusion of evidence or other remedy by 
Canadian courts.   
5.3.2  Counter-Piracy Operations Unlike missions in support of OGDs, contemporary 
counter-piracy operations rely upon a blend of international and domestic legal 
authorities.  Those operations are conducted pursuant to the blended authority and 
jurisdiction provided by customary international law, UNCLOS and SUA, together with 
UN Security Council Resolutions.
677
   These resolutions are expressed in terms normally 
                                                 
676 Supra note 49 Jose Pereira E Hijos, S.A. v. Canada (Attorney General), where the court permitted 
that Charter rights including the right to counsel without delay could be found in such circumstances. 




used by the Security Council when authorizing the use of armed force by State 
members,
678
 but here authorize ‘necessary means … for the repression of piracy on the 
high seas’.  These UNSCRs imbue participating States with quasi-law enforcement 
authority and employ IHRL as the lex specialis, in contrast to situations where UNSCRs 
authorize the use of armed force within the lex specialis of IHL.
679
   This language, 
viewed through the lens of my analysis above and in keeping with the principle of 
complementarity, may as a consequence have the effect of qualifying otherwise 
applicable human rights obligations with regards to those detained as part of authorized 
counter-piracy operations.  For example, while the conditions of detention and 
adjudicative process normally guaranteed by the ICCPR and Canadian Charter are 
uniformly high, in the situation where individuals are detained off the coast of Somalia as 
alleged pirates and then transferred to regional states for prosecution and possibly 
incarceration, the judicial process used will most certainly not observe Charter 
guarantees nor will the conditions of imprisonment match that seen in Canada.   
Another consequence of the language found in these UNSCRs is the possible 
affect they may have on the interpretation of domestic legal obligations applicable in 
these contemporary missions.  While acting under Security Council authorizations, 
authority under international law is thereby created and actions taken by Canadian naval 
forces are thus qualified – the recourse being to withdraw Canadian forces from 
participating in order to not subvert the international system of collective security.  This 
particular issue was present on the facts within the Amnesty Canada case, however 
                                                 
678 Supra note 94 at 841, and supra note 68 (UNSCR 1851) where the Council expresses concern for 
‘pirates being released without facing justice’. 




unfortunately the court declined to consider the qualifying affect of the UN Charter and 
UNSCRs on domestic obligations, relying instead primarily on R. v. Hape and the SCC’s 
reasoning which did not engage this factor after the Rule 107 motion was decided.  
Moving forward however it can be argued that these two cases, read together, 
demonstrate that in an international operation the effect of domestic law can be shaped by 
UN Charter, applicable UNSCRs and international humanitarian law, and that this added 
complexity will affect a State’s obligations towards those detained as part of UN 
authorized operations. 
For HMC Ships detaining suspected pirates, the first issue will be the existence or 
lack of flag State jurisdiction in the suspected piracy vessel.  To date most suspected 
pirate attacks have been launched from unflagged vessels, a significant issue as any 
concern for comity between States is thereby removed.  This was a critical factor for the 
courts in Hape and Amnesty in finding that the Charter could not be exported in a manner 
that would displace existing laws or without permission of the affected State.  Next is the 
location of the detention.  On the high seas RCN ships can exercise the universal 
prescriptive jurisdiction over piracy found in UNCLOS, and the qualified jurisdiction 
over offences contrary to SUA, as no other State enjoys jurisdictional claims over these 
matters beyond their own territorial or archipelagic waters (with some exceptions, not 
applicable and already discussed).  Likewise, within the territorial waters of Somalia and 
with the acquiescence of the Somali government, HMC Ships may exercise the expanded 
jurisdiction created by the applicable UNSCRs.  In either event, the lawfulness of any 




UNSCRs, as both domestic and international lawful authority must exist for the 
detention.   
Once detained, the reasonableness of any search and seizure of the suspected 
pirates would become an issue, as would their access to applicable judicial proceedings.  
In the event suspected pirates are returned to Canada for prosecution the full panoply of 
Charter and Canadian Criminal law protections would apply, which are beyond the scope 
of this paper.  If however Canada conducts a disposition of suspected pirates pursuant to 
an agreement to a third party State, such as Kenya, a more nuanced legal regime would 
likely apply.  In Canada the act of extradition
680
 is governed by the Extradition Act
681
 and 
involves a bilateral agreement between the sending and receiving States.
682
  In contrast the 
act of deportation
683
 is only cited in the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act
684
 
                                                 
680 Supra note 630 at para 159-160, and M. Kamto, ‘Sixth Report on the Expulsion of Aliens, 
International Law Commission’ UN Doc A/CN.4/625 (2010) at para 44.  Extradition is described as 
an exercise of judicial authority and cooperation between States to surrender a person from one 
State to another by reason of “a criminal prosecution or sentence by the second party and is sought 
to stand trial or to serve a sentence there” and consists of both the domestic law of the sending State 
and a bilateral or multilateral treaty with the receiving State. Such agreements normally involve the 
principle of ‘reciprocity’, referring to an agreement between States sharing such an international 
agreement to surrender, subject to Stated conditions or provisions, all persons requested under the 
agreement.  See 1957 European Convention on Extradition, art 1 which provides that all parties 
“undertake to surrender to each other, subject to the provisions and conditions laid down in this 
Convention, all persons against whom the competent authorities of the requesting Party are 
proceeding for an offence or who are wanted by the said authorities for the carrying out of a sentence 
or detention order”. 
681 Extradition Act, S.C. 1999, c.18 governs extraditions from persons in Canada.  Article 3(1) of the 
Act states that extraditions may only be granted for the purpose of prosecuting the person or 
imposing or enforcing a sentence imposed on a person, to designated States or entities, as set out 
within Part 2 of the Act.   
682 Supra note 630 at para 161.  See also ICJ, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 
Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United 
Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 24, where four 
members of the ICJ recognized the propriety of US and U.K. requests for the extradition of two Libyan 
nationals from Libya in connection with the Lockerbie incident, and the lawfulness of Libya’s refusal 
to extradite these individuals – particularly where its domestic law prohibited such extradition. 
683 Deportation– see supra note 680 (M. Kamto) at para 64 citing Mohamed and Another v. President 




and involves the unilateral act of expelling an alien found to be illegally within a State’s 
territory.  These actions are commonly understood when taken with regard to non-
citizens found within State territory,
685
 but not so well in the context of non-citizens 
detained extra-territorially.    Such an action is commonly known as a transfer, and in 
other circumstances involves a sending State responding to a foreign State or other 
international body’s request to make the concerned individual available to their 
jurisdiction either to appear personally, to give evidence, or to otherwise assist an 
investigation.
686
  While similar to extradition, the legal basis for a transfer is primarily 
within the realm of international law.
687
  International agreements such as Status of 
Forces Agreements (“SOFA”)
688
 or treaties (commonly known as “Mutual Legal 
                                                                                                                                                 
at para 155. The term deportation is linked historically and with regards to the Laws of War as the 
“forced displacement or forced transfer of individuals or groups of the civilian population - who are 
protected persons under the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 - from an occupied 
territory” – see Agreement concerning Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of 
the European Axis, London, 8 August 1945, UNTS, vol. 82, No. 251, p. 288.  M. Kamto proposes this 
link due to the language found in Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg, which referred to “the deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian 
population of or in occupied territory”, as a crime that fell within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and 
incurred individual responsibility. 
684 Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24 (Schedule: Provisions of Rome 
Statute) (War Crimes Act) at art. 7.1(d), defined as the “forced displacement of the persons 
concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, 
without grounds permitted under international law”. 
685 Supra note 630 at para 177.  See also supra note 115 at paras 45, 113 – 115 and 118, holding that 
deportation only applies to non-nationals as no State can expel its own nationals. 
686 Ibid at para 174, also described as “the forced movement of individuals from one State to another, 
in other words, beyond its frontier”. 
687 Supra note 630 at para 177.  In contrast, extradition as explained ibid, is a consensual act between 
two States, combining domestic law with international treaties or customary law as the lawful basis 
to remove the individual. 
688 Queens Regulations & Orders Volume IV – Appendix 2.4 Agreement between the Parties to the 
North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces  provides at Article VII for State military 
authorities to exercise criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction over their own forces when located 
within the territory of other party States.  Where concurrent jurisdiction between the host State and 
the sending State is created by virtue of the nature of the offence committed, rights of primary and 




Assistance Treaties”, or MLATs) oblige party States to carry out transfers upon request 
are common,
689
 and contemporary experiences with transfers have largely developed due 
to the creation of a number of international criminal courts
690
 including the ICTY
691
 and 
the International Criminal Court (“ICC”).
692
  The use of transfers has not been without 
controversy however, particularly with regards to the use of “extrajudicial transfers” 
following the events of September 11, 2001.
693
  For a few years these extrajudicial 
transfers, also termed “extraordinary renditions”, saw an increase both in volume and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
consideration” to requests to surrender their jurisdiction over an offence when such a request is 
made by other party States.  Further, State authorities agree to assist other State parties to the 
Agreement by arresting and handing over affected persons.   (Online: 
http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/qro-orf/vol-04/appendix-appendic-02-04-eng.asp). 
689 The UN General Assembly adopted a model treaty for mutual assistance in criminal matters in 
1990 at General Assembly resolution 45/117, 14 December 1990, Article 13, para 1. This model 
treaty contemplates a sending State transferring an individual to the requesting State (or body), 
subject to the individuals consent, agreement of the sending State, and provided the transfer is 
permitted by the sending States domestic law. 
690 Ibid at para 175.  See for example the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (“ICTY”), UN Security Council Resolution 827, S/RES 827 (1993) 25 
May 1993, which provides within the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev. 38 (13 June 
2006) adopted 23 April 1996, that the ICTY may request that a suspect held in custody by a State be 
transferred to the Tribunal at Rule 40, or that a State-detained witness be transferred at Rule 90 bis 
(adopted 6 October 1995). 
691 The transfer of Slobodan Milosevic, former President of the Federal Socialist Republic of 
Yugoslavia, from Serbia and Montenegro is described at Konstantinos Magliveras, The Interplay 
Between the Transfer of Slobodan Milosevic to the ITCY and Yugoslav Constitutional Law, EJIL (2002), 
Vol 13 No 3, 661-677 (Online: http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org /content/13/3/661.full.pdf). 
692 Supra note 214 (Rome Statute) art 58-60.  These articles actually uses the term “surrender”, 
however as noted by M. Kamto, Special Rapporteur for the UN in his Second Report (Supra note 630), 
no distinction is created through the use of this term.  The ICC used similar authority under Article 59 
to order the transfer, or “surrender” of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo from the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) for subsequent prosecution – see International Criminal Court Warrant of Arrest dated 
10 February 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06(Online: http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc191959.PDF). 
693 Supra note 630 at para 176.  The first contemporary use of the extrajudicial transfer occurred in 
1989, when US forces entered Panama, in part to seize the former leader General Manuel Noriega and 
bring him to American courts for prosecution.  In this instance General Noriega was then provided 
the benefit of legal due process both under American criminal law, but also under IHL as a prisoner 
of war – see Matthew Reichstein, Extradition of General Manual Noriega: An Application of 
International Criminal and Humanitarian Law to answer the Question, If so, Where Should He Go, 22 




number of countries participating in the practice.
694
  Despite that surge in use however, 
the US Supreme Court found these extraordinary renditions to be unconstitutional.
695
  







 converge at the point of any subsequent 
prosecution of suspected pirates.  States are encouraged, but not obliged, to cooperate in 
the prosecution of suspected pirates,
699
 and may transfer suspected pirates to other States 
for prosecution.
700
  As a result, two practices have emerged.  The first practice is known 
as “burden-sharing” and involves the transfer of suspected pirates from capturing 
warships to regional States for prosecution and, if necessary, punishment.
701
  Under 
international law, jurisdiction can validly be claimed by the seizing State or IO, another 
State within the region affected by piracy, a State with strong links to the offence, or even 
the pirate’s own State of nationality.  The practice of burden sharing has therefore been 
suggested to be an act of a political, rather than a legal, matter.
702
  Key to the burden-
                                                 
694 Ibid at para 176. and at para 235, where the author highlights that the judicial reasoning used by 
American authorities in the context of the Iraq conflict beginning in 2003 to transfer detainees from 
that State to US detention facilities was the same reasoning used to transfer Maher Arar from the US 
to Syrian authorities in September 2002. 
695 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), where the court held that the detention and proposed 
style of prosecution of these ‘unlawful combatants’ was contrary to the Geneva Conventions. 
696 Supra note 357. 
697 Supra note 358. 
698 Supra note 359. 
699 Supra note 38 (UNCLOS) at art 100, urging States to “cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the 
repression of piracy”. 
700 Ibid at art 105 
701 Supra note 67 at 145, and supra note 59 at 169-170.  It should be noted that this contemporary 
practice uses regional states, although any state with domestic authority to prosecute pirates could 
perform this role. 




sharing practice and of consequence to the detaining warship is the lawfulness of the 
manner and arrangement used to move the suspected pirate from the seizing State’s 
forces to the State exercising judicial jurisdiction.  While extradition has been suggested 
as a means to carry out this practice
703
 it has not been used in contemporary instances.
704
 
Instead, States have more commonly simply transferred the suspected pirates to the 
regional State for prosecution.
705
 
These transfers involve the detaining State making the suspected pirate(s) 
available to another State’s jurisdiction for subsequent judicial proceedings and have 
become known as ‘dispositions’.
706
  These dispositions have been encouraged by the UN 
Security Council, but precise procedures are not set out and thus a number of ad hoc 
processes have emerged largely governed by agreements between the detaining forces 
and receiving States.
707
  Canada has publically concluded one agreement with Kenya, and 
while the precise details are not publically available the UN Secretary General report of 
26 July 2010 states that Canada may request to transfer suspected pirates to Kenya based 
upon a number of factors including evidence gathered to support a prosecution.
708
  This 
                                                 
703 While UNCLOS is silent in this regards, supra note 299 (SUA) obliges the extradition or 
prosecution of suspects by the detaining State at art 10. 
704 Supra note 59 at 187-191, where the author also canvases ibid (SUA) art 8 authorizing the ship’s 
master of a State party to SUA to ‘deliver’ anyone suspected of committed any offence contrary to the 
offences listed at art. 8.  It is likewise pointed out that this mechanism has not been used, likely as the 
authority at art 8 does not extend to those commanding warships. 
705 Ibid a t 191. 
706 Ibid at 192-194. 
707 Ibid at 194, further discussing procedures used by EUNAVFOR, NATO and national contingents at 
194-196.  As pointed out however, NATO has not concluded any arrangements for the disposition of 
suspected pirates, rather ships operating as part of the NATO Operation Ocean Shield revert to their 
national control for disposition authority, which may include transfer. 
708 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 July 2010, S/2010/394, (Online: 




agreement also requires that those detained be treated in accordance with international 
human rights standards.
709
  To date, no public information has been made available 
indicating Canada has transferred suspected pirate detainees as the result of this 
agreement. 
The second emerging practice seen in contemporary counter-piracy operations is 
that of ‘catch-and-release’,
710
 which despite domestic Canadian authority to prosecute 
and the availability of the Kenyan transfer agreement has been the only option used by 
RCN forces to date.
711
  Under this practice, suspected pirates are retained onboard their 
own vessels and not embarked onboard HMC Ships, while piracy equipment and 
weapons are disposed of on site.  Thus suspected pirates, to date only found onboard 
flagless vessels, have likely remained outside the frontier zone necessary to extend 
Canadian jurisdiction and while they may fall with the authority and control of Canadian 
forces, do not find themselves within Canadian effective control of territory. 
Should Canada commence dispositions of suspected pirates in accordance with 
the Kenyan or another similar transfer agreement, suspected pirates would likely need to 
be brought onboard the warship for evidence collection and safety thus placing them 
more fully within the maritime frontier zone of the HMC Ship.  At this point the series of 
factors set out by the SCC in Simmons and discussed with regards to the proposed 
maritime frontier zone are engaged in determining if this constitutes a “detention”, and if 
                                                 
709 Ibid. 
710 Supra note 68 (UNSCR 1897) at para 8, noting with concern that some suspected pirates were 
“released without facing justice, regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to support 
prosecution”. 





so what if any Charter protections apply.  With regards to the transfer however, a central 
question would likely focus on issues of refoulement.  International jurisprudence has 
held that “mere words of assurance” are insufficient to vouchsafe detainees transferred to 
States with questionable human rights records, but Canadian courts have been 
significantly more deferential to such agreements.  In any event, the provisions of the 
transfer agreement in question would likely be examined, and provided sufficient 
mechanisms are in place to provide for both Canadian and impartial third party access to 
those transferred it is unlikely that such dispositions would be successfully challenged.  
The only remaining question would be what, if any, right an alleged pirate has to apply 
under Canadian law for determination of their status under the IRPA.  As the SCC in 
Singh and Jallow have already refused to see the Charter employed as a sword 
compelling the extension of IRPA rights outside of the territory of Canada, combined 
with the fact that alleged pirates are, absent additional facts, not protected by the Refugee 
Convention, it again is unlikely any such claim would succeed. 
 
5.3.3  Counter Drug Trafficking Operations - Op CARIBBE  Borrowing largely from 
the reasoning applied to counter-piracy operations, individuals detained in the course of 
Op CARIBBE counter-narcotics operations by the RCN face many similar legal issues 
but with a number of different factors at play.  Current Op CARIBBE missions see US 
Coast Guard LEDETs apprehend, detain and oversee the transfer of alleged narcotics 
smugglers.  Those individuals detained by the USCG LEDETs are of necessity brought 
on board the host warship for further transfer to the U.S. and prosecution within the 




proceedings. At this point in Op CARIBBE deployments it is likely that HMC Ships 
support by providing surveillance, refueling USCG helicopters carrying prisoners, and 
now with LEDETs embarked may also support the boarding of suspected smuggling 
vessels for the purpose of detaining suspected smugglers.  In any event, much as is the 
case with support to Canadian law enforcement operations the overriding purpose of such 
detentions would be to bring the prisoner back for subsequent criminal proceedings.   
As an international effort to combat the trafficking of narcotics, persons are 
detained in a law enforcement capacity as suspects in a crime.  The form this operation 
takes is unique, however, as the RCN warship would CHOP
712
 to the operational, or 
effective, control of the embarked USCG personnel for the purpose of supporting a U.S. 
domestic law enforcement action.  As described by the ILC Draft Articles and supported 
by the decisions in Al-Jedda and Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, such an assumption of 
both ultimate authority and control of the mission and effective control over the detained 
person would likely be sufficient to find any detention attributable to the USCG, who 
themselves are acting in accordance with permissive American lawful authority.  
Provided that any action taken following the CHOP from Canadian to USCG control did 
not retain some residual Canadian authority to influence the transfer, the transfer would 
likely be fully attributable to U.S. authorities.  As well, provided the detention of these 
individuals continues to be deemed lawful and not contrary to international human rights 
obligations (such as was seen in Khadr and Khadr II), it is unlikely that the Charter will 
be held to apply to these actions. 
                                                 




American authorities have long argued (and without challenge to date) that the 
lawful authority for these detentions is the result of permissive international law 
condemning the transport of narcotics internationally combined with expansive U.S. 
domestic law permitting such enforcement action.  By contrast, Canada does not share 
similar domestic legal authority and thus lacks the required combination of international 
and domestic authority to take similar enforcement action unilaterally.  This factor, 
together with the obvious exercise of Crown prerogative in a matter of high policy, would 
likely be significant factors in any judicial challenge mounted against participation in Op 
CARIBBE detentions and transfers.   
Likewise, as with counter-piracy detentions questions of refoulement would arise, 
but would likely receive much the same treatment.  Suspected narcotic smugglers would 
be as unlikely to find shelter under the Refugee Convention as suspected pirates, and 
Canadian jurisprudence would likely see little difference between such claims with 
regards to any Charter argument that the IRPA should be available extra-territorially in 
such situations.  In the same vein any examination of the transfer agreements used would 
balance the insufficiency of “mere words of assurance” where questionable human rights 
records exist against Canadian jurisprudence, including Amnesty, which accorded greater 
deference to the sufficiency of such agreements.  Regardless, while the effected transfer 
agreement could be examined, much as with counter-piracy transfer agreements provided 
sufficient mechanisms were in place to assure Canadian and impartial third party access 





CHAPTER 6:  CONCLUSION   
 
From the foregoing discussion and analysis of select contemporary RCN maritime 
operations, the confluence of international and domestic legal considerations and perils is 
both complex and unclear.  Unlike previous generations of sailors concerned primarily 
with situations of international armed conflict, epitomized by naval operations of WWII 
and the Korean conflict, today’s sailors find themselves on a far different ‘legal sea’.  
This new environment requires not only adherence to the recognized IHL concepts of 
caring for a defeated and captured enemy, but also requires consideration of a vast array 
of domestic and international law that themselves remain unsettled.  This question of 
what IHRL to apply in any given situation on the dynamic ocean of contemporary 
operations is far from settled, and it behooves naval leaders to address this uncertainty 
head on. 
As evidence of the lack of consideration such contemporary operations have 
received, current Canadian Forces regulations in this regard are comprised only of the 
Prisoner-of-War Status Determination Regulations.
713
  This regulation was drafted in 
contemplation of ad hoc tribunals
714
 applying the lex specialis of IHL
715
 to determine 
prisoner-of-war status for detained individuals who had committed belligerent acts.
716
  
                                                 
713 Prisoner-of-War Status Determination Regulations (SOR/91-134) pursuant to the Geneva 
Conventions Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. G-3)  (“POW Regulations”). 
714 Ibid at art 7 – 9.  A tribunal established under this authority would be convened following a 
request from the detaining unit’s commanding officer, and if a designated higher authority remained 
in doubt following review an investigation would be caused into the status of the detainee.  Of note, 
no qualification is provided for in the regulation for the investigator. 




Despite the POW regulations remaining in force since 1991, no published instance of use 
could be found.
717
  Furthermore, current CAF doctrine speaks to five classes of detainees, 
none of which directly considers the nature of contemporary maritime operations as 
discussed here.
718
   
From my examination of Canadian and international jurisprudence and analysis of 
contemporary naval operations, a number of inter-related principles emerge which I 
would propose be applied going forward: 
 
1. The Charter is a constitutional document related to Canadian public order, and 
like the ECHR for European State parties is intended to operate within the context 
                                                                                                                                                 
716 Supra note 713 at art 3 -7.  Tribunals consisting of a single officer of the Legal Branch who would, 
“when directed by the authority who established the tribunal, hold a hearing to determine whether a 
detainee brought before it is entitled to prisoner-of-war status”.  Only those detainees for whom 
there was doubt with respect to entitlement of POW status would be so entitled to a hearing, this 
decision held by the Authority defined at art 3 as the Minister of National Defence, Chief of Defence 
Staff, an officer commanding a command or formation, and any other authority appointed by the CDS.  
At art 10-13 the detainee is to be represented by an “officer or non-commissioned member” without 
further qualification, while art. 17 permits a right of appeal (termed a “review”) conducted by the 
designated higher authority and again, no further qualification is required. 
717 Supra note 14, 8:20.40 at 8-16. 
718 Supra note 14, 8:20.40 at 8-13 citing B-GJ-005-110/FP-020, Prisoner of War Handling, Detainees 
and Interrogation & Tactical Questioning in International Operations (January 8, 2004).  The 
categories are as follows:  
Category 1:  Belligerents, including armed civilians, who commit a hostile act, demonstrate hostile 
intent or otherwise obstruct friendly forces in the conduct of operations. 
Category 2:  Non-belligerents who commit an assault on any member of the friendly forces, who 
attempt to steal or loot friendly or protected property, or who commit any serious offence as 
designated by the component commander. 
Category 3:  Non-belligerents who enter or attempt to enter without authority any area controlled by 
friendly forces, or who obstruct the progress of friendly forces, whether by demonstration, riot or 
other means. 
Category 4:  Belligerents or non-belligerents who are suspected of having committed War Crimes, 
Crimes Against Humanity, or any other breach of humanitarian or human rights law. 





of a territorial ‘legal space’ or espace juridique – protections from these 
constitutional documents are not designed to be applied throughout the world, 
even in respect of the conduct of the respective State actors, thus any extra-
territorial application is found on an exceptional basis only. 
 
2. The concept of jurisdiction is legally distinct from the concept of state 
responsibility.  While state responsibility for acts may be found despite a lack of 
recognized state jurisdiction, under Article 32(1) of the Charter jurisdiction is an 
autonomous concept that applies to all Canadian State actors but does not 
necessarily create enforceable rights for those affected. 
 
3. The Charter, including Article 32(1), and Canadian obligations under 
international law should be interpreted in harmony with the general principles of 
international law when determining extra-territorial jurisdiction. 
 
4. The obligation under Article 32(1) to secure Charter rights and obligations to 
those within its jurisdiction is not dependent on the nature or quality of the alleged 
Charter breach - jurisdiction under Article 32(1), and by extension jurisdiction for 
all Canadian domestic and international legal obligations, is an indivisible matter 
and cannot be divided or tailored in accordance with the circumstances of an 
extra-territorial act in question. 
 
5. As an exception to the principle of sovereign equality and comity, effective 
control over the relevant area (in the context of maritime operations, the HMC 
Ship, unlike a Canadian base or presence inside a foreign State as was the case in 
Afghanistan) and authority and control of the person must be established both in 
fact and law (de facto and de jure) for Charter jurisdiction to be found.  Control 
of the person alone is insufficient to establish Charter jurisdiction or trigger 





6. Charter jurisdiction and Canadian human rights obligations are not ‘living 
instruments’ and do not expand the narrowly defined categories of cases in which 
jurisdiction is recognized extra-territorially. 
 
7. Canadian State actors are individually responsible to adhere to international 
human rights norms as imported into Canadian law; this does not however engage 
Canadian State responsibility to extend the protection of the Charter. 
 
Based upon these principles and with regards to the contemporary operations 
discussed within this paper, I therefore propose the following: 
 
1. Ships and individuals sailing in them on the high seas are beyond both the 
Canadian frontier line and any Canadian maritime frontier zone. HMC Ships 
which hail and query these vessels do not bring them within either their effective 
control or authority and control, and these vessels are not entitled to Canadian 
enforcement jurisdiction nor observance of IHRL or Canadian domestic legal 
rights and obligations as a consequence of such limited action; 
 
2. Any boarding or subsequent detention of ships and individuals sailing within 
them may only lawfully be conducted either under exclusive Canadian domestic 
authority, normally the exercise of the Crown prerogative, or under a domestic 
authority coupled with international authority including international agreements 
such as UNCLOS and SUA, customary international law, and U.N. Security 
Council Resolutions.  
 
3. Ships and individuals sailing in them may be brought within a Canadian maritime 
frontier zone upon being boarded by RCN sailors acting as Canadian State agents.  
The extent and nature of this Canadian maritime frontier zone would likely be 
dependent upon the reason for the boarding, the degree of effective control 




individuals both de facto and de jure.  Dependent upon the extent and nature of 
the Canadian maritime frontier zone found in a boarding situation, Charter and 
IHRL rights and obligations may become engaged.   
 
4. Where individuals are subsequently brought onboard Canadian warships in the 
course of boarding operations, this will be an additional factor to be considered in 
determining the nature of the Canadian maritime frontier zone and any rights and 
obligations triggered.  At this point observance of both the Canadian Charter and 
IHRL rights and obligations is more likely to become engaged, however may be 
tempered by the circumstances of the Canadian and, if applicable, international 
authority permitting the detention. 
 
5. Any requirement for observance of Canadian Charter and IHRL rights and 
obligations does not automatically trigger rights provided under other Canadian 
Acts, including the IRPA, and those detained within the proposed Canadian 
maritime frontier zone are not automatically entitled to avail themselves of those 
Acts. 
 
6. Factors that likely will be considered in finding effective control over the vessel 
and authority and control over the person, both de facto and de jure, include 
whether the boarded vessel is flagless or deemed flagless, the effect of the UN 
Charter and any applicable Security Council Resolutions, and whether the actions 
can be attributed to another State or IO. 
 
7. Any Charter or IHRL rights or obligations breached while detained within a 
Canadian maritime frontier zone during contemporary maritime operations, or as 
the result of being transferred to another State following detention, may be 
redressed in Canadian Federal court proceedings or, if sufficiently grave, before 





8. Canadian sailors, acting as State agents in the detention or subsequent transfer of 
individuals during contemporary maritime operations, may become liable under 
Canadian criminal or civil jurisdiction for any breach of detainee IHRL rights.  
 
Moving forward, naval leaders and planners of the RCN and CAF have not yet 
benefited from the same rich judicial consideration of rights and obligations owed by 
Canadian Forces when detaining individuals extra-territorially.  The diverse nature of 
contemporary operations does not show any sign of diminishing, nor does a return to 
strictly IHL dominated operations seem likely.  Naval leaders and planners alike must 
recognize this reality and are advised to move forward, engaging with legal experts to 
create and implement policy and doctrine that acknowledges these contemporary 
operations and provides useful guidance for, and legal protection over, the officers and 
sailors called upon to execute those missions.  If we as Canadians are to judge our Navy 
by how well it treats its prisoners, we must first give the RCN the necessary tools to 
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